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Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by beefhash on Friday February 14, 2020 @12:14AM (#22324123)
Notably from the changelog:

It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:34AM (#22324423)
Just for fun, most users on Github have RSA keys exclusively.

Did you know that your SSH keys are public on Github?

https://github.com/taylorotwell.keys

https://github.com/alexcrichton.keys

https://github.com/andrew.keys

https://github.com/egoist.keys

https://github.com/fabpot.keys

Some of the most popular users even have DSS keys.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by zimmerfrei on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:50AM (#22324492)
You are conflating RSA (the algorithm) with "ssh-rsa" (the option of the SSH suite indicating authentication with RSA in combination with SHA-1). They deprecate the latter.

Other options also based on RSA such as "rsa-sha2-256/512" are fine and will remain supported. In other words, the security problem is not with RSA per se.

Having said that, I have not checked whether the people you list have RSA keys bound to SHA-1...

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by mkj on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:00AM (#22324535)
The keys themselves are not bound to sha1 or sha256. The hash is just used for the ephemeral signatures during authentication (or certificates as mentioned in the release notes). "ssh-rsa" signature scheme at runtime (sha1) will be deprecated, but rsa keys themselves are fine (edit typo name)
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by tialaramex on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:32AM (#22324685)
Indeed, and so to actually use this $50k attack on SSH you'd need to somehow arrange for your target to pick random numbers you expected so that your attack works. But for clarity, OpenSSH isn't saying this can be used against SSH today - the deprecation is because we should abandon broken hashes before they actually cause us harm, not wait until after. Don't Walk Past.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:10AM (#22324843)
People are still obviously using 1024 bit RSA keys which are more of a problem.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by xorcist on Friday February 14, 2020 @05:26AM (#22325423)
Right. Most SSH keys are just keys, not hashes. The hash used for key exchange during authentication is something that is enforced by the server (and client) and not a property of the key.

The option in ssh-keygen for a signature algorithm is for signing keys in an SSH CA. This is not something Github supports.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by pilif on Friday February 14, 2020 @08:26AM (#22326275)
> This is not something Github supports.

actually, they do now[1], but only for enterprise accounts. Which is a shame - this is useful for "normal people" too.

1: https://help.github.com/en/github/setting-up-and-managing-or...

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by noodlesUK on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:20AM (#22324895)
With this in mind, can gpg-agent be configured to use a better hash function with its RSA keys for use in SSH?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by numlock86 on Friday February 14, 2020 @04:32AM (#22325181)
> Just for fun, most users on Github have RSA keys exclusively.

Rare ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 guy here. I'd welcome Brainpool, but support mostly boils down to NIST compromised curves on the majority of applications. sadface

> Did you know that your SSH keys are public on Github?

Wait, what? Github makes public keys public? Outrageous!

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @07:33AM (#22326004)
It's not intuitive because there's really no need for it.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by dspillett on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:12AM (#22326663)
No harm in it either though.

Unless for some reason someone imports one into their authorized_keys (which presumably would require deliberate steps not random numbskullary) in which case there is a (low) risk as they have just given a dev access to an account said dev does not know exists.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:30AM (#22326820)
What you described is quite literally a feature in Ubuntu Server.

Type in a github username during the installer to import from github.com/%s.keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by 3fe9a03ccd14ca5 on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:17AM (#22327249)
A cronjob on every one of my IoT crap devices, which sometimes stay stuffed in a shoebox without internet for years:

    @reboot root ssh-import-id gh:my-username
That way when I want to tinker with one, it will pull down my newest GitHub once it reboots and I’ll be able to login. The GitHub key is always up to date.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by dspillett on Friday February 14, 2020 @11:00AM (#22327604)
> Type in a github username

Exactly. That would be the deliberate steps I mentioned as a gate for this causing a problem. If you give it someone else's key you have a problem, though a minor one unless you've been conned into doing so by an adversary who will later scan for accounts that allow their key pair for auth.

Importing your own public key this way is not problematical at all.

Of course you might end up with people publishing their private key along with the private one, by error or because it seems convenient & they don't think things through...

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by tialaramex on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:09AM (#22327167)
My instinct is that's actually safer than a "set your password and open SSH to the world" step.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by boring_twenties on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:24PM (#22329439)
The harm is that if you use the same key elsewhere, it can be linked to your github identity.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by dspillett on Monday February 17, 2020 @08:25AM (#22347482)
If you are needing to keep your identity hidden/ambiguous, then you need to be careful with your keys. Don't publish a public key if you don't want it to be public!

These keys and the ways people often used them are very much not designed with privacy as a priority: they are explicitly for proving who you are so you can be given access to something. Key management with regard to keeping different concerns separated is up to the user.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by boring_twenties on Tuesday February 18, 2020 @10:24PM (#22362810)
I think it's fine as long as you _know_ github is going to make it public. The only problem is that it's not at all obvious, as can be seen in this very thread.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by jwilk on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:07AM (#22326611)
Why not ssh-ed25519?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by numlock86 on Friday February 14, 2020 @11:10AM (#22327676)
> Why not ssh-ed25519?

> [...] but support mostly boils down to NIST compromised curves on the majority of applications.

I am doing a lot of embedded stuff, and usually all that's supported is RSA ... and NIST curves when it comes to ECC. And I like to keep my key count at 1. Ditching RSA for ECC was a huge step already in that regard.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by egyiedfyfrtjjf on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:47AM (#22324475)
As a RSA-user myself, because I learnt about ssh through the github setup guides: Will ssh-keygen generate a secure key if I don’t pass it any parameters?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by jlgaddis on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:20PM (#22329401)
It will generate a 2048-bit RSA keypair by default. It will be "a secure key" as long as you protect it with an appropriate passphrase.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by gnufx on Friday February 14, 2020 @06:00PM (#22331298)
You need recent ssh-keygen's -o to make the passphprase effective (default for ed25519). That was covered here at some stage, but I don't have a reference.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:49AM (#22324485)
I haven't built the new version, but I assume it defaults to ed25519 now. You can otherwise make one with ssh-keygen -t ed25519.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by techntoke on Friday February 14, 2020 @05:20AM (#22325396)
Last time I tried AWS doesn't support anything but RSA keys.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by zenexer on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:25AM (#22326782)
They don’t need to. Boot up a default AMI, change the key to whatever you want, then create your own custom AMI from that. Or you can use something like Cloud-Init.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by lawnchair_larry on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:20PM (#22328779)
This is good news, because AWS will finally be forced to get with the times. Their certificate manager is stuck on RSA too.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @08:35AM (#22326337)
That’s right. Nothing stopping you having both though.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by pnutjam on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:12AM (#22326657)
Those are just the public portion of the key, not the private key.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by RL_Quine on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:28AM (#22326805)
I didn't say they were private keys.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by joeyh on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:54AM (#22327555)
github also appears to only have RSA and DSA host keys, the latter is already deprecated
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by Steltek on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:44AM (#22327461)
Can this be more simply achieved using the "KexAlgorithms" and "MACs" config settings for /etc/ssh/sshd_config and ~/.ssh/config ?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by jlgaddis on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:23PM (#22329430)
Sure, just remove "ssh-rsa" from the "HostKeyAlgorithms" list in /etc/ssh/sshd_config. For example, you might instead use:

  HostKeyAlgorithms [email protected],[email protected],ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
Myself, I've long set the (client-side) defaults on my workstations to

  HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
but it looks like it may be time to update that.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by nextweek2 on Friday February 14, 2020 @08:22AM (#22326241)
Oh deer, perhaps someone at Microsoft DevOps should be told.

https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/idea/365980/supp...

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by aepiepaey on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:46AM (#22327475)
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by mongol on Friday February 14, 2020 @01:44AM (#22324465)
What does chosen-prefix mean?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by tialaramex on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:20AM (#22324628)
Chosen prefix means somebody doing this attack gets to pick the start of both the colliding documents. For example maybe I want two children's stories, one which starts "Donald was an innocent young boy," and the other begins "Steve was a corrupt old gangster,"

The attack will calculate suffixes for these two documents such that both documents have the same hash result.

This means the attacker can then show some people a document about Donald, and others the one about Steve and if they rely on the same hash to validate that they're the same document they'd be fooled.

Digital certificates are the most prominent way computers deliberately depend on this assumption which a collision attack makes untrustworthy.

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by _pmf_ on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:09AM (#22324842)
Honest question: has this any relevance outside of academia?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by tialaramex on Friday February 14, 2020 @03:45AM (#22324991)
Sure.

Consider the Web PKI ("SSL Certificates"). Suppose you have a web site pmf.example it is of course pretty easy to get yourself a certificate to make https://pmf.example/ work, today for free but even many years ago it was pretty affordable from several commercial vendors.

The way those certificates work is they use a digital signature based on a hash algorithm, the CA uses its private key to sign the hash, and that's how computers can immediately tell a real certificate from a bogus one and be sure this is really news.ycombinator.com and not say, your ISP's advertising front end injecting a "special offer". The CA will refuse to give you a certificate for google.com or news.ycombinator.com because those aren't yours.

But using a chosen prefix attack you can create two documents with the same hash. One of them might be a fairly ordinary looking certificate for pmf.example that you're entitled to, the other says you're google.com

You get a CA to sign the first certificate, then you simply snip off their signature and attach it to the second one, since their hashes are the same the signature matches. You now have a valid certificate for google.com. Not theory, practice, this was really done with an earlier broken hash, MD5.

e.g. https://hackaday.com/2008/12/30/25c3-hackers-completely-brea...

A similar trick, probably done by or on behalf of the US and/or Israeli governments makes Flame work by colliding MD5 for code signing. That uses a collision nobody publicly knew about, which is a weird and expensive thing to do but of course governments have lots of money.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flame_(malware)

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by chadmeister on Friday February 14, 2020 @09:22AM (#22326733)
Very enlightening. Thank you for explaining this. Are there any resources you might recommend to someone looking to learn this stuff more in depth?
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by adricnet on Friday February 14, 2020 @10:39AM (#22327423)
Ange Albertini's work on collisions is pretty great and he makes lots of example images and illustrations.

https://corkami.github.io/

In particular he works on/with the PoC||GTFO team and is responsible for the MD5 collision cover art in a past issue:

https://github.com/angea/pocorgtfo

For SHA-1 (and others) you might find more at his github project:

https://github.com/corkami/collisions

hth,

adric

Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by aaronmdjones on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:08AM (#22324566)
It means that you can influence the result by controlling the first part of the input. In other words, you can find an x such that H(x) == H(y) (for x != y) if you get to control the beginning bytes of x and know (or control) the beginning bytes of y.
Re:OpenSSH 8.2 by tialaramex on Friday February 14, 2020 @02:23AM (#22324646)
Nope. That's a second pre-image attack.