Agreed. What I'm implying here is if we come circle to fully explaining how the brain works, then in theory we could predict how someone will function if given all input conditions (whether this is practical is another matter). If this is true, then wouldn't we just be biomechanical robots operating on stimuli? Would we be any more intelligent than say a rock, that similarly just reacts to physical stimuli? Or are we just a more complex rock?

Yes, that's right. Which is one of the big problems with this line of argument for many people -- how do you reconcile "biomechanical robot" with the concepts of "free will" and "moral decision-making"?

I'm personally agnostic on the issue (I don't believe science is able to answer this question yet -- or possibly ever.)

I do think it's interesting that you say "just a biomechanical robot." The "just" implies that being a robot -- a fancy rock -- in some way isn't enough. But in my mind, there's absolutely no (objective) reason to think of a human as any better or more important than a robot, or a rock.

I'm just trying to challenge people's assumptions of what makes something intelligent. To me, it's not precisely clear as to what makes something intelligent, and is why I think we've had trouble coming up with a satisfactory test for determining when a computer is intelligent.

(P.S. Sorry for putting words in your mouth -- I don't want to imply you said anything you didn't. My bad there.)

> are we just a more complex rock?

of course we are. moreover, it's pretty straightforward to trace our evolution back to rocks or rock-like formations.

(see the "Origin of biological metabolism" section - lots of good new research coming out recently, including simulations of the very early processes predating life as such)

You might counter that your brain is tricking you into thinking you have those experiences, when you don’t. It’s an illusion.

Bit ask yourself this. What would it even mean for the experience of pain or color to be an illusion? An illusion is itself a conscious experience!

Can you have evidence that something is "fundamentally unexplainable"? Other than a lack of explanation?

If your statement has consequences, then there must be an imaginable counterfactual where it does not hold. I'm struggling to think of that.

I think you're getting it wrong. There's no externally discernible difference between a normal person and a p-zombie, because the difference is in how they experience. I know I'm conscious, because I subjectively experience it, but I can't be sure about anyone else because they could be a p-zombie that has everything except that subjective experience.