iCloud backups are definitely encrypted. They just aren't end-to-end encrypted.
That should have been plainly obvious to any technically knowledgeable user because you don't lose your data forever when you forget your Apple ID password. Or the fact that you can see your photos through a web browser on icloud.com
As you can see from this discussion, there are a lot of technically knowledgeable people who did not find this "plainly obvious". It's disingenuous to blame users for Apple's misleading marketing.
But when you send a backup, it's decrypted, sent to Apple, and then re-encrypted with a key that Apple controls, and has nothing to do with any of the "things I personally know"? IOW, I couldn't myself decrypt my Apple backup stored on their servers?
My phone, my data.
Back up my data to their computer, their control.
This is perfect plausible deniability for them.
"Hey, we gave them a secure device. But they chose to upload their data to us, and we made it clear how we handle it in our terms of service."
Which it is.
You could build a system where there's a key stored on each of your devices, and your password also acts like a key. In that case, you could
- Lose all your devices, but unlock with password
- Forget your password, but unlock with any device
- Lose one device, but unlock with your password or any other device
Of course, most people's passwords would probably be way to weak, no matter how much time Apple spends stretching it into a key, but for people who use a decent password this would be fairly secure.
No, they do not. If Apple wants a reputation for privacy and respecting its customers, then it has to put them first. Don't apologize for them making this user-hostile choice.
We could be merely a generation away from the hell hole that is social credit. We can't afford to keep ceding ground on privacy. We have to engender a sense of importance and urgency.
I'll be very mad at the rest of you lot that choose convenience over privacy, rights, and autonomy if 2030 sees our freedoms and liberties eroded further.
Our collective choices matter, and that's why I'm calling you out.
2. Apple at least put some effort into this matter because otherwise there would not be so much media attention to breaking into iPhones. To get data from android on the other hand seems to be no problem at all.
3. We are already in hell but we do not yet see the flames surrounding us.
4. If collective choice matters so much we are all doomed and you know it. Try telling the Joneses about encryption etc. - they will still use WhastApp, Facebook and the likes because it is so convenient over a way of burden and hard work to get there or even live without all these "magical devices and services".
We have to comply with court orders. That’s it.
The funny thing is that I just read a bit of the linked Wikipedia article to find this: Companies and organizations who no longer have warrant canaries
The following is a list of companies and organizations whose warrant canaries no longer appear in transparency reports:
* Apple
* Reddit
* Silent Circle
That is something very different from cooperating with a specific investigation.
Why did Apple not fight this in court?
Could Apple keep the backups outside the EU, like Microsoft did for email in the Dublin case?
But it is not about prohibiting encryption but the possibility and/or necessity that Apple has another key to decrypt your data with.
It does not matter where they keep the data as long as the companies headquarters are on US soil.
Google gives their customers the option for end-to-end encryption of uploaded data and I'm sure they have to play by the same rules as Apple.
Now this does not exactly help me feeling more comfortably about this issue.
> Our collective choices matter, and that's why I'm calling you out.
I'll be direct and say that your passion inspires me and your articulation of the issue is very close to my deep feelings about privacy, encryption, and law enforcement. Of course, human brains are complicated pieces of kit and the rational part of me tempers "my deep feelings" with the context I elaborated in the parent comment.
Still, I wanted to take the time to thank you for expressing this in precisely the way you did. Thank you.
I also want to take a moment to recommend an article by John Gruber (Daring Fireball), "Regarding Reuters’s Report That Apple Dropped Plan for Encrypting iCloud Backups" which critiques the basis of the Reuter's article. [0] (I'd have made it a post except for being a bit overactive this morning with submitting Daring Fireball-sourced links to HN.)
You might feel less disillusioned considering Gruber's points, many of which are excellent.
[0] https://daringfireball.net/2020/01/reuters_report_on_apple_d...
I fear we have one foot there already. If you are so inclined, you can dig up a lot of dox on most people, all freely given to social media, or via scrapers like Spokeo.
I guess it's all still optional, kinda. And there is no centralized clearinghouse. But it is scary.
"or used as an excuse for new legislation against encryption."
By not making iCloud backups end-to-end encrypted, they likely did exactly that.
Although I'd find it funny if by doing so they caused a backlash from governments with new laws that ruined encryption for everybody. It'd be dystopian but also funny.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man
Meanwhile, Apple says:
> Privacy is a fundamental human right. At Apple, it’s also one of our core values. Your devices are important to so many parts of your life. What you share from those experiences, and who you share it with, should be up to you. We design Apple products to protect your privacy and give you control over your information. It’s not always easy. But that’s the kind of innovation we believe in.
https://www.apple.com/privacy/
When Apple markets themselves this way, people expect their actions to be in line with their words. Making iCloud device backups vulnerable to law enforcement demands is not in line with Apple's privacy-oriented marketing, and suggests that Apple's vocal defense of encryption is just a public relations strategy.
I certainly wasn’t defending Apple in this case.
I believe Apple changed how operating system updates were installed after this point so that they did not have the capability to upgrade the phone's operating system without access to the device passcode.
>Starting in Android Pie, devices can take advantage of a new capability where backed-up application data can only be decrypted by a key that is randomly generated at the client. This decryption key is encrypted using the user's lockscreen PIN/pattern/passcode, which isn’t known by Google.
>By design, this means that no one (including Google) can access a user's backed-up application data without specifically knowing their passcode.
https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
This is cliche as can be, but the trade off is security for convenience.
Fact is, iOS is consumed largely by people who want convenience. They don’t want to lose all of their data if they forget their passwords.
But for those people who are ok with that type of unforgiving paradigm, then don’t use iCloud backups, and you’re all set.
I see this in the thread. What does that mean? Do they have to? Are they being forced? What is the balance between?
Why aren't iCloud backups e2e encrypted?
If Apple is privacy-oriented, they should've allowed this long time ago. Unlike iCloud backups, this is certainly not a legal issue, as the "local" backups stored on one's computer are already fully encrypted.
* My memory says I spent way too much on an iPhone. My ego says that can't be true, and in the end memory yields. -nietzsche
In this instance, Apple decided to continue to not encrypt iCloud backups because, according to one source,
> […] the company did not want to risk being attacked by public officials for protecting criminals, sued for moving previously accessible data out of reach of government agencies or used as an excuse for new legislation against encryption. [0]
Apple's stance on privacy is more than mere marketing and more than a meme, but their legal team decided that encrypting formerly unencrypted backups, which had already been used as evidence in previous cases, is ill-advised.
Most people, including technically knowledgable users here on HN, were unaware iCloud backups have always been unencrypted. Many of us concerned about privacy have avoided iCloud backups because they are subject to subpoena.
I wish Apple would (have) offered encrypted iCloud backup as an option, and I understand why they chose not to. However, I disagree that their stance on privacy is mere marketing. Apple has a balance to strike between the issues of encryption, privacy, and law enforcement, and their products are not perfect for either users or law enforcement.
That doesn't mean Apple doesn't care about its users and their privacy.
[0] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...