News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by tunesmith on Wednesday January 01, 2020 @07:58PM (#21932042)
I saw the Akka people talking about this on twitter once, I think they were theorizing that encrypting the data in the log would be sufficient, because then "deleting the key" could be interpreted as the deletion of the record (even though the useless data still exists in the log). But I'm not sure this was ever legally validated?
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by xtagon on Wednesday January 01, 2020 @09:47PM (#21932568)
That is what I was referring to as "crypto-erasure" (also known as "crypto-shredding"). I'm not sure what counts as legally validated, but some have shared concerns that the encryption you use to do this would need to be future-proof against, say, advancements in quantum computing cracking the encryption down the road even after the key has been thrown out.
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by rodocite on Wednesday January 01, 2020 @10:23PM (#21932750)
if the references don't point to actual data, you don't need this.

- minimum 2 parts. a relay (reference hash) and the cold/true storage portion. you can break the reference hash up and reassemble only for secret holders. which brings us to:

- content-based routing

- there are also deterministic vaults for rolling keys

i'm actually not sure in what high-level situation "crypto-erasure" would work in because being able to re-key a reference means you have complete control. so why would you need to erase the "bad" key when you can just switch the reference?

Eth draft for enabling cold storage relay https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1077.m...

Decentralized ID https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/

^ both generally use the same concept i described above and solve GDPR "delete" issue. actually, it solves GDPR completely if you can just rely on the DID. "hard delete" is a separate issue, though-- no other way to get around that but to fork/version + replay your store and re-reference anyone who wants to hard delete if you didn't use reference hashes.

Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by guywhocodes on Wednesday January 01, 2020 @09:07PM (#21932393)
That is a very interesting approach, however I can imagine that it can be quite a large database of encryption keys.

I'll have to build a small system for this and try it.

Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by imglorp on Wednesday January 01, 2020 @09:40PM (#21932535)
Oh, why? Holding one key for every human on earth would fit in 8 TB plus read-mostly replicas. You'd delete their key if they made GDPR removal request and the keyless, encrypted, immutable entries would be entombed in place.
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by pookeh on Thursday January 02, 2020 @12:14AM (#21933197)
What do you do when the data involves multiple people?
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by shrimpx on Thursday January 02, 2020 @03:58AM (#21933896)
It's unclear (regardless of crypto shredding) what the delete policy should be if the data involves multiple people.
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by randolorian on Thursday January 02, 2020 @10:05AM (#21935872)
Why would it? Typically you would have one stream per user.
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by tunesmith on Thursday January 02, 2020 @01:42PM (#21938296)
Event: "User A sent Message X to User B". (I think the answer here is again to have PII be in other repositories, and only refer to them by id in the log.)
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by specialist on Thursday January 02, 2020 @02:17PM (#21938673)
Good question. Create alias proxies?
Re:Event Sourcing (2017) by specialist on Thursday January 02, 2020 @02:13PM (#21938633)
Just like password stores. Store salted and hashed password value, vs actual password.

Cleverly applying this strategy to all sensitive datas is the Translucent Database thesis.