A lot of time, complete outsiders find very high "value" tasks that they can do, seem trivial, but the organisation seems unable to "task" to someone.
A classic example is "watchdog" regulators that are supposed to police an industry. Regardless of mandate, they nearly always operate entirely via well organized, documented complaints. They don't do "outbound" policing, even if it's deeming easy & productive. The
@patio11 recently did a great post on his dealings with CROs, and such regulators make an apoearance.
Add a little risk/reward to the mix and an overarching system that impractically punishes failure to convict or prosecute, leading to risk-averse approaches, and you get a nice system that is happy to prosecute the low-level weed peddlers instead of the real players. Those people land on your desk or you get them from a traffic stop. Try to go further and you might lose your job or your pension. And, of course as a prosecutor or AG, make sure you plea-bargain everyone to boost your incarceration stats.
Lots of easy wins to cook the books without really touching on the real problem. So you've got Too Big To Fail in the black markets and the criminal world too.
(I hasten to avoid saying 'criminal-underworld' because our righteous overworld tends to be just as bad, if not worse in some cases.)
That said, the FBI is not in the pre-crime business (with few exceptions), so they're not really set up to warn businesses like I did for so many years.
This seems like a bit of a systemic defect, if you can watch a financial (etc.) crime in progress but not have the jurisdiction (or allocation) to intercede.
p.s. Shouldn't some of this fall into USSS jurisdiction?
I guess those pre-crime exceptions are the ones were the agent convinces the malcontents they're embedded with to try a little terrorism?
That's the exception, you have to justify your job and budget somehow. And nothing loosens purse-strings like the 'T-word' post 9/11. Although to be fair, the first attempt to bomb the WTC was a failed FBI Sting:
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/28/nyregion/tapes-depict-pro...
[“Protecting our senior citizens from criminals who target them is one of the Trump Administration’s highest priorities”](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-...)
Sadly, the FBI is apparently not in the business of going after the king pin either. They are prosecuting the low level money mules, who are either unwilling or unable to comprehend the need to cease and desist after a letter from the FBI.
>In many instances, my call would come in just minutes or hours before an unauthorized payroll batch was processed by the victim company’s bank, and some of those notifications prevented what otherwise would have been enormous losses — often several times the amount of the organization’s normal weekly payroll. At some point I stopped counting how many tens of thousands of dollars those calls saved victims, but over several years it was probably in the millions.
Because Mr. Krebs was doing so with good effect and as a private individual he did not face the legal firewalls in place to prevent LEOs taking such actions for corrupt or ill intent or blow investigations.
Law enforcement already masquerades online as underage girls and boys, potential terrorists searching for bomb-making materials, etc.
What "legal firewalls" would prevent them from walking a URL to see what companies are about to get robbed?
And forget about law enforcement, why wouldn't banks and payroll services do the same thing to protect their customers?
It's beyond ridiculous that our only line of defense is Brian Krebs.
None there, but the moment they have a bank freeze a company's account…
Apparently, the companies themselves called their banks to prevent the transactions. Banks do engage in effort to protect their customers and already flag questionable actions.
* You do not want to create an environment where some enjoy the protection of the FBI and others do not.
* You do not want to jeopardize an ongoing investigation or later trial.
Consider that the attackers are in different countries that are beyond the reach of U.S. federal law enforcement. The machines they used to send the spam and remote into the victim systems are usually elsewhere. The money mules are and their corresponding banks are scattered across the U.S. and Europe. The victim's bank may or may not be located in the same place as the victim. And so on. Where did the crime take place? That's a monumental challenge for federal law enforcement, and frankly the local PD is just not up to it, especially when they're up to their eyeballs in fighting crimes (often violent ones) where their jurisdiction is quite clear.
Costs consist of writing and updating the malware itself, maintaining C&C servers and hiring mules to cash out the proceeds with an 8% commission.
Maybe there are kickbacks to government authorities, though I understand kickbacks are often payments in kind, by sharing exploits with intelligence agencies.
From what we've seen out of Russia, the militarization of hacking hasn't yet evolved to private armies - so either it's all being controlled by an existing (maybe the government) or early emergent (maybe a shiny new oligarch) player or the profit margins just aren't enough to justify violence. As soon as you can make 200k by robbing a criminal you'll see it happen though.
I would be interested in what legal firewalls in particular exist - anyone have references?
My own guess would be that "don't blow the investigation" would be the catch-all phrase used to explain this situation (even if there is not investigation at time X). It seems as if the institutional mandate of law enforcement is 99% catch criminals, 1% stop crimes without catching criminals. So no one wants to be tasked in efforts to merely stop a theft and not catch a thief.
This seems much in line with the push to "get tools to catch bad guys" by weakening encryption, even if said weakening would result in many more crimes.
Somebody attempted to cash some fraudulent checks for a company I worked for, luckily this was caught by our bank before we lost any money. The NYPD had no interest in doing any more than taking a report and were extremely happy when the perpetrator attempted to cash a third check, taking the total above $100k and into FBI justification. The FBI took the report and nothing happened even though our bank was able to provide details which should have led to an arrest.
It's also the case with more serious financial crimes, eg. Ponzi Schemes. The crazy thing is some of these things are completely illegal operations, yet publicized, with brick and mortar locations. This can go on for years. Sometimes there are complaints. Sometimes it's one determined victim or would-be victim that blows the lid on the whole thing. Even then it can take time; months to years. It's an area where people have been able to get away with it, often for a good chunk of their adult lives.
And then proceed to take the force to the court for "damages".
Probably they were using Scrum.
They also have a heavy focus on counterterrorism these days, which likely makes everything else lower priority by default.
> So, each day for several years my morning routine went as follows: Make a pot of coffee; shuffle over to the computer and view the messages Aqua and his co-conspirators had sent to their money mules over the previous 12-24 hours; look up the victim company names in Google; pick up the phone to warn each that they were in the process of being robbed by the Russian Cyber Mob.
Just assigning an agent to that seems like a dead simple way to really quickly curtail that operation.