Law enforcement already masquerades online as underage girls and boys, potential terrorists searching for bomb-making materials, etc.
What "legal firewalls" would prevent them from walking a URL to see what companies are about to get robbed?
And forget about law enforcement, why wouldn't banks and payroll services do the same thing to protect their customers?
It's beyond ridiculous that our only line of defense is Brian Krebs.
None there, but the moment they have a bank freeze a company's account…
Apparently, the companies themselves called their banks to prevent the transactions. Banks do engage in effort to protect their customers and already flag questionable actions.
* You do not want to create an environment where some enjoy the protection of the FBI and others do not.
* You do not want to jeopardize an ongoing investigation or later trial.
Consider that the attackers are in different countries that are beyond the reach of U.S. federal law enforcement. The machines they used to send the spam and remote into the victim systems are usually elsewhere. The money mules are and their corresponding banks are scattered across the U.S. and Europe. The victim's bank may or may not be located in the same place as the victim. And so on. Where did the crime take place? That's a monumental challenge for federal law enforcement, and frankly the local PD is just not up to it, especially when they're up to their eyeballs in fighting crimes (often violent ones) where their jurisdiction is quite clear.
Costs consist of writing and updating the malware itself, maintaining C&C servers and hiring mules to cash out the proceeds with an 8% commission.
Maybe there are kickbacks to government authorities, though I understand kickbacks are often payments in kind, by sharing exploits with intelligence agencies.
From what we've seen out of Russia, the militarization of hacking hasn't yet evolved to private armies - so either it's all being controlled by an existing (maybe the government) or early emergent (maybe a shiny new oligarch) player or the profit margins just aren't enough to justify violence. As soon as you can make 200k by robbing a criminal you'll see it happen though.
I would be interested in what legal firewalls in particular exist - anyone have references?
My own guess would be that "don't blow the investigation" would be the catch-all phrase used to explain this situation (even if there is not investigation at time X). It seems as if the institutional mandate of law enforcement is 99% catch criminals, 1% stop crimes without catching criminals. So no one wants to be tasked in efforts to merely stop a theft and not catch a thief.
This seems much in line with the push to "get tools to catch bad guys" by weakening encryption, even if said weakening would result in many more crimes.
>In many instances, my call would come in just minutes or hours before an unauthorized payroll batch was processed by the victim company’s bank, and some of those notifications prevented what otherwise would have been enormous losses — often several times the amount of the organization’s normal weekly payroll. At some point I stopped counting how many tens of thousands of dollars those calls saved victims, but over several years it was probably in the millions.
Because Mr. Krebs was doing so with good effect and as a private individual he did not face the legal firewalls in place to prevent LEOs taking such actions for corrupt or ill intent or blow investigations.