6 hour later, C's NOC calls B's NOC, saying to knock it off, and they have 18 hours or they're getting booted.
6 hours later, B's NOC calls A's NOC, saying to knock it off, and they have 12 hours to figure it out or they're getting booted.
In under 12 more hours, A cuts off 111-1111.
If peeringDB is to be believed, big providers all require their peers to have a 24/7 NOC number to call.
That approach is obviously not very effective in a DDoS scenario, but as I understand it these robocalls typically originate from a handful of different VoIP termination services -- as opposed to tens of thousands of hosts in a DDoS scenario.
Yet this has been going on for years, so I suspect shenanigans by providers too happy to continue charging their Tier7 peers for access.
Anyone in a region with sensible legislation.
I worked in this business briefly, the economics are fascinating. Your average mom and pop restaurant is very likely buying its VoIP transit from an entity like "B" in this story.
Or make it easier for consumers to report spam calls. For example, dial *666 after hanging up on the spammer and it reports the last call as spam. Enough abuse reports originating from a particular carrier and T-Mobile knows there's a problem. That's basically how it works for email spam and other forms of Internet abuse.
It's very hard to reform the whole system, but you have to start somewhere and this could be how.
Call verification is already here and rolling out progressively. System is called STIR/SHAKEN. iOS supports it as of 13.something. The UX is terrible though, all you see is a checkmark after the caller in the call log. Android might have a better situation on some phones, this system is carrier dependent. More about it here: https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication
There are scenarios where it doesn't work. Calls routed through Google Voice to my T-Mobile line will never show this checkmark. Also, not showing it onscreen for unknown incoming calls defeats the purpose, really not sure what Apple was thinking.
The problem here is that the origin can be spoofed.
You are imagining a system where a telco like T-Mobile connects the caller directly to you. That's not how it works. The connection chain could look like this.
bad caller 111-1111 -> A -> B -> C -> T-Mobile -> you 999-9999
All T-Mobile knows is that 111-1111 is calling 999-9999 and that the call was routed from C, it does not know about A, B, or the true identity of the bad caller.
That's also why spoofed attacks are also a problem on the Internet. These systems were not made with spoofing in mind, and it will cost a lot of money to get these companies to switch over to a new system seamlessly that can detect spoofing.