Externally, no. But it matters to me, the original.
> I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person.
Yes, for the copy, it is as if they are the original.
> The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off.
What if the copy is made non-destructively?
> But you still exist.
A version of you still exists.
> Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive.
The causal chain of events matters. If a copy of your consciousness is made, it can be done without you ever knowing about it.
You may now commit suicide, safe in the knowledge that it doesn't matter, because there's no difference between the current you and the distant you.
Unless you're now going to change tack and say it only counts if you're in each other's Light cone, and have seen each other, and understand the cloning machine's workings, and trust it was built correctly, and an endless amount of other procrastinating which proves that it does matter to you which one dies, and no matter what words you type, your behavior will show that you recognize a stark difference between "you" and "someone else".
Clearly a condition "I know they exist" doesn't change whether you two are the same person or not, so that can't be an important part of it.
If you decide to commit suicide, then any identical copies of yourself will also have the same thought process and decide to commit suicide too, so you'll have killed all identical copies of yourself. That's very different than deciding to do something (like use a scan-clone-destroy teleporter) that will create a copy of yourself and then destroy one copy of yourself.
Now is it any different to stepping into the teleporter?
If there were truly infinite worlds and infinite of each variation, and you could somehow play russian roulette instead with an entire world, so that each one has a risk of just entirely blinking out of existence ... it feels superficially wrong, but I find it hard to argue against. I'd worry that there's a risk of if it was done infinitely, then by some logic the infinite sum could eventually lead to all worlds not existing eventually, but if that was definitely known not to be a risk then I would find it hard to care about whether the world played russian roulette or not.
A destructive copy is strictly more feasible (as far as such things are feasible at all). But it comes with a possibility to print copies once the reading is done. Then you can get multiple clones made and they will be you, but will start diverge from each other right away due to slightly different experiences.
There is a transition point - at least for b.
a gets to the transition point and dies. b "awakes" with a's memories.
So: you are a ... > [transition] ... you are ?
How do you know you (formerly a) become b at that point? Certainly from b's perspective that is the case - but from former a's perspective? Which do you "switch to"? Death or b?
You need to consider 3 perspectives:
a then after the transition:
b (live a)
c (dead a)
If you don't want to consider dead a, then consider this: what if the experiment went wrong?
a isn't killed in the process, but a copy of their consciousness is loaded into b.
Same situation as before, but both a and b think they are former a.
Which are you (formerly a) in that circumstance? Why?
I would argue a has a strong case to be considered the correct version - which means you die in the first case.
I would argue no. Because for you, your consciousness, it's as if you are still the same person. The first doesn't matter, because it's just turned off. But you still exist.
Unless you're arguing for a 'soul', there is no difference between the two consciousnesses. Therefore, you are still alive.