This is under the assumption that there will be capital available to flow, if there isn't because of a truly bad scenario, yes it's a downward spiral, but it will take quite an event to get us to that point.
Typically the opportunists here would be stat-arb hedge funds. They bread and butter of their strategy is to isolate the non-explainable ("idiosyncratic") movement in single name stocks, then bet on that factor mean-reverting.
E.g. if Microsoft goes down 0.5%, but the market's up 1%, and the tech stocks are up 1.2%, and various other factors that move Microsoft don't explain it being down. Then they'll bet that the movement is driven by random noise, and buy Microsoft, betting that it will re-converge with where it's expected to be. They'll also use various techniques to isolate whether idiosyncratic movements are likely driven by company specific factors or market noise. Like NLP on a newsfeed to look to see if there are any breaking stories, or tracking recent analyst revisions on the stock.
Suffice to say that stat-arb funds in this day and age are very very good at this. In a liquidity unwind event, the signals stat-arb traders use would absolutely be lighting up. The biggest question would be whether stat-arb funds in aggregate have enough capital to counter the absolutely humongous flows that a potential index fund unwinding would release.
Another complicating wrinkle is that most stat-arb desks are no longer independent hedge funds, but units within larger multi-strategy funds (like Two Sigma or Millennium). There's good and bad. The good is that if there's all of a sudden massive opportunity the multi-strat fund can quickly reallocate more capital to the stat-arb desk.
The bad part is that stat-arb desks may be unwound due to arbitrary contagion in other parts of the market. If the multi-strat fund sees a big loss in another unit, it may pull capital from the stat-arb desk to meet margin calls or redemptions. For example this happened in August 2007 [0]. The subprime mortgage market blew up, then all of a sudden a bunch of esoteric stocks started behaving crazy for the next weeks. And that was largely because multistrat funds were pulling capital to meet margin calls on their mortgage portfolio.
IE if a smart person with a lot of money think there is no "smart money" left, wouldn't (s)he just start their own smart money hedge fund to provide / do this?
If nobody is left to do thing X AND thing X is basically guaranteed profit, isn't it natural for people to step in and do thing X?
"i'm supposed to sell 500m of this small stock but i only got to sell 300m before it was frozen out...now my basket of holdings is slightly off from the actual index...hopefully i can rectify it tomorrow..."
Arguably, after the crash they might be able to take advantage of the opportunity. If they concentrate into the stocks with the biggest price displacements, then as those stocks return to normal, they may make up some or all of their initial losses. Passive indexers can't do this, because they don't have the mandate to deviate from their pre-defined allocations.
But I think the broader issue is that excessive amounts of indexing present potential systematic risks for everybody. Burry's hypothesis is more relevant for policymakers than it is for investors.
As an individual, long-term buy-and-hold investor, low-cost index funds are without question the best option for investing. The problem is behavior that's rational on an individual level, may produce irrational results at the collective level.
I'm asking for a comparison of two scenariors. In the index fund scenario, we're in the world where index funds represent a large and growing chunk of the market. In the active funds scenario, index funds aren't a thing. Why is it that in the active funds scenario, what you're describing in the previous post doesn't happen? Why doesn't a 20% marketwide downturn cause chaos in these smaller stocks? Is it because there would be higher volumes if those stocks were held by active funds? Or because the active funds wouldn't hold stocks like that?
Basically, I'm asking for a comparison of the scenario you described with what happens in a no-index world, because I can't quite think through the difference myself.
First as mentioned before, active investors have discretion. There's strong reason to believe that as the sell-off's happening that they'd move into the most dislocated stocks. That acts as kind of a negative feedback loop. It wouldn't stop a market-wide selloff, but would keep things more balanced between single-name stocks vis-a-vis the rigid rules governing passive index managers.
Second, by definition active funds are more differentiated from one another. Passive indexing produces a mono-culture with analogous ecological risks to what we see in nature. The typical active fund only holds about 50 positions at any given time. So, on the whole while active investors in aggregate hold 0.3% of their portfolios in Chubb, at an individual level most funds hold zero. And some minority may hold 1%, 5%, 10% or more of their assets in Chubb. So if one fund fails, that's less likely to spread contagion to every other fund in the universe.
In that type of unwind scenario, some funds will do pretty decently, and some funds will do horribly. But the point is there will be a dispersion of results. That makes the market as a whole more robust. Panicking investors are more likely to re-allocate their capital from the bad funds to the good funds, rather than pull all their out in a flight to quality.
Yes in theory the manager can try to alter the composition of the fund by selling the stocks that are still going strong. But why would they? That just exposes them to known hazards even more.
So, probably the active funds will be the first ones to drop the small stocks first in a crash.
If the index instruments have a lot more liquidity than the underlying names, then that means they won't be able to gracefully absorb the liquidity shocks from an unwind in the index.
Here's some back of the envelope calculations. Between SPY, IVV, and VOO alone, there's $500 billion in S&P 500 index ETFs. Consider if an unwind event leads to 20% of index assets being redeemed in a single day. That's $100 billion from the above ETFs alone.
Now consider a typical thinly traded single-name stock like Chubb Limited (symbol CB). CB makes up 0.3% of the S&P 500 by weight. So in the hypothetical scenario above, the APs would have to collectively sell $300 million worth of CB in a single day. Chubb's entire ADV is only $238 million.
Trying to sell more than 100% of a stock's ADV in a single day is guaranteed to produce huge market impact. The current liquidity providers in CB almost certainly cannot absorb that amount of trading volume all in one direction. In that scenario, Chubb's stock might fall by 20%, for something that had nothing to do with the company itself.
I think the overall point is that a lot of single-name stocks nowadays don't really have much of an individual market. Names like TSLA, FB or TEVA definitely have a robust market with a lot of traders still focused on company specifics. But a lot of the more boring, lower volatility, mid-cap stocks (like CB) mostly just trade along with the index nowadays. If there are technicals related to index capital flows, stocks like that are going to get taken for a ride.
[1] https://www.etf.com/channels/sp-500-etfs [2] https://www.slickcharts.com/sp500 [3] https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CB?p=CB