Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by desdiv on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @04:37AM
(#20693700)
One of my favorite piece of WWII trivia is that Albert Einstein actually worked on fixing the Mark 6 exploder of the Mark 14 torpedo.
Back then, Einstein was not employed by the military at all; he was an academic at the Institute for Advanced Study[0] in Princeton. Lt. Stephen Brunauer from the Bureau of Ordnance sent an unsolicited letter to Einstein basically saying: “Hey Einstein, can you help us with our torpedo problem?” and Einstein happily obliged[1]. Their entire correspondence is in the national archives; here’s an example: [2].
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by redis_mlc on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @01:49AM
(#20693010)
This is a great read.
If you study the Pacific carrier battles carefully, you'll notice that the Americans sank no Japanese carriers with torpedos for 2 years, while the Japanese had great success.
So all of the US torpedo planes and pilots were sent fruitlessly for that period of time. Usually the performance of their obsolete planes was blamed, but that doesn't matter when you're dropping duds.
In later wars, the US repeated similar disasters ...
The F-4 didn't have a gun, early air-air missiles either didn't work or were sensitive to carrier landings and stopped working, the Zuni rocket had electrical issues, the F-14A had the wrong (bomber) engine, carriers were loaded with tons of "expired" bombs to reduce costs which contributed to the USS Forrestal inferno, etc.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by brazzy on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @04:14AM
(#20693598)
> This is a great read.
It is not. I found it maddeningly superficial.
It talks about "crippling flaws in all three control mechanisms." but fails to provide any information whatsoever about what those flaws were and what effects they had.
The story about how the flaws were isolated and fixed is confined to a single sentence.
It is completely unclear how "Lesson 1: Indecision can thicken the fog of war" has anything at all to do with the faulty torpedoes. Why and how did "operational consequences of this startling strategic decision masked the true nature of the torpedo problem"?
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by wffurr on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:36AM
(#20694851)
It's not a technical article about torpedo design. From that perspective, it is superficial but that's not what it's about. You can easily research the torpedo design if you want.
The article is actually about the organizational and strategic failures that led to and exacerbated the problem. From that perspective, it has plenty to offer.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by brazzy on Friday August 16, 2019 @07:50AM
(#20714172)
Even from that perspective, it has very little to offer because it completely fails to explain how those "organizational and strategic failures" actually had anything to do with the torpedoes.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by pjc50 on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @04:19AM
(#20693623)
The wikipedia article cites three problems: wrong depth setting (caused by the test warheads being lighter than the real ones); over-sensitive magnetic detonators and under-sensitive contact detonators.
It also cites inadequate testing because the torpedoes were too expensive.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by dsfyu404ed on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:05AM
(#20694607)
The article posted cites them and doesn't even discuss them. Furthermore it doesn't even go into any deep discussion as to why the navy couldn't figure it out. It's just hand waving about money and organizational politics. There is no depth or breadth of subject matter in this article. I think that makes "maddeningly superficial" an accurate description.
Edit: If you're going to edit your comment to change the subject of your comment from "it" (referring to the posted article the GP is talking about) to "the Wikipedia article" thereby totally changing what you are discussing do us all a favor and mention it.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by CamperBob2 on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @03:56AM
(#20693519)
A good companion to this story is that of the Tang, which benefited from more reliable torpedoes later in the war and racked up an extremely impressive kill record.
Unfortunately, while the improved torpedoes were great at exploding, they still had some guidance-system issues:
Nine survivors, including (Capt.) O'Kane,
were picked up the next morning by
Japanese frigate CD-34. Survivors
of Tang's previous sinkings were on board,
and they beat the men from Tang. O'Kane
stated, "When we realized that our clubbing
and kickings were being administered by
the burned, mutilated survivors of our
handiwork, we found we could take it
with less prejudice."
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by nosianu on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @05:34AM
(#20693935)
You don't really want to "hit" anything directly. You want the torpedo to pass and explode underneath the target.
> The design for the Mark 6 exploder used in the Mark 14 torpedo had started at the Naval Torpedo Station (NTS), Newport, in 1922. Ship's armor was improving with innovations such as torpedo belts and torpedo blisters (bulges). To circumvent these measures, torpedoes needed larger warheads or new technology. One option would use a fairly small warhead but was intended to explode beneath the keel where there was no armor. This technology required the sophisticated new Mark 6 magnetic influence exploder, which was similar to the British Duplex and German models, all inspired by German magnetic mines of World War I. The Mark 14 shared this exploder with the concurrently-designed surface ship Mark 15 torpedo.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by vonmoltke on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:17AM
(#20694697)
It wasn't just cost. The USN considered the magnetic influence detonator to be such a potential difference-maker that it didn't want potential adversaries to know it even existed. That feature was not adequately tested because the USN felt testing would reveal it.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by hackeraccount on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @11:03AM
(#20696271)
I think the Germans and the Americans both looked at the question "How do you get a torpedo to sink a boat when they put armor on the sides where the torpedo will strike?" and came up with answer: Have it explode under the boat not on the side.
The Japanese just said - have a larger warhead. The problem for them was that you then need a more powerful motor to drive that larger warhead but they didn't screw that up.
The odd thing is that the Germans and Americans (but not the Japanese) mainly used submarines to sink lightly armored commerce ships not heavily armored warships.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by Tuna-Fish on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @04:39AM
(#20693712)
However, the missile was used to great effect by the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war.
Part of the reason the US only got to fire it 3 times was probably just how effective it was in Iranian hands. Because when Iraqi MiGs detected the radar of the F-14, they always immediately fled. The Iranians still field the old missiles in active service, and have recently publicized that they are manufacturing a domestically produced clone of it, called the Fakour-90.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by dsfyu404ed on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:20AM
(#20694728)
>Part of the reason the US only got to fire it 3 times was probably just how effective it was in Iranian hands
Not to mention that the Navy generally preferred not to fly the tomcat if there was anything else that was available to do the job (for good reasons) so that greatly limited the AIM-54's exposure to potential targets. It's a good missile but it's fundamentally old technology and fielding it is resource intensive compared to newer tech. It's also heavy, no reason to strap that thing to your plane unless you expect to need to blow a bomber out of the sky or you're gonna be going up against someone with similar long range capability.
The Iranians made heavy use of it because they had no better options and they clearly like it enough that they built a clone (probably modernized with digital electronics and a more modern warhead) to replace it.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by vonmoltke on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:19AM
(#20694714)
The Phoenix missile was designed primarily to counter massed formations of Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers before said bombers could get within missile range of the carrier group. It obviously never got the chance to do that.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by cstuder on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @07:31AM
(#20694400)
I had a chuckle while reading this: Switzerland is currently starting an evaluation of a new ground-to-air missile defense system.
The Swiss military decided that due to the enormous cost of the missiles, the evaluation will not include a firing test, but rely on a big questionnaire for the manufacturers of said system.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by nradov on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @07:55AM
(#20694541)
If you're buying a weapons system for deterrence then it doesn't actually have to work reliably. It just has to present a credible appearance of possibly working some of the time in order to complicate an adversary's plans.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by noir-york on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @08:32AM
(#20694822)
For a worse screw-up read about the bureaucratic slug fights around the M14 rifle (the shortest-serving US standard issue rifle), and the M16 (substandard ammo, etc) in Vietnam that needlessly cost American lives. There are good reasons the Springfield Armory was closed down by McNamara in '68.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by protomyth on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @09:25AM
(#20695253)
The USS Barb's story is amazing. It is detailed in the book
Thunder Below! The USS Barb Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II by Eugene B. Fluckey who was the commanding officer for 5 deployments. Another good book is Sink ‘Em All Submarine Warfare in the Pacific by Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood who was the US Navy commander of the Pacific submarine fleet during World War II.
Both discuss the torpedo problem and are available as Audiobooks. Fluckey says in his book that they installed stiffer springs in all torpedoes before sailing on his first deployment as Barb's captain.
Re:Fire One, Fire Ten: Implications of the Torpedo Scandal o...
by CharlesColeman on Wednesday August 14, 2019 @12:41PM
(#20697253)
> As a result, the Bureau of Ordnance developed highly artificial testing procedures that were designed, in part, to safeguard their practice torpedoes so they could be used for multiple tests.
Back then, Einstein was not employed by the military at all; he was an academic at the Institute for Advanced Study[0] in Princeton. Lt. Stephen Brunauer from the Bureau of Ordnance sent an unsolicited letter to Einstein basically saying: “Hey Einstein, can you help us with our torpedo problem?” and Einstein happily obliged[1]. Their entire correspondence is in the national archives; here’s an example: [2].
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Advanced_Study
[1] https://mathscinotes.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/torpedoesan...
[2] https://catalog.archives.gov/id/305254
If you study the Pacific carrier battles carefully, you'll notice that the Americans sank no Japanese carriers with torpedos for 2 years, while the Japanese had great success.
So all of the US torpedo planes and pilots were sent fruitlessly for that period of time. Usually the performance of their obsolete planes was blamed, but that doesn't matter when you're dropping duds.
In later wars, the US repeated similar disasters ...
The F-4 didn't have a gun, early air-air missiles either didn't work or were sensitive to carrier landings and stopped working, the Zuni rocket had electrical issues, the F-14A had the wrong (bomber) engine, carriers were loaded with tons of "expired" bombs to reduce costs which contributed to the USS Forrestal inferno, etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_USS_Forrestal_fire
The USA has always taken a while to spool up for war, but has then been unstoppable. It would be nice to break the pattern of early failures though.
It is not. I found it maddeningly superficial.
It talks about "crippling flaws in all three control mechanisms." but fails to provide any information whatsoever about what those flaws were and what effects they had.
The story about how the flaws were isolated and fixed is confined to a single sentence.
It is completely unclear how "Lesson 1: Indecision can thicken the fog of war" has anything at all to do with the faulty torpedoes. Why and how did "operational consequences of this startling strategic decision masked the true nature of the torpedo problem"?
The article is actually about the organizational and strategic failures that led to and exacerbated the problem. From that perspective, it has plenty to offer.
It also cites inadequate testing because the torpedoes were too expensive.
Edit: If you're going to edit your comment to change the subject of your comment from "it" (referring to the posted article the GP is talking about) to "the Wikipedia article" thereby totally changing what you are discussing do us all a favor and mention it.
Unfortunately, while the improved torpedoes were great at exploding, they still had some guidance-system issues:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Tang_(SS-306)
> The design for the Mark 6 exploder used in the Mark 14 torpedo had started at the Naval Torpedo Station (NTS), Newport, in 1922. Ship's armor was improving with innovations such as torpedo belts and torpedo blisters (bulges). To circumvent these measures, torpedoes needed larger warheads or new technology. One option would use a fairly small warhead but was intended to explode beneath the keel where there was no armor. This technology required the sophisticated new Mark 6 magnetic influence exploder, which was similar to the British Duplex and German models, all inspired by German magnetic mines of World War I. The Mark 14 shared this exploder with the concurrently-designed surface ship Mark 15 torpedo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo
It was too expensive for live testing.
It's not necessary to actually blow up a ship in testing, just that the torpedo hit where it was aimed, and the firing mechanism fired.
The Japanese just said - have a larger warhead. The problem for them was that you then need a more powerful motor to drive that larger warhead but they didn't screw that up.
The odd thing is that the Germans and Americans (but not the Japanese) mainly used submarines to sink lightly armored commerce ships not heavily armored warships.
Part of the reason the US only got to fire it 3 times was probably just how effective it was in Iranian hands. Because when Iraqi MiGs detected the radar of the F-14, they always immediately fled. The Iranians still field the old missiles in active service, and have recently publicized that they are manufacturing a domestically produced clone of it, called the Fakour-90.
Not to mention that the Navy generally preferred not to fly the tomcat if there was anything else that was available to do the job (for good reasons) so that greatly limited the AIM-54's exposure to potential targets. It's a good missile but it's fundamentally old technology and fielding it is resource intensive compared to newer tech. It's also heavy, no reason to strap that thing to your plane unless you expect to need to blow a bomber out of the sky or you're gonna be going up against someone with similar long range capability.
The Iranians made heavy use of it because they had no better options and they clearly like it enough that they built a clone (probably modernized with digital electronics and a more modern warhead) to replace it.
The Swiss military decided that due to the enormous cost of the missiles, the evaluation will not include a firing test, but rely on a big questionnaire for the manufacturers of said system.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/19/swis...
I see it in tech when developers often try to tell me there’s no problem until weeks later admitting there is one.
Why not spend the time investigating instead of denying?
Both discuss the torpedo problem and are available as Audiobooks. Fluckey says in his book that they installed stiffer springs in all torpedoes before sailing on his first deployment as Barb's captain.
Reminds me of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pentagon_Wars