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Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by BuildTheRobots on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @05:01PM (#20348743)
> Another feature we omit is the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension, which allows a single server to run TLS handshakes on behalf of multiple domains, using multiple public keys.

I don't understand how you can seriously use TLS and privacy in the same headline whilst actively ignoring the mess that is SNI...

Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by dagenix on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @09:21PM (#20350697)
If you connect to a website behind a CDN hosting many websites, a passive observer can tell that you connected to the CDN, but has no idea which website you requested (let's pretend that they can't use a length fingerprinting attack). However, unless the CDN supports domain fronting, which most don't, you have to use SNI to tell the CDN which website you want so you can get the right cert. As SNI is unencrypted, a passive observer now knows what website you are talking to. Privacy defeated.

If you connect to a website not behind a CDN, you probably don't have to use SNI, but, the website is revealed by doing a simple reverse DNS query. Privacy defeated.

Unencrypted SNI doesn't hurt privacy when compared to the status quo. Encrypted SNI will boost privacy. But until then, TLS is basically the best you can do for privacy, outside of using some more exotic service.

Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by cortesoft on Thursday July 04, 2019 @01:09AM (#20351743)
Not for all CDNs. Some provide dedicated VIPs which don't require SNI.

Of course, an adversary can then figure out who you are connecting to based on the IP.

Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by 3xblah on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @10:33PM (#20351026)
"If you connect to a website not behind a CDN, you probably don't have to use SNI, but, the website is revealed by doing a simple reverse DNS query."

As an example, I tried a reverse DNS query for the IP address of matrixssl.org. All I got was a subdomain at gandi.net.

Reverse DNS was originally intended for troubleshooting. It is not required for websites (cf. email) and not everyone bothers to set it up. That is one group of websites where we have to do more work to get the names that are using the remote IP address and figure out which one the user asked for.

In fact, DNS is not required for a functional website. IP address of course works fine. That is another group of websites where we have to do additional work to figure out what is at the remote IP address. We do not know what the user sent in her HTTP headers.

By comparison, SNI makes the process of invading user privacy easy and reliable, less work. The user is required to send a name, and to send that name in the clear.

Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by gruez on Thursday July 04, 2019 @12:08AM (#20351433)
>As an example, I tried a reverse DNS query for the IP address of matrixssl.org. All I got was a subdomain at gandi.net.

While the gp is wrong in saying that it's as simple as a reverse DNS lookup, his general idea is correct. It's trivial to crawl the internet to find all the ip -> domain mappings for all public domains. It's even easier if the attacker is an ISP because they can log DNS queries/responses.

Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by 3xblah on Thursday July 04, 2019 @12:25AM (#20351506)
If the parent comment is suggesting it is no easier with SNI, then I disagree. Not all domains are "public" and not all users send their DNS queries to ISPs or third party DNS providers. There are alternative sources for IP to domain mappings for TLS-enabled websites besides reverse DNS, crawling the entire internet is not necessary, but sniffing SNI is easier and more reliable than relying on DNS.
Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by nfoz on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @08:12PM (#20350330)
Could you elaborate? What's the problem with SNI? (I haven't dived deep into these protocols)
Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by mschuster91 on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @08:54PM (#20350559)
SNI exposes the target domain to everyone with sniffing capabilities - including everyone on your private/corp network as well as all involved ISPs.
Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by gruez on Thursday July 04, 2019 @12:11AM (#20351447)
That's an non issue because the target domain is in certificate that the server sends back. This happens with or without SNI.
Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by toast0 on Thursday July 04, 2019 @12:35AM (#20351556)
In TLS 1.3, the certificate is now sent encrypted with an ephemeral key. A given IP can serve differwnt certificates depending on SNI, so if SNI can become unsniffable, determining the certificate based on observing traffic to the server as well as generating traffic would be much harder for shared IPs anyway.