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Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by cjbprime on Wednesday June 26, 2019 @10:33PM (#20291278)
The reason people are outraged is that "don't use a single sensor to decide that the plane should perform an uncontrollable nose-dive" isn't the outcome of new learning. That wasn't competent airworthiness seventy years ago. It's a lesson the industry thought it had already internalized. We shouldn't applaud mistakes of the distant part being repeated recklessly as some kind of improvement.
Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by jussij on Wednesday June 26, 2019 @10:56PM (#20291380)
What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing.

Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane.

That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining.

What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level of deception that seems to have occurred is concerning.

Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by cmurf on Thursday June 27, 2019 @12:28AM (#20291759)
I wouldn't say the 737 MAX is nothing like the 737 NG, they're quite a lot alike in important ways, but there are clearly significant differences. And there should be an aggressively adversarial system to determine whether the difference is significant enough to warrant a separate type certification for the MAX variant.

I'm not at all amazed by Boeing's blatant deception and blame shifting. They've done this before, and with this same model of aircraft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by sopooneo on Thursday June 27, 2019 @12:02AM (#20291675)
I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".
Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by bronson on Thursday June 27, 2019 @12:30AM (#20291767)
More like deceived: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/b...

Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.

Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by taneq on Thursday June 27, 2019 @12:56AM (#20291860)
The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)
Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by nolok on Thursday June 27, 2019 @10:44AM (#20294842)
The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.
Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by salawat on Thursday June 27, 2019 @10:46AM (#20294860)
This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks.

For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles).

Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view.

A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers

Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance.

Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX.

[1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...

Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by mantap on Wednesday June 26, 2019 @10:48PM (#20291340)
What seems to have happened is that the system was originally designed with more conservative parameters. Testing showed that these parameters were insufficient to prevent a stall so they "turned it up to 11", and didn't re-evaluate the original design.
Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by salawat on Wednesday June 26, 2019 @10:53PM (#20291370)
It wasn't that it wasn't sufficient.

It was that they found similar behavior happening in a low-speed part of the flight envelope. That required increasing the authority and losing the G-load safeguard.

Re:FAA Finds New Risk on 737 Max, Orders Boeing to Make Changes by jussij on Thursday June 27, 2019 @08:38AM (#20293838)
> "turned it up to 11", and didn't re-evaluate the original design.

In other words they thru all engineers principals out the window.

Now there is no doubt this is exactly what happened.

But the bigger question is why did this happen and why was it allowed to happen?