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Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by staunch on Saturday May 11, 2019 @06:33PM (#19888783)
Now imagine if Boeing had created a brand new design instead of the 737 MAX and it had some mysterious fatal flaw as well? Second System Syndrome is something every engineer should understand. There's just no good reason to suspect a brand new design would've been bug free or easier to debug than the 737 MAX.

The 787s or A320neos could start dropping out of the sky at any minute. Maybe their carbon fiber panels start disintegrating midair after some number of pressurization cycles. The 787s almost did drop out of the sky due to battery problems. Because of the complexity involved, the only hard proof of an aircraft's safety is many years of successful flying.

Other planes have had fatal flaws that took a lot more work to discover. The silver lining of the 737 MAX's MCAS problem seems to be that it is at least quite straightforward to fix, as far as aircraft bugs go.

IMHO Boeing should payout millions for each death they caused, fix the mistakes that caused them, reorient their culture towards safety first, and return the 737 MAX to service. If they work very hard and learn from this mistake there's no reason to think they can't regain the public's trust within a few years.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by blattimwind on Saturday May 11, 2019 @07:07PM (#19888944)
> There's just no good reason to suspect a brand new design would've been bug free or easier to debug than the 737 MAX.

A brand new design actually supporting the engines used would not have aerodynamic issues that place the airframe outside the limits set forth by regulations.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by cm2187 on Saturday May 11, 2019 @08:37PM (#19889343)
I think the point if the OP isn't that a new design would have the same flaw, but rather that it would possibly introduce many other flaws. I think the analogy to a full software rewrite vs fixing a bug in a battle tested software is relevant.
Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by CydeWeys on Saturday May 11, 2019 @09:07PM (#19889447)
The larger point is that the 737 is a highly antiquated design by this point. The cockpit has screens that emulate old analog displays to maintain common type rating, even though much better ways of displaying that data now exist. The plane's controls are highly manual, which are a negative now that fly-by-wire and autopilots are mature and very good. Hell, the entire plane sits so low to the ground because it was designed to support a non-jetway use case (which is now non-existent), and as a result 737s are more susceptible to foreign object damage from debris sucked up off the runway.

The 737 is riddled through with legacy design features and needs to be put to pasture once and for all. And designing a replacement wouldn't be from scratch; there are plenty of other modern airliners to base a new one off of.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by kortilla on Sunday May 12, 2019 @12:08AM (#19890080)
>so low to the ground because it was designed to support a non-jetway use case (which is now non-existent)

Complete bullshit. I’ve boarded/deplaned without a jetway in Beijing, SLC, JAC, and AMS in the last couple of years alone.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by CydeWeys on Sunday May 12, 2019 @05:30AM (#19890959)
I meant to say "no ground support whatsoever". I've deplaned 737s and 320s on the tarmac recently too (at big airports), and they used mobile stairs. It's the stairs integrated into the aircraft itself that the 737 was designed around, and that's what's antiquated. Hell, just flying the stairs around with you is very fuel inefficient.
Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by hirowan on Sunday May 12, 2019 @07:23AM (#19891274)
I think it's a little bit of everything (stairs, tech, loading/unloading) but the main reason prrrobably was being able to throw bags into the cargo hold without the need for GSE - the airstair could've easily been made taller.
Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by raverbashing on Sunday May 12, 2019 @03:25AM (#19890644)
It's not a "non-jetway" case, it's a non jetway and no airport stairs case and/or manual loading of cargo

An embedded staircase is an option on the 737

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by staunch on Saturday May 11, 2019 @07:27PM (#19889040)
What regulations are you referring to?

Yes, it's true that it would be have been free from this specific MCAS issue. But what other issues would a new design have had? It's impossible to know.

It's also true that if Boeing had done a better job of implementing the MCAS design it would have been viewed as a triumph of software solving hardware problems.

Air France 447 crashed in large part because the pilot flying was incapable of handling the aircraft at cruise speeds without software assisting him. He thought the plane would stop him from doing something stupid but it didn't because the software failed in a somewhat similar way to the MCAS failures (sensor failure).

Airbus hasn't done anything to make their planes easier to fly at cruises speeds without software because software assisting pilots with complex flight characteristics is a fundamentally sound idea. The important thing is that the software actually works. Clearly the first version MCAS did not work reliably but there is no reason to believe that it couldn't work reliably.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by smadurange on Sunday May 12, 2019 @01:54AM (#19890406)
Airbus uses software to enhance safety. MCAS is trying to fix a very specific and a potentially dangerous issue while keeping it from the pilots. So, I'm not sure if there's a good analogy there.
Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by staunch on Sunday May 12, 2019 @12:17PM (#19892765)
In both cases the software was designed to prevent the pilot from stalling the aircraft i.e. to enhance safety.

And yet hundreds of people died in Air France 447 because the pilot stalled the aircraft when sensor failure disabled the Airbus software without the pilot realizing it.

In the case of MCAS, people died because the Boeing software didn't disable itself due to sensor failure.

Definitely not the same issue but both examples of software-sensor-related fatal crashes.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by salawat on Sunday May 12, 2019 @06:14PM (#19894922)
Also note, Airbus has had issues where pilots are so used to the machine not letting them do something stupid, that direct law has caught them by surprise.

Automation creates complacency, which can be lethal when things go wrong.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by Theodores on Sunday May 12, 2019 @05:00AM (#19890881)
They should also announce a new aircraft design, a full replacement that is from blank canvas. There might not be that many sales in the sector if the humans are going to take climate change seriously but we all know that isn't going to happen and that Boeing need a fresh design.

The fresh design could tackle problems such as noise in a new way in order to get new customers.

Re:Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting a... by Aeolun on Saturday May 11, 2019 @11:55PM (#19890050)
Well, for one thing, a new design would have to be recertified.