Re:Some AMD CPU's RDRAND might not return random data after ...
by Havoc on Tuesday May 07, 2019 @08:26PM
(#19854757)
>By step 4 we have taken 26 microseconds and we have the kind of entropy I would be comfortable generating an RSA private key with.
And yet Truecrypt made me wiggle the mouse around for like 30 seconds?
Re:Some AMD CPU's RDRAND might not return random data after ...
by ris on Tuesday May 07, 2019 @05:48PM
(#19853759)
> 128-bits of random data is sufficient to securely generate a stream of 100s of terabytes of random data.
What you are describing is /dev/urandom. Your argument is basically "urandom is good enough for anybody". If you want to use that, use it.
Re:Some AMD CPU's RDRAND might not return random data after ...
by Dylan16807 on Tuesday May 07, 2019 @06:27PM
(#19854019)
/dev/urandom is not always sufficiently seeded.
/dev/random makes sure that it's seeded, then pretends it can run out somehow.
getrandom() with default settings is the right behavior almost always, and it took ages to get implemented.
Note that step 3 is effectively a measure of how precise the system clock and CPU are. Attacks have been demonstrated against step 3, but they require co-resident processes and don't apply during the boot-phase, if you've got a dedicated core at least. In theory if system clocks and CPU got super precise it could become too deterministic, but the point is the likelihood of /both/ that happening /and/ RDRAND being broken.