I think the only way to survive this is to use the electrical trim assist to get to level flight and then shut off the system. After it’s level you can go ahead and trim using the manual wheel. Well the other way to survive this is to not have Boeing design the mcas to read from one sensor only and also have mcas operate in a narrow authority.
it seems the trim wheels are connected manually to the trim mechanism in the back, but when the trim stabilizers are in an extreme position the wind loading on them makes it very hard/impossible to rotate the trim wheels manually.
from what i understand, one way to relieve/lessen the wind loading so that the manual wheels can be used again is to (in the case of trim down) dive the plane. this would lessen the wind loading on the stabilizer and allow the manual wheels to move again. but you would need "room" to dive, something they did not have in this case.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19575318 "option 2)" (on this same page) refers to a situation where a "dive" could be executed in a situation where manual strength is not enough to trim the aircraft.
Correct. One wonders if this is a consequence of trying to maintain the type rating and therefore not being able to introduce any pilot training about the MCAS feature, and therefore not being able to introduce any control features for it.
Such a system should have been subject to extreme scrutiny, and honestly it beggars belief that the potential for these accidents wasn't seen. "This system can trim the nose down beyond the authority of the manual controls, based on readings from a single non-redundant sensor" should have been more than enough to get the gears turning, and it seems that the deeper one looks it only gets worse.
I guess that's no longer a requirement.
They could make the trim control wheel mechanically assisted, for example (since there are cases where electronic trim control is required because because of the amount of force needed to turn the wheel)
I'd imagine it already IS mechanically assisted. There is a limit to how much you can amplify a pilot's input mechanically, and I'd imagine the load on the aircraft exceeded the amount of amplification needed.
I.e. your car has power steering, so the car manually adds power to the turn based on the user's input. That doesn't mean that something in the road can't override the input of both the driver and power steering and jerk the wheel.
MCAS will evidently work with less maximum nose-down trim than the current version has, as the proposed update places a limit on it.
Also, it's not zero power. A ram air turbine deploys and provides hydraulic pressure to move the controls. And there are batteries to keep a small number of essential flight instruments powered.
Are the trim wheels mechanically connected to the trim mechanism in the back? Is there no way to trim the horizontal stabilizer electrically without also enabling MCAS? What would happen if the pilots continually pressed the trim up switch on the yoke? That should've prevented MCAS from activating, right?
I thought Boeing airplanes were built such that "the pilot is always in control". That doesn't seem to be the case anymore, if by cutting the power to certain subsystems you can't control the airplane anymore.