Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by dalbasal on Friday April 05, 2019 @07:06AM
(#19581401)
When I was about 17 I read a Peter singer book on his ethical philosophy. It was all about grounding ethics rationally in principles. It made me enroll in a philosophy degree.
He flirted with all sorts of wierd conclusions. Babies are less conscious/intelligent/etc than ravens or apes. Does that mean they have the same moral standing as apes and birds?
However you try to rationalize human exceptionalism (or ethics in general), you can usually find examples where they don't apply to all people, or some other rational conclusion that doesn't feel right.
Anyway... I don't think our morals are or can be grounded in morality. Ultimately, "Man is the measure of all things." Morality applies where we decide it applies. There is no higher truth, no underlying rules we can unvover. There is only subjective human judgement and our attempts to rationalize it.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by AnIdiotOnTheNet on Friday April 05, 2019 @08:25AM
(#19581795)
> There is only subjective human judgement and our attempts to rationalize it.
I feel that the very realization of that fact is the first step in becoming a more moral person. Now that the previous model of morality has been shown to be fundamentally flawed, one can begin building the next.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by simonh on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:07AM
(#19582111)
Quite. Recognising that animals have many of the same experiences as us should inform but not necessarily dictate our moral position concerning them. I believe humans evolved form a common ancestor with apes, so for me it is completely unsurprising and to be expected that we share many of the same behaviours, sensations, experiences and feelings because I believe we inherited those from our pre-human ancestors. So when I see a human exhibit emotional responses and an ape displaying similar responses, that seems natural to me and I believe they have a common root in our evolutionary biology.
That doesn’t mean I have to assign apes moral equivalence to humans. Rights also imply responsibilities and apes are not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of a human being. But then you hit the argument that some human beings aren’t capable of fulfilling those responsibilities either. Well, we are communal and social beings. We have a tendency to treat members of our community differently from outsiders, and generally better. For example we treat citizens differently from non-citizens. Family differently from non-family. I think it’s reasonable to treat humans differently from non-humans and grant them enhanced rights.
However I do still accept our common biology and experiential and emotional lives with some animals. I can accept that when an ape or a human sit watching a sunset, relaxing and not actively thinking about anything, that they have fundamentally the same kind of experience. I think that reasonably extends to a bias against causing unnecessary suffering for example. How we treat others and how we treat animals says something about our character.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by mannykannot on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:41AM
(#19582365)
Our experiences may differ most from other animals in the degree to which we are aware of having them, and we assume that other people are similarly aware of having their own experiences and similarly assume that they are thinking the same of us -- we have a theory of mind (and in addition, we can discuss it, with both ourselves and other people, using language.)
a surprisingly wide range of species display something similar in some cases, though it is hard to say how aware they are of it, or how important it is to their lives.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by simonh on Friday April 05, 2019 @12:19PM
(#19584025)
If animals behave as though they have a theory of mind (empathy, love, self-sacrifice, etc) without actually having a theory of mind, that raises very prickly problems concerning human evolution. After all if you don’t have to have a theory of mind to exhibit the behaviours of having one, did our common ancestors exhibit this behaviour before they developed a theory of mind? Presumably the answer would have to be yes, because all of our close evolutionary relatives exhibit this behaviour. It would be extraordinary to suppose that this behaviour evolved completely independently in all these animals and that our common ancestor didn’t have this behaviour.
So if our non-human ancestors exhibited this behaviour, but did not actually have a theory of mind, how come we can say that our equivalent behaviour does flow from having a theory of mind? That makes no sense. So we develop the behaviour first, then we develop a theory of mind, and it’s a pure co-incidence that the behaviour flowing from having a theory of mind just so happens to be completely indistinguishable, even though the cause is completely different? I just don't see how that can be credible.
The only coherent account, to me, is that the behaviour we have which we believe flows from having a theory of mind, if exhibited by other animals, must be evidence that they posses a theory of mind as well.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by mannykannot on Friday April 05, 2019 @03:22PM
(#19586084)
Firstly, let me make it clear that I am not saying that only humans have a theory of mind, and I am also not saying that it is a binary property, either you have it in full or not at all.
Having said that, one can still consider when, where, how and how often it evolved. For example, there are many species that cache food. Some (some squirrels and also scrub jays, for example) will either only pretend to cache the food they are carrying, or move it later, if they notice they are being observed. Is that an application of a general theory of mind at work, or an instinct that evolved for one particular circumstance? As far as the ethical treatment of animals is concerned, I have no objection to assuming the former, but if we want a scientific understanding of what is really going on, that assumption cannot be made without further evidence.
What you are overlooking, I think, is that there are several possible explanations for the externally-observable behavior, and once you recognize that, there should be no paradox. In our case, we, as privileged observers of our own minds, can see our theory of mind at work, and, through language, we can talk to other people and ask how it seems to them. Neither of these lines of inquiry are an option when it comes to studying other species.
There is an interesting parallel in ethics: some people are well-behaved because they are fearful of punishment or ostracism, while some do so out of respect for other people. You can't always tell motive from actions alone.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by simonh on Friday April 05, 2019 @10:16PM
(#19588748)
I’m aware of the idea of parallel evolution. You’re quite right, it’s entirely plausible and not something we can dismiss out of hand.
With species like squirrels that are more remotely related to us, there is more scope for an argument of parallel evolution, sure. Maybe their similar behaviour developed independently and has a different cause especially when other mammals do not exhibit this behaviour.
With our much closer relatives such as apes though that exhibit so many more behaviours that are very close to ours it’s much less plausible. If all of them exhibit a common pattern of social behaviour with ourselves, arguing all of them could have independently developed this behaviour separately from us and each other, to appear indistinguishable, that seems highly implausible.
Even with squirrels though, as mammals they exhibit many behaviours common to all mammals. Behaviours we exhibit as well. So if all mammals have these behaviours and we do too, if our behaviour has a different cause, at some point our ancestors must have switched from exhibiting the behaviour due to the common mamalian cause to exhibiting it due to this new cause unique to us. I don’t find that account very plausible either.
Did our ancestors stop exhibiting this behaviour first, then develop new neurological mechanisms that happened to replace the lost behaviours? When did that happen, before or after we diverged from other apes? Maybe they have these behaviour for the same reason as us but other mammals don’t? Did we develop a parallel mechanism and the behaviour transitioned to the new causal mechanism? I’d expect to see some residual evidence in our neurology or behavioural patterns of that having happened.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by mannykannot on Saturday April 06, 2019 @10:11AM
(#19590802)
Parallel or convergent evolution is coincidental to the point I was making, which is that you cannot assume a theory of mind from observations that might be consistent with it; you also have to give due consideration to the other possibilities, such as it being an instinctive behavior evolved for a particular situation.
>Even with squirrels though, as mammals they exhibit many behaviours common to all mammals. Behaviours we exhibit as well. So if all mammals have these behaviours and we do too...
Here you are combining speculation with an argument from the general to the specific. There are some behaviors common to all mammals, but are there any theory-of-mind-like behaviors in that category? No, so the rest of that paragraph and the one following are built on a false premise.
I am no expert, but FWIW, I happen to think that apes, or at least chimpanzees and orangutans, do have a nascent theory of mind, and that it was more developed in the various hominins that are now extinct.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by mannykannot on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:30AM
(#19582277)
Rationalizations of morality may be more or less flawed, but the golden rule is a pretty good basis for practical ethics, regardless of its philosophical status.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by mannykannot on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:51AM
(#19582455)
Well, it doesn't actually assume that - it raises the issue, and provides a basis for discussing it.
When it comes to other animals, I personally tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, though I don't think there is much room for doubt, in the case of snails, as to whether they have inner lives (for example, I think cone snails are dangerous, but not evil.)
AI is an interesting case because the discussion of AI ethics is almost always about having AI behave ethically towards us.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by Causality1 on Friday April 05, 2019 @11:06AM
(#19583258)
Humans are not rational beings. A tremendous fraction of our thought processes arise from instinctual programming from survival in an era much different than our current environment. A fully rational being would look at a burning house and decide the 70 year old man is more worth saving thnn the five day old infant,but thinking like that isn't going to result in maximum reproductive success for your genes in the dangerous, resource - scarce environment we evolved in.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by Luc on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:48AM
(#19582421)
> Anyway... I don't think our morals are or can be grounded in morality. Ultimately, "Man is the measure of all things." Morality applies where we decide it applies. There is no higher truth, no underlying rules we can unvover. There is only subjective human judgement and our attempts to rationalize it.
That's pretty much the antithesis of, for example, Derek Parfitt's work, I would say. A lot of moral philosophers would disagree with this.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by bjoli on Friday April 05, 2019 @08:17AM
(#19581746)
I dont think we can just say morality applies where we want it to apply because you it will always be a part of the equation whether you want it or not. I would rather say that no moral system is perfect, and that there are many decision where you just have to pick the lesser of several wrongs. Just because we in certain situation chose not to look at them through a moral lens doesn't mean they a void of moral consequence .
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by papermill on Friday April 05, 2019 @10:34AM
(#19582911)
There are plenty of arguments against the "babies are less conscious than ravens" position. One of the most prominent being "Future like ours" and "thread of life" argument. A human baby may be less conscious than a raven, but he will eventually grow up to reach his adult potential which will easily outstrip that of ravens. There are plenty of other arguments which I'm sure you are familiar with if you majored in philosophy.
I agree with you on "subjective human judgement". I'd even suggest that morality is ultimately pure human selfishness. What we find "moral" and "immoral" changes as our interests change. Morality is what we feel relatively benefits us the most. It is selfish rationalization.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by Grustaf on Friday April 05, 2019 @06:30AM
(#19581232)
I don’t think most people care about what parts of the human brain are present in monkeys. Even if the difference is just quantitative, it still remains a fact that humans talk, make music, feel remorse and have civilisations. So clearly we are fuyndamentally different from all other animals, even if we have the same components.
The thing is really that when it comes to the mind, physical components are not really the interesting thing, holisitic, virtual components are what matter. Mice probably can’t feel remorse, but that is probably not because they lack a remorse center, it\s because their brains are too small or have too few connections to provide that functionality.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by 2muchcoffeeman on Friday April 05, 2019 @07:05AM
(#19581394)
> it still remains a fact that humans talk, make music, feel remorse and have civilisations
We are very clearly not the only species that can have complex communication. Other mammals do so without even counting primates.
Bird songs and whale songs are not music?
I partially agree about feelings. My gut says that animals have emotions. But we should not be assigning human emotions to whatever is going on with them. Though perhaps primates mirror our emotions since we are after all closely related.
They certainly don't have civilisations or culture on the level that we do. That's clear. But some other species of primate could have survived instead of us.
At the end of the day, we're just an accident of evolution. Our ultimate goals is still to mature and try and reproduce just like everything else.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by AnIdiotOnTheNet on Friday April 05, 2019 @08:27AM
(#19581815)
> So clearly we are [fundamentally] different from all other animals, even if we have the same components.
This is not even remotely clear. More and more we are finding that the properties we told ourselves separated our minds from those of animals are not unique to us.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by TeMPOraL on Friday April 05, 2019 @08:38AM
(#19581894)
I don't see poems written by mice, movies directed by monkeys, or starships built and crewed by dolphins. There's no lion embassy anywhere on the planet. Maybe only the cats plot to conquer the world.
Point is, "the properties we told ourselves separated our minds from those of animals [that] are not unique to us" result in a qualitatively different outcomes in us vs. all the other animals. For instance, human socializing is about as similar to raven socializing as a computer is similar to a bunch of bowls and pebbles.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by JoeAltmaier on Friday April 05, 2019 @09:58AM
(#19582515)
We changed in those 50,000 years. We are nowhere genetically the same. There was more change in the human genome in the last 50,000 years, than in millions before then.
We changed. Into something different. Which is different in kind, from the other animals.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by AnIdiotOnTheNet on Friday April 05, 2019 @11:40AM
(#19583619)
Are we different from the humans still living in tribal hunter-gatherer societies? Are they lesser beings, inherently inferior to our glorious master race?
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by posterboy on Sunday April 07, 2019 @07:26PM
(#19600634)
It's fascinating to think that poetry required a genetic disposition, that might have helped language to evolve. I rhymes in several ways are important for morphology, also alliteration and the like, and that's nothing to say of metaphors or aspects of poetry that I couldn't explain, might not even understand.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by Grustaf on Friday April 05, 2019 @12:11PM
(#19583934)
I don’t think we have changed significantly in ways that matter for this discussion. People 50.000 years ago, and indeed Neanderthals, were surely equally able to develop civilisation and high culture, given enough time.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by JoeAltmaier on Friday April 05, 2019 @12:55PM
(#19584511)
Incorrect. We've changed to adapt to sedentary community life with specialization. It is absolutely unclear and unlikely those ancient people and particularly Neanderthals, were able to develop 'high culture'. They were given tens of thousands of years and failed.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by kiliantics on Friday April 05, 2019 @01:06PM
(#19584649)
I don't know how you can decide this is incorrect. Earlier humans likely failed to develop civilisation because they were living under harsher conditions during an ice age. It probably isn't a coincidence that humans became sedentary only after the earth warmed, allowing agrarian communities to be successful.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by Zigurd on Friday April 05, 2019 @11:01AM
(#19583200)
I can imagine multiple conscious, tool-using, dextrous homo species who bear mostly helpless babies and who cook their food. That happened. I can also imagine conscious species evolving from primates. I can foresee someone being stupid enough to genetically engineer a very smart chimp. That's enough to think differently about some animals.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by JoeAltmaier on Friday April 05, 2019 @10:00AM
(#19582540)
...and we changed, in the last 50,000 years. More change than in millions before then. And it was probably civilization that did it. Adapting to live in larger communities has had a profound effect on us genetically.
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by lordnacho on Friday April 05, 2019 @10:34AM
(#19582912)
Maybe the expression he's looking for is that humans are part of a continuum. So we're not off the animal chart entirely, to be described by a whole other set of ideas, but we are at least somewhat special in where we've gone with things.
About religion, I don't think his argument holds. Sure it's human nature to believe in it, but it's also human nature to be quite violent. And we've come a long way in reducing violence, so why not also remove a way of thinking that no longer serves a purpose?
Re:Primatologist Frans de Waal takes exception with human ex...
by biztos on Friday April 05, 2019 @10:17AM
(#19582719)
I recently discovered that de Waal is a rather controversial figure in primatology circles. I’m probably getting this wrong since IANA(P|Z|B)[0] but I believe the gist was that he’d studied Bonobos in captivity and made all kinds of sweeping generalizations and questionable extrapolations based on his observations, and it turned out that the same animals studied in the wild behaved quite differently and a lot of people think his conclusions are not only wrong but dangerous, in that a lot of lay people use his work to give scientific legitimacy to popular but distinctly unscientific ideas.
FWIW I too dislike human exceptionalism, I just happen to have run across the “de Waal controversy” recently and thought I’d mention it.
[0]: Primatologist? Zoologist? Biologist? But at least I’m a primate!
He flirted with all sorts of wierd conclusions. Babies are less conscious/intelligent/etc than ravens or apes. Does that mean they have the same moral standing as apes and birds?
However you try to rationalize human exceptionalism (or ethics in general), you can usually find examples where they don't apply to all people, or some other rational conclusion that doesn't feel right.
Anyway... I don't think our morals are or can be grounded in morality. Ultimately, "Man is the measure of all things." Morality applies where we decide it applies. There is no higher truth, no underlying rules we can unvover. There is only subjective human judgement and our attempts to rationalize it.
I feel that the very realization of that fact is the first step in becoming a more moral person. Now that the previous model of morality has been shown to be fundamentally flawed, one can begin building the next.
That doesn’t mean I have to assign apes moral equivalence to humans. Rights also imply responsibilities and apes are not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of a human being. But then you hit the argument that some human beings aren’t capable of fulfilling those responsibilities either. Well, we are communal and social beings. We have a tendency to treat members of our community differently from outsiders, and generally better. For example we treat citizens differently from non-citizens. Family differently from non-family. I think it’s reasonable to treat humans differently from non-humans and grant them enhanced rights.
However I do still accept our common biology and experiential and emotional lives with some animals. I can accept that when an ape or a human sit watching a sunset, relaxing and not actively thinking about anything, that they have fundamentally the same kind of experience. I think that reasonably extends to a bias against causing unnecessary suffering for example. How we treat others and how we treat animals says something about our character.
a surprisingly wide range of species display something similar in some cases, though it is hard to say how aware they are of it, or how important it is to their lives.
So if our non-human ancestors exhibited this behaviour, but did not actually have a theory of mind, how come we can say that our equivalent behaviour does flow from having a theory of mind? That makes no sense. So we develop the behaviour first, then we develop a theory of mind, and it’s a pure co-incidence that the behaviour flowing from having a theory of mind just so happens to be completely indistinguishable, even though the cause is completely different? I just don't see how that can be credible.
The only coherent account, to me, is that the behaviour we have which we believe flows from having a theory of mind, if exhibited by other animals, must be evidence that they posses a theory of mind as well.
Having said that, one can still consider when, where, how and how often it evolved. For example, there are many species that cache food. Some (some squirrels and also scrub jays, for example) will either only pretend to cache the food they are carrying, or move it later, if they notice they are being observed. Is that an application of a general theory of mind at work, or an instinct that evolved for one particular circumstance? As far as the ethical treatment of animals is concerned, I have no objection to assuming the former, but if we want a scientific understanding of what is really going on, that assumption cannot be made without further evidence.
What you are overlooking, I think, is that there are several possible explanations for the externally-observable behavior, and once you recognize that, there should be no paradox. In our case, we, as privileged observers of our own minds, can see our theory of mind at work, and, through language, we can talk to other people and ask how it seems to them. Neither of these lines of inquiry are an option when it comes to studying other species.
There is an interesting parallel in ethics: some people are well-behaved because they are fearful of punishment or ostracism, while some do so out of respect for other people. You can't always tell motive from actions alone.
With species like squirrels that are more remotely related to us, there is more scope for an argument of parallel evolution, sure. Maybe their similar behaviour developed independently and has a different cause especially when other mammals do not exhibit this behaviour.
With our much closer relatives such as apes though that exhibit so many more behaviours that are very close to ours it’s much less plausible. If all of them exhibit a common pattern of social behaviour with ourselves, arguing all of them could have independently developed this behaviour separately from us and each other, to appear indistinguishable, that seems highly implausible.
Even with squirrels though, as mammals they exhibit many behaviours common to all mammals. Behaviours we exhibit as well. So if all mammals have these behaviours and we do too, if our behaviour has a different cause, at some point our ancestors must have switched from exhibiting the behaviour due to the common mamalian cause to exhibiting it due to this new cause unique to us. I don’t find that account very plausible either.
Did our ancestors stop exhibiting this behaviour first, then develop new neurological mechanisms that happened to replace the lost behaviours? When did that happen, before or after we diverged from other apes? Maybe they have these behaviour for the same reason as us but other mammals don’t? Did we develop a parallel mechanism and the behaviour transitioned to the new causal mechanism? I’d expect to see some residual evidence in our neurology or behavioural patterns of that having happened.
>Even with squirrels though, as mammals they exhibit many behaviours common to all mammals. Behaviours we exhibit as well. So if all mammals have these behaviours and we do too...
Here you are combining speculation with an argument from the general to the specific. There are some behaviors common to all mammals, but are there any theory-of-mind-like behaviors in that category? No, so the rest of that paragraph and the one following are built on a false premise.
I am no expert, but FWIW, I happen to think that apes, or at least chimpanzees and orangutans, do have a nascent theory of mind, and that it was more developed in the various hominins that are now extinct.
When it comes to other animals, I personally tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, though I don't think there is much room for doubt, in the case of snails, as to whether they have inner lives (for example, I think cone snails are dangerous, but not evil.)
AI is an interesting case because the discussion of AI ethics is almost always about having AI behave ethically towards us.
That's pretty much the antithesis of, for example, Derek Parfitt's work, I would say. A lot of moral philosophers would disagree with this.
I agree with you on "subjective human judgement". I'd even suggest that morality is ultimately pure human selfishness. What we find "moral" and "immoral" changes as our interests change. Morality is what we feel relatively benefits us the most. It is selfish rationalization.
The thing is really that when it comes to the mind, physical components are not really the interesting thing, holisitic, virtual components are what matter. Mice probably can’t feel remorse, but that is probably not because they lack a remorse center, it\s because their brains are too small or have too few connections to provide that functionality.
We are very clearly not the only species that can have complex communication. Other mammals do so without even counting primates.
Bird songs and whale songs are not music?
I partially agree about feelings. My gut says that animals have emotions. But we should not be assigning human emotions to whatever is going on with them. Though perhaps primates mirror our emotions since we are after all closely related.
They certainly don't have civilisations or culture on the level that we do. That's clear. But some other species of primate could have survived instead of us.
At the end of the day, we're just an accident of evolution. Our ultimate goals is still to mature and try and reproduce just like everything else.
Animal language is very limited, it is fair to call it fundamentally different. Same with bird songs.
As to your last statement, that’s just that, a statement without basis.
This is not even remotely clear. More and more we are finding that the properties we told ourselves separated our minds from those of animals are not unique to us.
Point is, "the properties we told ourselves separated our minds from those of animals [that] are not unique to us" result in a qualitatively different outcomes in us vs. all the other animals. For instance, human socializing is about as similar to raven socializing as a computer is similar to a bunch of bowls and pebbles.
There's also something to be said about using your own ruler when measuring someone else's worth.
We changed. Into something different. Which is different in kind, from the other animals.
The outcome is fundamentally different, but not necessarily the brain.
https://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/slave-ants-and...
https://modernfarmer.com/2014/04/meet-earths-oldest-farmers-...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/science/ant-fungus-farmer...
About religion, I don't think his argument holds. Sure it's human nature to believe in it, but it's also human nature to be quite violent. And we've come a long way in reducing violence, so why not also remove a way of thinking that no longer serves a purpose?
FWIW I too dislike human exceptionalism, I just happen to have run across the “de Waal controversy” recently and thought I’d mention it.
[0]: Primatologist? Zoologist? Biologist? But at least I’m a primate!