> The researchers however disagreed with Intel's comments and reportedly said in an online discussion that the patched Intel firmware can be downgraded using Intel ME, making the chipset vulnerable and opening the door for accessing Intel VISA.
I agree that "physical access" is a threat that I'm not too concerned about¹. But the researchers don't seem to agree that that's the extent of the issue.
¹If physical access means "disassemble the case and do X". If physical access is "two seconds with an exposed USB port", then that's a different matter.
0) http://www.computersecurity.com/coverlock/
1) https://www.amazon.com/Kensington-Cable-Guard-Rectangular-K6...
Made me wonder if an attack scenario would be feasible where compromised phones could be used for targeted attacks utilizing one of the USB vulnerabilities; essentially just laying dormant until the user plugs into something interesting to charge.
Assuming that: Physical access vectors are often deemed a low priority/less likely to be patched and that testing if an employee cares more about the BYoD security policy or their dying phone will have not favor infosec. It seemed like an interesting way to get access to point of sale systems that I had not heard anyone talk about before.
Some other privilege escalation vulnerability would have to be exploited go beyond the usual app malware capabilities but I don't know enough about USB or mobile OS's to know if it would be possible even with root(maybe that's why no one talks about it).
No, the main thing is if VISA is for qualifying chips on the production line, why don’t they burn a fuse permanently disabling it on chips that pass QA?
This said, its basically a giant signal mux system run into a main block, you'd be pretty limited on what preselected signals are available at a time. People were also reasonably careful not to give entire busses of signals at once.
Speaking of documentation, while not fully open, Intel/AMD are already ahead of many others when it comes to documenting things. Look at the SoCs used in smartphones and tablets, or the infamous Raspberry Pi. AFAIK, Intel is not in the business of making secure cryptoprocessors like the ones used in payment cards and SIMs, but once again even with those you are very unlikely to find public documentation --- everything is NDA'd.
That said, don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating for leaving things undocumented; just explaining how it usually turns out that way.
They have entered a rather comparable space with stuff like TPM and SGX (and are largely using it for nefarious, consumer-hostile stuff like DRM and remote code attestation, of course).
Unless there are countermeasures that we don’t know about, this is a huge backdoor for such systems.
With DRM, the attackers afe consumers. With enclaves, the attackers are Intel and government intelligence agencies.
You will always want layers of security and even then security is an illusion .... there will always be a way, just with different costs to exploit and thus risk/reward frontier.
Unless that service has monopoly power. SGX makes it far too easy for an entity to abuse monopoly power, by directly turning it into power over what their customers have to run. This is why this sort of thing should only ever be done via physical devices - "monopoly" over a single, dedicated device is far more obvious and less insidious.
People care because that means that when you run something in the "Cloud(tm)" you have to trust the cloud provider.
The goal of things like "SGX" was so that you could run things on machines under someone else's control and still trust the results.
Oblivious RAM, FHE, ZKSNARKs are to be considered when you don’t trust the hardware, the users, the cloud, administrators, etc.
Some combo of TEEs, formal verification, binary verification, FHE, etc. might keep your data secure for a little while...maybe.
Am I the only one here who thinks "threat model" and isn't all too worried? Physical access = full control, I've long held that belief and am not happy that this freedom is continually being eroded in the name of ever-increasing ridiculous "security" (a lot of it against the user, for things like DRM, as mentioned in one of the other comments here.)
Debugging/"test mode" features are basically present in all modern CPUs. I would not bet that Intel is the only one.
Edit: such features have been present in CPUs dating back to the late 70s, so perhaps "modern" isn't needed: see http://forum.6502.org/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=3366 and http://e4aws.silverdr.com/hacks/6500_1/