Apple can't extract information from your device, even under subpoena. They'd have to push an OS update that explicitly changes what they do to start sending that info to Apple, but the US legal system doesn't allow the government to compel them to make that kind of change.

That said, if the data is available in your iCloud backup in a form that can be read by other devices, Apple can presumably extract that data under subpoena. If it's in your iCloud backup but encrypted with a per-device key (like your non-iCloud keychain entries), Apple cannot extract that because decrypting the backup (which they can do) isn't sufficient to decrypt this per-device-encrypted data.

All that said, if the government wants to know your spending history, it would be simpler just to subpoena Goldman Sachs.

> They'd have to push an OS update that explicitly changes what they do to start sending that info to Apple, but the US legal system doesn't allow the government to compel them to make that kind of change

Australia's does now.

I'm not quite sure exactly what Australia's laws actually let them do regarding Apple, but what I am sure of is if Australia tried to compel Apple to add a backdoor to iOS, Apple would stop doing business in Australia rather than comply.

Their position in China doesn't reflect that.

Their position in China is not offering iCloud at all is no better than offering iCloud where the data is managed by a Chinese company. Importantly, this does not affect anyone outside of China. This compromise to follow the law sucks, but it doesn't fundamentally weaken protections for anyone else. And of course iCloud is optional and can be turned off by any Chinese citizen who doesn't want their data stored on Chinese servers.

Altering the OS to install a backdoor is a much different beast. It's non-optional, fundamentally weakens the security of the entire OS, and affects all customers everywhere, not just Australian citizens.

Also, if Apple did withdraw from Australia, any Australian citizen who wished to use an iPhone could still acquire one from overseas (though this is admittedly a fair amount of effort) and they'd continue to have a secure computing experience.

> but the US legal system doesn't allow the government to compel them to make that kind of change.

Source? I’m pretty sure the legal system does allow that.

The legal system lets them say "you already have the information? Great, give it to me". It doesn't let them say "you have to redesign your systems to collect information that you explicitly told your users you aren't collecting".

I don't have a direct citation for you, besides having seen this spoken about before, but a simple thought exercise should prove it: If the government could compel that sort of thing, then we wouldn't have end-to-end encrypted chat (including iMessage) and the government would have already compelled Apple to give the government a backdoor into iPhones.

I personally want the law to say that but:

The FBI took a different view in a recent court case referencing the All Writs act of 1789 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_d... but dropped it when they unlocked the device by other means., and the issue hasn't really made it through the court system, so it's unclear what the law requires.

Until a federal case gets to the appeals court level it basically won't establish any binding precedent in other cases under stare decisis.

Good news is the FBI doesn't write the law. My recollection is the general consensus was the FBI was severely overreaching and was going to lose their court case.

I mean that's what I think, but general consensus also doesn't write the law, unfortunately.

I think under the construct that computer code is a means of expression protected under the first amendment, the US government requiring Apple to implement a code change would be considered a form of compelled speech.