Edit: remove "interpret" from last sentence to clarify
Read it in full here: https://www.statisticsdonewrong.com/power.html#the-wrong-tur...
Not really. A low p-value says that it was surprising to get the result that you got, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. And if the null hypothesis is true it would be surprising to get again the same result (i.e. a result as extreme). If the null hypothesis is not true, the result would not be so surprising (or maybe more, if the true effect is in the “wrong” direction).
The result we got gives some evidence for the null hypothesis being false, but if the null hypothesis was very very likely to be true before it may still be very likely to be true afterwards. In that case it wouldn’t be surprising to get a different result if the experiment is performed again.
Illustration: I roll a die three times. I get three ones. P<0.01 (for the null hypothesis of a fair die and the two-tailed test on the average). This is not simply saying that if I roll the die three times again it would be surprising to get something other than ones.
Hmm. At a glance, that doesn't seem right. Yes, the chances of rolling 3 1's is 1/(6^3), but if we only rolled once and got a single 1, we wouldn't have any reason to suspect that the die was unfair. So maybe we should only consider the second two repetitions, and conclude with p ~ .03 that the die is unfair? Otherwise, consider the case that we rolled a 1, 5, 2 --- certainly we shouldn't use this series of non-repeated outcomes as p < .01 evidence of an unfair die?
The sampling distribution for the average can be calculated and for three rolls the extreme values are 1 (three ones) and 6 (three sixes) which happen with probability 1/216 each. Getting three ones or three sixes is then a p=0.0093 result.
You raise a valid point. This is clearly not the best test for detecting unfair dice, because for a die which has only two equally probable values 3 and 4 we would reject the null hypothesis even less often than for a fair die! (In that case, the power would be below alpha, which is obviously pretty bad.)
P values don't tell you the chances of getting the same result, only with the chances of getting the same result by chance.
If we repeat the experiment and get a different result, then we need to be looking into confounding variables and testing methodology. Just because the P-value is low doesn't mean there's no fundamental flaw in the experiment used to find the p-value.
You're only allowed to say either nothing happened or it's unlikely nothing happened, but it doesn't say what the "unlikely nothing happened" means.
I would say it’s the other way around.
The p-value says something about the result (how likely this result would be if the null hypothesis were true).
It doesn’t say anything about the probability of the null hypothesis being true.
It's how likely the result is to occur by chance if the null hypothesis is true. A positive result can occur for lots of other reasons even if the null hypothesis is true, and the p-value doesn't tell you anything about how likely you are to get a certain result if the null hypothesis is true (or false).
I don’t think your comment makes sense.
Given a parametric model and a particular value of the parameter (i.e. the null hypothesis) one can calculate the sampling distribution of the data.
Therefore under the null hypothesis the model gives a well-defined probability distribution for the data and you can tell how likely you are to get a certain result.
There is no room for “other reasons”.
Looking at the p-value of a study doesn't tell you anything about how likely the study was to have been based on fabricated data.
I agree that if the data is made up the results of the study and the statistical analysis based on the results will have no relation whatsoever with the fact that the null hypothesis was or wasn’t true.
The p-value tells you just how likely you are to get a certain (or more extreme) result if the data generating model is indeed correct and the null hypothesis is true.
We agree that the p-value doesn’t tell you anything about how likely it is that the study was based on fabricated data, or how likely it is that the model is correct or how likely it is that the null hypothesis is true.
The p-value doesn’t tell us anything about the real world. It’s a probability conditional on a hypothetical model.
That interpretation subtly suggests that the P-value gives an estimate of the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis being true.
Any observation is consistent with an infinite number of models. Eg., your sight is defective, ie., in many cases: your sample is biased, not big enough, etc.
And that A correlates with B, or fails to, to "some significance" is consistent with any causal relationship between A and B.
> Surveys of hundreds of articles have found that statistically non-significant results are interpreted as indicating ‘no difference’ or ‘no effect’ in around half (see ‘Wrong interpretations’ and Supplementary Information).
You can't expect a statistical test to comb through your experimental procedure to check whether or not you did it right. (Least of all, to comb through your personal medical history. ;) )
>Any observation is consistent with an infinite number of models.
I'm afraid that slips below the "get out of bed in the morning" pragmatism bar. Although it's a provocative idea, concluding that conclusions are impossible because you could be making a mistake or hallucinating would lead to, literally, not getting out of bed in the morning, if you took it seriously.
At the end of the day you just have to hope that the human beings reading your paper will be able to tell whether or not you did the experiment right. Any statistical test just walls off one way (or a few ways) in which you could fool yourself.
>Surveys of hundreds of articles have found that statistically non-significant results are interpreted as indicating ‘no difference’ or ‘no effect’ in around half (see ‘Wrong interpretations’ and Supplementary Information).
What we really want to avoid here is requiring every paper to have a twelve paragraph Sophist disclaimer about how knowledge is impossible. ;) Just because the text doesn't say "oh and by the way there could be gnomes in the LHC that are fooling us to entertain themselves," doesn't mean that the author wouldn't begrudgingly acknowledge it as an epistemic risk.
It isnt a trivial sceptical point.
Does CO2 cause climate change, or climate change cause C02, or are they both caused by a hidden factor (one of many) or do they co-vary accidentally (ie., no joint cause)?
No "statistical significance" of any kind can decide between them, yet this is how it is used. There is no way to do so with statistics; it requires repeated experimentation and refutation of all plausible causal models until the one remains stands as "the most plausible".
"Statistics" is being used in place of the scientific method which it cannot replace. Covariation is not causation: the covarying of any number of variables is consistent with any number of causal models. No "test" decides.
The point is for people to make a decision using probability as one available decision aid, and then deciding whether to place a bet.
Not if you don't have free will, which is apparently the conclusion that a lot of scientists seem to be coming to recently.
When I look around me I see people doing this every day.
Emphasis added (obviously). This word was missing from the analysis of whatshisface (GGP). While all of our models are probabilistic, and it would be silly to constantly describe everything this way in normal parlance, a discussion of how we want to go about building and interpreting models of the world is exactly the domain where this needs to be explicitly stated. You're not wrong here, but neither is GP. GGP is wrong, though not provably so (again, obviously).
> In effect, we can make a statement like "at least 90% of studies like ours will detect an elephant larger than 20 microns if it is actually there on the table".
The "in effect" disclaimer makes this statement arguable, but fundamentally we still can't say that. We can only say whether or not an elephant was detected, since detection (in this sense) is subjective. We can't say whether elephants actually exist or not. Perhaps all tables have invisible elephants on them, or perhaps all elephants are hallucinations shared by multiple humans through crazy coincidence. If 50% of elephants that actually exist on tables are invisible, and 10% of visible elephants are not detected due to error, then only 45% of studies will detect an elephant even though it will still seem like 90% to best of our knowledge. Since we don't know what percentage of elephants are currently detectable we need to be even more ridiculous and say something like "we guesstimate that there is a 99ish% chance that at least 90% of studies like ours will detect an elephant larger than 20 microns if it is actually there on the table".
Edit: s/whathisface/whatshisface
I have seen outrageous examples of "accepting the null hypothesis" many times, but many negative result studies have great value and even a single negative study can provide evidence against a very large effect.
True, but this crucial assumption needs to be kept in mind when using the study to inform yourself of the state of the world. Too often, it's forgotten that there are two questions that need answering for the study to be relevant and, only one of those has a number associated with it.
In that sense, Bayesian statistics, where this is explicit, are less misleading because they actually draw attention to the fact that we don't know that the model is correct.
Interesting point about Bayesian methods, whenever there are potential flaws or additional uncertainty, it's better if they are more explicit to prompt thoughtful interpretation.
If you're willing to treat probability as a measure of uncertainty, then you'd be right at home as a Bayesian.
But successfully ruling out an elephant is uninteresting if you didn't expect an elephant. The problem is that "statistically significant" sounds impressive, but we shouldn't be impressed.
I guess we need a less impressive term for this? Maybe something like "may have avoided statistical blindness."
The groups need not be similar to fail to rule out the null. It can also be that the measurements are too noisy and too few.
Also on the flip side, if you do reject the null, it doesn't mean the the groups are different. It could also be that you have so many measurements that you are picking up tiny biases in your experiment or instruments.
Null hypothesis testing is almost always too weak of a test to be useful.
A tiny effect is very easy to reject (p<0.0000...000001). I can tell you before running the experiment that any two objects close enough for long enough to be in each other's light cone have at least a tiny effect on each other.
The null hypothesis is hereby rejected for most anything relevant to humans. No need to calculate p-values. Just reference this comment.
I don't see why a scientist at a conference who's saying that two groups are the same has to be heard as claiming, "we have measured every electron in their bodies and found that they have the same mass, forget about six sigma, we did it to infinity." Instead they could simply be understood to be saying that the two groups must be similar enough to not have ruled out the null hypothesis in their study.