This should not be done preemptively.
An example of the bad side is that Nvidia says they cannot develop drivers for their cards because Apple hasn't allowed them to (Apple develops the drivers). I technically believe they can, but they would have to make the user jump through some very unreasonable steps (reboot into a maintenance mode and disable integrity protection).
Just confirming this is accurate. SIP wouldn't need to be disabled completely, just the blocking of unsigned kexts. (Apple allows you to selectively enable and disable pieces of SIP).
I don't think this would be so wholly unreasonable. The types of users installing third party video cards in their Macs are the types of users who should know how to do this. At the cost of their security, you could argue, but of course you still have normal Unix root restrictions to protect you there, as long as you're savvy enough to not grant such permissions to any random software.
Unless of course by enforce you mean taking control of the sandboxing away from the user, in which case I totally agree that should not be done because I'm against that kind of user-hostile bullshit.
Nearly every effort I've seen by OS makers to implement sandboxing by default also makes the sandbox difficult or impossible to disable. iOS, UWP, the list goes on. I agree they shouldn't be connected, but they nearly always are. And it's always done in the name of protecting users.
macOS is the one bright spot here, and even then, the new dialogs in Mojave that can't be disabled fare crippling if you make heavy use of apps that need access to other app's sandboxes[1]. I'm convinced that if Apple moves to ARM, it will likely come with a massive tightening on user restrictions, in the name of security.
[1] https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/339509/edit-tcc-db...
Sandboxing should be done, treating users like children who need to have control stripped from them for their own good should not.
As soon as you implement the option at an OS level, there are going to be (many!) developers who want it enforced for all users. It's the obvious path to go down.
Note, I use Dark Souls as an example here (as opposed to, say, Skyrim) because Dark Souls mods were very much not developer-sanctioned at the outset. If From Software had needed to explicitly allow mods, you can bet they never would have happened.
Maybe if these notifications were less vague, they wouldn't be hounded as annoying and useless... Just saying.
That behaviour is a little bit gross.
99% of end users will not be able to reverse engineer the binary and find out that copy is never transmitted. The fact it is 'touching' private files at all without any consent degrades trust.
Furthermore, if I want to delete all traces of Steam from my computer how the hell would I know there is a copy of steam's localconfig in a different program's folder? or what if I backup or share privately/publicly my EpicLauncher directory without realizing all my steam contacts are in there?
Epic might be doing the right thing today. Will they tomorrow? Is every library they use trustworth forever?
~ Darth Vader
You can read the changes to the ToS at www.palpatine2020.com/toremotetomakeaneffectdemonstration
I want this to be the normal. Right now, it's basically a free for all -- record the screen, send network requests, fingerprint hardware, scan for files, examine other processes. The default, out-of-the-box security settings for most distributions are unacceptable.
I'm really excited to see that sandboxing on native is starting to move in the same direction as the web; I'm hoping that within the next year or two we start to see dramatic improvement here.
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The launcher sends a hardware survey (CPU, GPU, and the like) at a regular interval as outlined in our privacy policy(see the “Information We Collect or Receive” section). You can find the code here.
The UDP traffic highlighted in this post is a launcher feature for communication with the Unreal Editor. The source of the underlying system is available on github.
The majority of the launcher UI is implemented using web technology that is being rendered by Chromium (which is open source). The root certificate and cookie access mentioned above is a result of normal web browser start up.
The launcher scans your active processes to prevent updating games that are currently running. This information is not sent to Epic.
We only import your Steam friends with your explicit permission. The launcher makes an encrypted local copy of your localconfig.vdf Steam file. However information from this file is only sent to Epic if you choose to import your Steam friends, and then only hashed ids of your friends are sent and no other information from the file.
Epic is controlled by Tim Sweeney. We have lots of external shareholders, none of whom have access to customer data.
Daniel Vogel VP of Engineering Epic Games Inc.