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Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by stcredzero on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @05:58PM (#19323856)
Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex.

Do they distrust their own coders to the same degree they distrust the processes they sandbox? I suspect the answer to this is "no" but I would like to hear from someone who actually codes there.

I think the truth is more like this: You can write safe C++, just like you can keep a secret. It's just that the odds that you fail go up with the size of the team involved, and it does that by compounding. So by the time you get to the size of the Google Chrome team, the odds of failure are very, very close to 1.

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by zetafunction on Thursday March 07, 2019 @01:05AM (#19325898)
> Do they distrust their own coders to the same degree they distrust the processes they sandbox? I suspect the answer to this is "no" but I would like to hear from someone who actually codes there.

Actually, the answer is yes. That's why the renderer process is sandboxed.

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by nothrabannosir on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @06:28PM (#19324058)
The number of people required was a function of the "this complex" qualifier.

I can write a safe C++ app on my own. I can't write Chrome on my own.

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by Johnny555 on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @06:50PM (#19324213)
I can write a safe C++ app on my own

But only if you don't use any external libraries, once you link in someone else's code, you can no longer be sure your program is "safe".

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by chii on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @07:41PM (#19324576)
> I can write a safe C++ app on my own >> But only if you don't use any external libraries

using an external library is not "on your own"

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by dymk on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @08:10PM (#19324729)
Can you use the STL? What boundary is considered trusted?
Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by chii on Thursday March 07, 2019 @09:34PM (#19334643)
The point i was making is that such boundary doesn't exist - no one can write everything "on their own".

Therefore, language features to prevent a class of exploits should be a high priority when considering a project.

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by Agathos on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @08:21PM (#19324776)
I can trust the compiler... I hope?
Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by stcredzero on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @08:24PM (#19324799)
Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by pjmlp on Thursday March 07, 2019 @02:43AM (#19326258)
Not at all, check the Linux 5.0 bug introduced by a gcc "optimization" regarding UB.
Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by Miltnoid on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @08:56PM (#19324937)
Use CompCert! (And C instead of C++)
Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by Johnny555 on Thursday March 07, 2019 @03:21PM (#19331929)
Don't most people link at least with basic libraries to help with I/O and other standard operating system interfaces?

Do many people really use the kernel syscall interface directly?

Re:Serious Chrome zero-day by stcredzero on Wednesday March 06, 2019 @07:11PM (#19324354)
once you link in someone else's code, you can no longer be sure your program is "safe"

This also fits in with the "keeping a secret" analogy. Good luck keeping something secret, if it has to be shared between organizations.