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Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Spivak on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:11AM (#19255451)
So what's the argument from the other side? Going through all this effort to allow PFS to be disabled seems like a ton of work? What's their use-case?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by rocqua on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:04PM (#19256107)
If your stance is:

No opaque data leaves my network

Then this is the only way you can have outbound HTTPS connections. And for e.g. a bank, certain legal firms, or any company that has a lot of sensitive data they either don't want to be leaked, or at least want the option of detecting when it is leaked, that is a somewhat reasonable stance. In the case of banks, this is needed for regulatory compliance regarding insider trading. For legal companies, I imagine this is about ensuring certain confidentiality. I could see the same thing for companies dealing with trade-secrets.

The statement 'Just log it on the end-points' presumes complete access to those end-points and all software running on them.

This method is considered better than terminating TLS early at a proxy and setting up a separate tunnel to the clients because breaking PFS is passive, rather than active. Thus it is a lot less resource intensive, a lot less vulnerable (no internet facing box that, if broken, has all communication in plaintext), and introduces no extra latency.

It is essentially a 'better' way to do an authorized MitM on everything on your network, and some companies want this authorized MitM. Like any authorized MitM, it introduces a third party who can compromise security, which is not generally desirable, but some companies don't mind being that third party to their own employees.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by deathanatos on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:27PM (#19257500)
Why not have the endpoints ship their session keys OoB to a centralized place / whatever needs to look at the traffic? Sure, there's more of them, but that shouldn't be a huge volume? (It is insignificant compared to the captured traffic.)

> The statement 'Just log it on the end-points' presumes complete access to those end-points and all software running on them.

There still has to be some control over the endpoints. Otherwise, what prevents them from negotiating an algorithm in TLS 1.2 that has PFS?

And I am not sure if you're attempting to address this, but instead of terminating at a more edge-ish node, why not just decrypt and re-encrypt there? (So, it is still encrypted internally, but the node can inspect the data in an authorized manner.) (You seem to address it, but I'm not sure what you mean: yeah, having a centralized box decrypting your traffic means that an attacker that gets access to that can see a lot. But what were you doing in TLS 1.2 w/ a non-PFS ciphersuite that didn't involve a machine w/ the ability to decrypt everything?)

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @05:37PM (#19259002)
> Why not have the endpoints ship their session keys OoB to a centralized place / whatever needs to look at the traffic? Sure, there's more of them, but that shouldn't be a huge volume? (It is insignificant compared to the captured traffic.)

When you have communication between two endpoints, over your own network, transmitting session keys OoB doesn't improve the security of your systems, but does increase the complexity.

> And I am not sure if you're attempting to address this, but instead of terminating at a more edge-ish node, why not just decrypt and re-encrypt there?

Aside from adding a ton of latency and extra performance overhead, you now have a new operational endpoint that you have to trust. That doesn't fit the trust model. They key point here is the data is getting logged and then decrypted offline, by a totally separate system.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by deathanatos on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @08:46PM (#19260175)
> doesn't improve the security of your systems

Having PFS increases security for your end users. (Minus your storing of the session keys, of course; if whatever you need the session keys for doesn't require you to store them forever, then it still seems like a benefit.) Being able to use standard, well-audited libraries instead of a proprietary piece of "enterprise" code is a benefit.

> Aside from adding a ton of latency and extra performance overhead

The performance of TLS on today's hardware is negligible; CPUs have instructions to accelerate it in hardware.

> you now have a new operational endpoint that you have to trust

No: In the prior TLS 1.2 design, the decryption key was on both the node MitM'ing the traffic, and the actual end nodes dealing with the traffic. The proposed TLS 1.3 alternative does not change that. (Nor does it improve it.)

If your TLS 1.2 was that you terminated at the node doing the MitM'ing, then do the same thing in TLS 1.3.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Wednesday February 27, 2019 @03:17AM (#19261778)
> Having PFS increases security for your end users.

The context of ETS/eTLS is that you yourself are the end user.

> The performance of TLS on today's hardware is negligible; CPUs have instructions to accelerate it in hardware.

Uh-huh. I like that you believe that, but with a lot of HFT systems, even the latency of going from the NIC to the CPU is too much. Adding a hop in between that decodes and then reencodes, the the inherent buffering involved, is way, way too much latency.

> No: In the prior TLS 1.2 design, the decryption key was on both the node MitM'ing the traffic, and the actual end nodes dealing with the traffic. The proposed TLS 1.3 alternative does not change that. (Nor does it improve it.) > > If your TLS 1.2 was that you terminated at the node doing the MitM'ing, then do the same thing in TLS 1.3.

Yeah... see, that's the part you aren't getting. The old model was also not terminating through a proxy with TLS 1.2. That actually doesn't address the needs of the trusted system.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by bmm6o on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @08:13PM (#19260014)
Not to mention that you have to trust the endpoint to ship their session keys. If one "forgets" or the key is "lost in the mail", there's no way to prove that message wasn't problematic.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by deathanatos on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @08:38PM (#19260131)
Assume that non-PFS ciphersuites had remained in TLS: You still have to trust the endpoint to not negotiate a PFS ciphersuite.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Wednesday February 27, 2019 @03:18AM (#19261780)
Yes, but a failure to do so would be considered a compromise, as opposed to a simple network failure.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by tinus_hn on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:22PM (#19256297)
It’s a pipe dream. The webpage or application can easily include its own encryption that can’t be broken by these proxies.

If your stance is ‘no opaque data leaves my network’ your only option is an air gap.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by acdha on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:04PM (#19256740)
Engineering is all about making trade-offs (“perfect is the enemy of the good and all”) and security engineering is no different. The same logic could be used to say that you don't need an edge firewall because each client should have one but it's much easier to simplify the baseline.

If nothing else, it would make the remaining traffic stand out more since you wouldn't be spending time auditing normal apps which decode cleanly and it's highly likely that someone trying to circumvent such a system would be required to do things which stand out more than routine usage.

As a simple example, an organization which does that kind of monitoring is unlikely to allow users to install arbitrary applications or visit any site on the web. With a standard setup, someone trying to exfiltrate data could just hit a popular site like Github, Gmail, Dropbox, etc. but if they need to use some custom encryption or steganography code they're either forced to install it somewhere far less common (i.e. more likely to stand out) or installing something locally where client monitoring can report an unusual browser extension or application.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by tinus_hn on Wednesday February 27, 2019 @05:57AM (#19262423)
A cute excuse until one of your popular sites starts to do this. Now it happens to be that Google hates these proxies as they are a popular target for repressive governments, who technically can’t be distinguished from a snooping ‘enterprise’.

The reality is that world kept turning without these proxies and it will keep turning once they are made obsolete.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by AndyMcConachie on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:19PM (#19256871)
It's not a pipe dream if your only goal is to be compliant with a formal rule or regulatory structure that requires it. The reason we need stuff like ETS is really because there are organizations that otherwise could not allow any outbound HTTPS sessions.

There are people who need to check off boxes in order to comply with certain rules. Their security reality is not actually all that important.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Freak_NL on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:00PM (#19257242)
They control the devices on their side of the firewall, so they can log whatever they want before the data sent enters the encrypted tunnel, and after the data received exits it.

ETS just means they don't have to spend money on replacing their man-in-the-middle monitoring gear with client-local solutions on every workstation and server.

It al seems pretty silly though. Regulators aren't idiots; they know that HTTPS is everywhere now, and that TLS 1.3 means that third parties listening in on connections are going to be thing of the past, so the regulations will change to reflect that.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by funkymike on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @04:44PM (#19258561)
> ETS just means they don't have to spend money on replacing their man-in-the-middle monitoring gear with client-local solutions on every workstation and server.

Doesn't it still require altering the TLS implementation to use the static DH keys instead of following the TLS 1.3 standard of using random keys?

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by rocqua on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:19PM (#19256875)
You can ban the use of such applications a lot easier than you can ban HTTPS. This means that simply using those tools is grounds for legal action, which might suffice. Especially if the concern for confidentiality is not for internal reasons, but for legal reasons.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by SamuelAdams on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @03:56PM (#19258243)
It's not just companies that want to MitM their traffic: consumers want this too. Otherwise all the IoT devices in a house will no longer be trustable: Alexa can start uploading everything it hears, even if you never said "hey alexa!". And because of forward secrecy, you can't verify what it did or did not send: it all looks the same.

This expands to any IoT device with proprietary software on it, which by 2023 will be quite a lot of things.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by hsk0823 on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:20AM (#19255552)
There's a whole IT market segment around TLS decryption for corporate LAN. Basically corporate MITM that will decrypt TLS at the gateway / firewall, and with currently used TLS standards, will then re encrypt the traffic back to the client so the browser thinks it has a legit connection. It's used to scan packets for intrusion detection, for malware, to track for data loss like the article talks about.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by excalibur on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:45PM (#19256545)
But you don't NEED to kill forward secrecy to do that. TLS 1.3 doesn't seem to be a problem for the anti-malware, IPS, or even DLP use cases. You just need to decrypt, inspect, and re-encrypt traffic at the firewall, using a CA cert trusted by your clients. The problem is lazy organizations that just want to passively collect all of the encrypted traffic and then decrypt it later at their leisure, which smells much more like surveillance than security.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @05:39PM (#19259014)
Yeah, you're missing the security model.

The point is to have the decryption done on a system that is isolated from the production environment (and is consequently isolated from security compromises).

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by throwaway2016a on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:46AM (#19255887)
All of those require your computer to trust a new Certificate Authority or you will get warnings all over the place. If there is a company that claims to be able to do it without trusting the CA or producing warnings I would love to see it. (seriously, I actually would love to see that).

And if you are in a corporate environment using a company computer you forfeit your privacy anyway. You can always go somewhere else or do your banking and Facebook on a different machine / not on company time.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by KingMachiavelli on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:16PM (#19256233)
Why? If you have the private key you can decrypt TLS traffic if forward secrecy is off. Which is why forward secrecy exists, to prevent captured encrypted sessions form being decrypted out-of-band with, presumably, comprimised private keys.

The issue is that TLS 1.3 deprecates the key exchange that makes this possible, essentially making (perfect) forward secrecy a requirement since the only inlcuded ciphers do so. The only way to monitor/inspect TLS traffic in this situation is to MITM the traffic rather than simply record encrypted sessions.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by dcbadacd on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:24PM (#19256919)
It's deceptive to call out-of-band MITM not MITM, it's still MITM just covert. TLSv1.3 forcing it to become glaringly obvious is exactly what should be happening.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by aidenn0 on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:17PM (#19256252)
For client-side it does require a new CA, but for server side it does not (since you have access to all of the private keys in use). Given that banks are pushing for this standard, that would make a lot of sense.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by tonyarkles on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:13PM (#19256208)
Correct re: the root cert in my experience at least. They usually get pushed out as part of a Group Policy in Active Directory.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by tinus_hn on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:30PM (#19256386)
The original purpose was governments spying on their citizens, which is why a lot of software uses certificate pinning to block this intrusion. These MITM solution just let through the big players’ traffic so you don’t get too much of a fuss while still retaining the ability to ‘check for malware’.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by kevin_b_er on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:33AM (#19255709)
Breaking the security of HTTPS for surveillance and monitoring purposes. The BITS group is formally opposed to secure communications because they want to make it easier to MITM attack the secure communication. They want to make it easier to decrypt communication.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:51PM (#19257162)
...and they want that for transparency, not for nefarious reasons.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by JoshTriplett on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:09PM (#19257336)
MITMing TLS outside the endpoints is inherently nefarious, whether they think it is or not.

If you want to compromise the endpoint, compromise the endpoint. Install your own MITM certificates and terminate the connection in the middle, or install client-side malware. Either way, there should always be a giant warning sign on the client that end-to-end security is compromised.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:34PM (#19257568)
...and in this context they aren't compromising it. They're just sharing their keys so that another component, all part of the same trusted system, can also decrypt the traffic.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cesarb on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @03:15PM (#19257945)
Sharing the key allows more than just decryption; it also allows undetectable modification of the traffic. A protocol which allowed third-party decryption but not modification would have been designed differently.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @05:01PM (#19258708)
In this case the key is used by a system that is reading a log of the archived traffic. It has no direct network connectivity to the production traffic. I think we can safely say it isn't modifying the traffic... in fact, that's a requirement for the security apparatus.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:33PM (#19257556)
They don't want to compromise the endpoint. They want to ensure they have a record of all communications to and from the endpoint.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by funkymike on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @04:48PM (#19258598)
In order to implement ETS they already have to compromise the endpoint to make the TLS 1.3 implementation use static keys, right?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by cbsmith on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @05:23PM (#19258907)
Yeah, but it's a means to an end, not the end.

The assumptions that TLS 1.3 is based around are in direct conflict with the requirements of the secure environment they operate in.

This isn't some evil thing... a cryptographic protocol is a part of a trusted system, and whether it is appropriate for a particular context has to do with the design of the trusted system.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by marios on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:08PM (#19256149)
Corporate environments where "endpoint solutions" snoop through all traffic to detect malware activity. While I understand the use case, I would not support it. What I find unacceptable is, assuming the article is correct, that ETSI is asking NIST to recommend their crippled TLS in their new guidelines rather than TLS1.3.

Disabling PFS and thus enabling the decryption of all TLS sessions should be a conscious decision rather than something that was there 'by default' (and could easily be abused).

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by yfiapo on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:58AM (#19256045)
The other side of the argument is frequently discounted and as an IT security person myself I understand that. However, there is a real challenge for companies who deal with large amounts of very sensitive data. To be able to effectively monitor for data loss it makes a lot of sense to be able to monitor the connection points between your protected network and outside networks. The move to all traffic being encrypted and uninspectable breaks this paradigm.

You can cover some of the same concern by implementing an agent on every connected computing device but this brings much greater complexity as you are monitoring potentially hundreds to thousands more places and still have to worry if you have complete coverage.

Consider an analogy of going through international customs. Do you employ customs officials at the border who are allowed to sample and inspect private belongings to verify laws are being followed? Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border? The second example is a bit stretched but hopefully illustrates the scale problem.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by dcbadacd on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:21PM (#19256899)
> Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border?

Without telling the person who's things were packed that they were packed by the official.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Legogris on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @03:40PM (#19258111)
I assume that organizations deploying this make it clear to employees that the network and computer equipment is intended for professional use.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Spivak on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:10PM (#19256162)
But since every device needs to trust your CA aren't you forced to pack their belongings in either case?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by yfiapo on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:13PM (#19256198)
Hmm, I'm straining my own analogy already so I won't try to beat that horse any deader. :-) I am mostly trying to argue the positives of centralized inspection at network chokepoints in simplicity and guarantee of coverage.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by bryanlarsen on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:19AM (#19255546)
Banks are required by regulation to monitor & audit pretty much everything. Previously they did this for internet usage by using MITM proxies. TLS 1.3 makes that approach hard/impossible.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by snek on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:34AM (#19255731)
Why can't they just install their own self signed root ca on all their computers and continue MITM it?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by yfiapo on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:40AM (#19255794)
Certificate pinning is used by some very common applications and can break a MITM that relies on a self-signed certificate.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by JoshTriplett on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @02:10PM (#19257342)
Then those applications are correctly getting the behavior they desire: either they get a secure connection or they don't connect at all.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Legogris on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:48AM (#19255911)
Do you have any example of such applications that would be used by a bank?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by yfiapo on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:05PM (#19256113)
I don't work for a bank so I can't speak definitively to their applications. A few sample applications I see listed as certificate pinned in Netskope (a CASB) though include:

  Adobe Creative Cloud
  Amazon Work Spaces
  Docusign
  GitHub
  Google Drive
  GoToMeeting
  iCloud
  Microsoft Office 365 Outlook.com
  Microsoft Skype for Business
  Salesforce.com
Note this typically refers to native applications and plugins which also connect over TLS and not web applications.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Legogris on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @03:29PM (#19258044)
My suspicion was that any such applications have a web version.

I'm a bit surprised by Skype for Business (horrible product BTW, it's a gamble to even be able to sign in on a fresh install) though, the rest I would expect people to use web versions of.

I would think that (perhaps coincidentally), the organizations that require these kinds of insights are not the ones that are relying on services that do cert pinning. And if they do, they can but the marketing department/the server running THAT wonky old software from the 90s in a separate subnet.

Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by Dylan16807 on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @07:41PM (#19259865)
Isn't that exactly the same between TLS 1.2 and 1.3? They won't have the private keys for google drive. How are those handled today?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by goda90 on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @11:46AM (#19255892)
Are those common applications necessary for their business operations though? They could just blacklist them entirely.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It by vetrom on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:08PM (#19256146)
besides, many of those applications depin when you install custom CAs, don't they?