Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It
by dcbadacd on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @01:21PM
(#19256899)
> Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border?
Without telling the person who's things were packed that they were packed by the official.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It
by Legogris on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @03:40PM
(#19258111)
I assume that organizations deploying this make it clear to employees that the network and computer equipment is intended for professional use.
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It
by Spivak on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:10PM
(#19256162)
But since every device needs to trust your CA aren't you forced to pack their belongings in either case?
Re:ETS Isn't TLS and You Shouldn't Use It
by yfiapo on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @12:13PM
(#19256198)
Hmm, I'm straining my own analogy already so I won't try to beat that horse any deader. :-) I am mostly trying to argue the positives of centralized inspection at network chokepoints in simplicity and guarantee of coverage.
You can cover some of the same concern by implementing an agent on every connected computing device but this brings much greater complexity as you are monitoring potentially hundreds to thousands more places and still have to worry if you have complete coverage.
Consider an analogy of going through international customs. Do you employ customs officials at the border who are allowed to sample and inspect private belongings to verify laws are being followed? Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border? The second example is a bit stretched but hopefully illustrates the scale problem.