Some hack targets multiple megacorporations that also lead the technical revolution and all those companies go out of their way to explicitly deny anything ever happened? Undetected arbitrary code execution is one thing, but what was the exfil plan that also avoids a totally separate detection system?
On top of that, these authors are known publishers of bad technical stories?
Possible was never the problem, but the total lack of evidence and massive unlikeliness just doesn't add up.
However there's a massive disparity between that and actually modifying the bus data, pattern matching data going across it, delivering a payload effectively (watch how flakey serial busses get at high speeds), miniaturising and packaging the entire exploit, compromising supply chains and board reviews and inspection.
For an analogy, it's like donning a yellow jacket, necking half a bottle of whisky then carrying a bazooka across the whitehouse lawn.
I don't and never will buy this attack vector. They could have easily infiltrated the chipset manufacturer, but no they went through a huge number of difficult steps which leave thousands if not million of smoking guns around which are all traceable back to the source. Hmm...
Making the main board fail arbitrarily would be easy, but controlling the board or exfiltrating data is hard.
"communicate with external command&control and know how to read interesting data or send interesting effectful commands to the mainboard." is hard only in the sense that it takes some effort, however, this requires pretty much the same capabilities and skills as every engineered malware we've encountered, so you can assume that every serious adversary can do it, not only nation state adversaries but many serious commercial pentesting companies and cybercrime teams have demonstrated such capabilities.
I can imagine an attacker that can make the "hard" software required but doesn't have the capability to insert that modified hardware within a supply chain - as in, it's not even assumption, for pretty much every intelligence agency it's known that they can easily do software which "would need to communicate with external command&control and know how to read interesting data or send interesting effectful commands to the mainboard" - even just counting things that have failed (because we've detected and analyzed and attributed them), there's clear evidence that they can do it because they've done it many times.
I literally can't imagine an agency that can pull off the supply chain attack but doesn't have the capability to write software to control the board and exfiltrate data.
Now specific targeted attacks is more believable, at that point though I'd think a one off MITM hardware swap would be more likely.
When you say you created a two terminal device; do you mean you have a PCB (or equivalent) with two IO pads which you soldered to the pads which would normally be occupied by I2C pull-up R, but on a different PCB.
Basically, I'm wondering how the attiny85 was powered.
Given your description, I'm guessing you made a local power well which floated on the SDA line similar to how a boost cap works in a buck regulator (or more generally a charge pump). This is also approximately how a one-wire device works, like say the DS28E07.
To turn a 0->1 strengthen the pull-up equivalent which is in parallel to the uC circuit. I could probably add a simple feedback circuit to make sure the pull-up is just strong enough to keep SDA above VOH_min which should help prevent the I2C driver from getting damaged. To turn 1->0 open the pull-up equivelent and let the bit leak down.
Assuming standard I2C, I just need to make sure by uC is fully booted and ready to go by the end of the start bit. Should be doable.
I think I mostly convinced myself I could build one too. Of course any board I want to attack probably uses a SPI ROM, so roughly the same idea, but in a series termination resistor. :)
You guys are overthinking this. Server motherboard PCBs are usually 4-8 layers with GND and VCC planes available near any component. The hackers, according to Bloomberg, modified the motherboards, so presumably they would simply add vias to the GND and VCC planes to power their rogue chip. You don't gain much by going the trouble of making the chip self-powered by leeching current from the SPI line... The vias that bring power to the chip can be hidden within layers (it's a standard thing to do) It would not even be detectable by a visual inspection. You would have to x-ray the PCB to detect it.
I'm with the GP. I've said it before (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18146566): the presumed hack described by Bloomberg is actually not that hard, and perfectly doable. All the attacker has to do is compromise the PCB manufacturer. Actually not even that. He would swap a box of legit PCBs with a box of compromised PCBs when they are in transit from the PCB manufacturer to the assembler. The assembler (the one who solders components on the PCB) wouldn't suspect a thing because normally PCBs are just passive things. No chip. No logic. No firmware. Just stupid layers of copper that either work (conduct electricity) or don't. That's why no one pays attention to PCB manufacturers and instead supply chain security is focused on everything higher in the chain: the providers of components, the assemblers, the distributors, etc.
This Supermicro rogue chip story is in fact an attack much less advanced than some real-world attacks we have seen, like Stuxnet which exploited four(!) zerodays...
The NSA was also actively using COTTONMOUTH II [2] which was a USB header for a motherboard that could be inserted into the supply chain and provided a long range transceiver for software implants to bypass airgapped networks.
Ten years on I would not be surprised that the Chinese have a similar tool in an even smaller form factor. People seem to be treating this like a futuristic sci-fi plot.
1. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/NSA_MAES... 2. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/nsa-ant-cotto...
And sandwich it between the PCB layers. No way to find even upon close up inspection without Xraying the board itself, and even interpreting the Xray image of modern multilayer board would be a nontrivial task. I dont think Supermicro did it, at least for statistically meaningful set of boards.
I don't know how you would even detect that, short of decapping and scanning the die in.
It might be useful if nobody knows your doing it, but other than that it’s mostly pointless especially if you compromise every sample.
please do elaborate on this uC that will be the size of an SMT resistor, in a 2 lead package.
How did you get an ostensible power terminal (for pull up) and two terminals for MiTM (input and output) from two terminals? Assuming a situation where there are other pullups on the wire, how did you assert the low state (short to ground) without a connection to ground?
How good is the idea while you could be caught with physical evidence?
Corporations are state actors in China, and their actions have worldwide repercussions.
They are investigated for intentional business practices, not for secret hacks by unknown entities.
Using an attiny85 uC, a couple resistors, a cap, and a couple diodes I had laying around, I was able to wire up a two terminal "device" that pretty much acts like a 5k pull up resistor on a I2C line.... But when you pass data through the signal line (SDA) wire it can read and modify it. It is crude and very limited, but it works (only at lower I2C data rates in this case, but hey, it's a cheap hack).
A nation state adversary could trivially miniaturize this to the size and form of an SMT resistor, and use a much more capable uC in the process.
Im not saying that this substantiates the Bloomberg story in any way.
Just saying it's a great (black hat) idea, and it works.
It would surprise me a little if this weren't used in the wild by somebody.