Re:Commandeering Australian citizens to become spies
by vermilingua on Thursday December 06, 2018 @05:04PM
(#18622773)
I may have phrased it badly, but my point wasn't that they would/could not target individuals, but more that they don't really care about their capacity as developers; more that these people are simply government implants in the target org, and that whether they are unable to provide the capability through ordinary channels is simply irrelevant.
If the Govt strongarms a developer into implanting a backdoor, they won't care that they can't do it without breaking company policy or QA or workflow or even the law, because they cease to be primarily an employee, and become an asset of ASIO.
Re:Commandeering Australian citizens to become spies
by alfiedotwtf on Saturday December 08, 2018 @08:57PM
(#18638766)
This is why I'm choosing to stick to the term commandeering
One well documented[2] example where individuals were "tasked" (spy on) directly is the compromise of satellite ISP Stellar:
> The document lists "key staff" at the company. The document states they should be identified and "tasked." "Tasking" somebody in signals intelligence jargon means that they are to be targeted for surveillance. In addition to CEO Christian Steffen, nine other employees are named in the document.
The shock on the IT chief's face[4] when he saw his name in an NSA document...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_%28decryption_program%...
[2] https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12...
[3] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-...
[4] http://www.spiegel.de/video/chokepoint-the-moment-stellar-le...