Sort of. The data corruption part yes, that's a core transparent part of the filesystem as it should be. But for ransomware ZFS only provides helpful tools for doing so, it's not designed around that specifically (though it could provide the foundation for something that was). Very low cost atomic snapshots and ease of replication definitely can help if they're used, particularly combined with ZFS permission delegation system. You can set a user to have snapshotting permissions separately from permission to destroy snapshots, as well as rollbacks, sends, etc. Of course that won't help if ransomware gets root (unless in turn the storage has hardware separation, loaded over a NAS say), but it's still quite handy.
It would be interesting actually if ZFS had some limited active content monitoring capabilities, such as detecting changes in entropy or a sudden massive spike in snapshot delta size (indicating everything in the file system had been touched). At any rate though note the "a carefully planned" bit there, ZFS is a fantastic foundation for a better data protection system and makes it easier to do well. But it's not install-and-forget by itself either right now, though someone could build something on top if they wanted to (or maybe already has? it has been a while since I surveyed ZnapZend and the like).
It certainly should help against ransomware in that an admin who was investigating an unexpectedly full disk, who's hopefully aware of such things, would probably notice that all the files on the drive were no longer readable and all had recent modification timestamps. And that's if a user doesn't happen to notice it first and report issues with their files to IT.
As long as those snapshots last more than a few days as to provide sufficient time to catch and investigate the issue, ransomware damage is usually revertable much faster than backups with simple snapshots.
See also: There is no stable ZFS implementation for Windows as of right now, and the implementation for macOS (while surprisingly painless in general) requires at least some command line use to set up.
If anyone actually develops a ZFS implementation designed for average users, I would agree that it should include automated backups by default.
I don't know about this specific system, but typical behaviour of NILFS (a continuously shapshotting log file system) is to report the filesystem as full, requiring manual intervention or waiting until the data ages-out and gets garbage collected.
I guess because of this you see "protect yourself from ransomware attack" guides recommending keeping your backup drive/filesystem attached for as short a period as possible. But even then you're left hoping that the ransomware doesn't encrypt your backups first - perhaps because it's smart enough to - or that it doesn't get too many of them before you notice the infection.
I wish all backup software would avoid making the remote filesystem available system-wide and raise the bar by requiring ransomware to know how to extract access to the remote filesystem from the particular backup software you're using before it could encrypt your backups. Unfortunately, as far as I could tell last time I looked this issue seems to be ignored by backup software vendors.
Where I have implemented it, the only access the production system has to the backup system is to connect to an ssh server with a private key, and shove a tar down the pipe, which the backup system then squirrels away somewhere safe. This is a push configuration, but it's a safe one - the backup system doesn't have access to the production system either, and the production system cannot overwrite/delete any data on the backup system.
> As a copy-on-write file system, OpenZFS provides efficient and consistent snapshots of your data at any given point in time. Each snapshot only includes the precise delta of changes between any two points in time and can be cloned to provide writable copies of any previous state without losing the original copy. Snapshots also provide the basis of OpenZFS replication or backing up of your data to local and remote systems. Because an OpenZFS snapshot takes place at the block level of the file system, it is immune to any file-level encryption by ransomware that occurs over it. A carefully-planned snapshot, replication, retention, and restoration strategy can provide the low-level isolation you need to enable your storage infrastructure to quickly recover from ransomware attacks.
[0] https://www.ixsystems.com/blog/combating-ransomware/