That doesn't compute. A decision doesn't do deciding. A decider decides decisions. Any phenomena of "will" necessarily implies contingency on a prior. To ask for non-contingency is to ask for freedom _from_ will.
I certainly think randomness comes into play for sure, but conceptually my personal prior state might include a source of randomness. It could be just one factor, and I might make choices based on my memories and preferences to allow greater or lesser input from that randomness, or I might lack the mental tools to prevent that randomness from manifesting in my actions. At an extreme that might be a form of pathology and then we can talk about the limits of personal responsibility in various circumstances. The idea that my state leads to my decisions still holds though.
I think at some point notions of intervention or change become critical. So, for example, I think implicit in the idea of free will is the idea that an individual can freely choose to change their decision in some repeatability sense, and this change cannot necessarily happen in any other way, such as from outside influence.
Just to make it clear, let's say there's two choices or choice types, A and B. A is "bad" and B is "good," in whatever sense (utilitarian, moral, whatever).
Key to the notion of free will it seems is that one could change, of their own volition, their choice, from A->B or B->A. In practice we can't rewind time or transport to possible worlds in a counterfactual sense, but we do talk about decisions as interchangeable and repeatable. E.g., someone can choose whether or not to take a drug at one point, and then, at a later point, choose again whether or not to take the drug. In one metaphysical sense, those decisions are not the same because circumstances have changed, but we treat them as the same.
I think the idea of free will is that someone could change their decision, to an extent that another person could not. That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can.
This is fine at some level, but what if someone wants to change their mind but cannot? E.g., a drug addict or someone trying to lose weight? What about something simpler, like decision under a lapse in attention? How do we define volition or lack thereof?
Or, maybe more importantly, let's say the external individual in question is omniscient. If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior, why would you hold that individual responsible in a free will sense? That is, let's say someone truly wants to change, but an omniscient being could not even help and change them. Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible?
This is all stream-of-consciousness, but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises, whatever that outcome is. He made it possible, even likely and bears responsibility for that by selecting the set of possible outcomes and the degree of randomness. Also he does this many times, so it wasn't a "random choice to randomly choose", it's a consistent repeated pattern of behaviour that directly emerges from his personal ongoing mental state.
I don't go around randomly killing people and that's a consistent pattern that emerges from my persistent ongoing (if evolving) mental state and it _is_ a free choice. The fact that it's pre-determined is fine, because it means it comes from me.
To some extent yes, our choices and scope of action is constrained by our essential nature, some of which is determined before we are even born. However this doesn't absolve us of all accountability. It simply sets up a framework within which we can discuss what accountability is and how we want to manage it.
This is a difficult issue and I don't have all the answers about accountability, I see my take on it as my starting point for the discussion about it not the end. I believe in rehabilitative rather than retributive justice because of this. Also see my reply to fjuerfilis.
I think that morality, love and justice emerge from human nature. I think that I, my self and my consciousness are emergent properties and I'm fine with that. I think that the purpose of human life is chosen for us by the rules of biology, natural selection, game theory and a host of other factors that, seemingly miraculously, lead me to the conclusion that the philosophical Good Life is desirable and largely attainable.
> If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will?
Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1].
> Does that encapsulate the notion of free will?
free will [2]
the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate;
the ability to act at one's own discretion.
> That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can.
Your free will attempts at influencing me to make a certain choice would seem to entangle my state with your's and perhaps change the probability I will make one choice over another.
> If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior,
'omniscient external individual' is a quite an assumption here.
> Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible?
Free will is the _only_ way to hold the individual responsible.
> but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
(I may be misunderstanding you here) Free will over a decision must ultimately collapse to a choice made. At that point it is determined reality and no amount of free will can undo it.
You either took the Red pill or the Blue pill. If the decision is never observed the choice was never made ergo it didn't happen, it is not real.
In the spirit of Spinoza [3] I actually find bestowing free will upon particles very intuitive. We then have free will because it is an attribute of our fundamental components. If particles have no free will and are pre-determined we have no free will and are pre-determined. If we have free will then particles must have free will.
Full disclosure, I am an armchair philosopher with an interest in the cross-section with physics.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_cat [2] https://www.google.com/search?q=define%3A+free+will [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)
I know I'm in the minority, but I object to the idea of responsibility actually, and prefer to think of change in a kind of "neurobehavioral engineering" or transformative justice sense. That might seem pathological or even psychopathic (which is ironic because I'm anything but); I just mean that I think responsibility (like randomness maybe, at least with reference to free will) is sort of a red herring. It's one of the reasons I'm interested in free will issues, because I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution. To me, punishing an individual for a crime out of retribution makes as much sense as punishing a car for breaking down; I'd prefer to see the individual "fixed" in the same way I'd prefer to see my car fixed. The primary obstacle to the former from my perspective is lack of knowledge, which will diminish rapidly with time whether we as a society want it or not. I think one of the biggest challenges we will face as a society in the next 200 years (assuming we don't disappear or devolve into a dark age) is how to integrate advances in neuroscience and psychology into our sense of justice and responsibility. E.g., if you could change a person completely for the better, is withholding that change unethical? What's the point of retributional justice then? Aren't you just shooting yourself in the foot, societally speaking?
This is all tangential to the paper, but I think issues of free will become critical when you are faced with the possibility of total change in an individual.
My belief in determinism as a driver of free will is predicated entirely on the principle that without that there is no responsibility. Taking out determinism breaks the connection between my self, my persistent state, and my decisions. My choices have to come from me in a deterministic way, or they are not mine. I want to be responsible for my choices.
This is of course a mechanistic interpretation in the sense you describe, so it also leads me away from a retributive justice stance towards a rehabilitative stance even though I strongly believe in responsibility.
If a decision is undetermined, i.e. not determined, how can it be called a decision?
The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide.
I personally think the notion of free will is fallacious because it's poorly defined, or even undefinable. I admit I could be totally wrong about that, but I think lack of predictability leads to an illusion of free will. It's the same illusion as the god illusion, injecting agency as an explanatory mechanism when there is none, either through chaotic processes, true randomness, or epistemological weaknesses.