Compare that to to some of the other systems which often have complex mathematical descriptions which are hard for people to wrap their heads around.
Another thing is how big a deal is 'non-monotonicity' is it actually going to be something that will affect elections all the time, or is it something that's more minor than say turnout which honestly has no solution and on one side you have USA where turnout is low so the game is all about making sure your base turns out, or on the other side you have Australia where voting is mandatory so making sure people who don't care, don't vote at random is a big part of the game.
https://rangevoting.org/IrvExec.html
There are many examples of voters in real-world IRV elections _do_ rank their favorite candidates last, to help them win (the same problem plurality voting has, but worse, because there are multiple plurality runoff votes).
Mathematical models also agree – situations in which IRV produces bad results are extremely common. Something like 70% of possible situations where IRV and plurality voting produce different results, the IRV result is worse than the plurality result.
Approval voting and range voting are really the only voting systems I know of that are strictly better than plurality. They have their flaws, but per Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, there aren't any voting systems without flaws.
The key point which is laboured a couple of times is that some seat results are different than plurality outcomes. But that is a feature of IRV, not a bug.
Had the election been run under plurality rules voters would of voted differently and this fact seems to of escaped the author of this website.
Voters who preferenced greens first, recognising a minor parties zero chance of winning under plurality would of instead cast votes according to two party preferred lineup, who mostly would ideologically align with labour. But under IRV they can vote for anyone they feel more closely represents them but still have meaningful input into a 2PP outcome.
Show me a critique of an IRV outcome where 2PP outcome violates Monotonicity and you'll have a real critique of IRV.
However, in close three-cornered races, tactical voting does sometimes come into play. The recent Wentworth by-election was an example of this: Liberal voters could have assisted their party to win the election by switching their first preference to the Labor candidate, because if the Labor candidate had beaten the eventual winner (Phelps, Independent) into second place, then Phelps' preferences would have been distributed and almost certainly given the win to the Liberal. Of course, this is a risky strategy, because if too many Liberal voters did this then they would have instead engineered a Labor win. And in reality, despite the possibility of tactical voting, the Condorcet winner Phelps won anyway.
An example where the Condorcet winner may not have won is the seat of Rockhampton in the 2017 Queensland State election. The primary votes had Labor in first, independent Margaret Strelow in second, One Nation in third and the LNP in fourth. However preferences from the LNP candidate pushed One Nation into second, which gave Labor the win on Strelow's preferences. It seems likely that Strelow would have beaten any of the other three head-to-head, though. And as previously mentioned, this sort of situation is notable for its rarity.
That doesn't affect the tactical voting possibility there - the possibility arose because the Liberal candidate's chances were greatly affected by which of the other two major contenders made it into the final runoff.
Huh? There isn't a clear-cut way of determining the best voting system, so how were they compare the two? That matters quite a lot.
There are situations where IRV get so complicated it is unpredictable, but living in Australia that does sometimes feel like a feature - if the polity expresses no strong consensus preference, random selection amongst candidates is not a bad idea.
> Approval voting and range voting are ... strictly better
Yeah, totally [0]. Approval voting looks like the one to use just in terms of doing what a voting system does.
Any system that lets neutrals and moderates in occasionally is better than plurality. And plurality is streaks ahead of having no choice at all.
The weirdness comes in the strange tiebreaker methods if there's a "loop", but when you have a lot of voters, loops are rare.
(Condorcet proponents would probably get more mileage if they had a better conceptual split between methods that identify the Smith Set, and methods that seek to award single winners of multi-member Smith Sets - those "tiebreakers" are where all the problems happen, and none of those flaws are relevant in elections where there is a Condorcet Winner.)
> Compare that to to some of the other systems which often have complex mathematical descriptions which are hard for people to wrap their heads around.
> Another thing is how big a deal is 'non-monotonicity' is it actually going to be something that will affect elections all the time, or is it something that's more minor than say turnout which honestly has no solution and on one side you have USA where turnout is low so the game is all about making sure your base turns out, or on the other side you have Australia where voting is mandatory so making sure people who don't care, don't vote at random is a big part of the game.
> Runoffs are something people understand, IRV is conceptually similar and makes intuitive sense to people, it's very easy to explain to people, 'if nobody gets a majority, eliminate last place and redistribute their votes, repeat'.
Compare that to to some of the other systems which often have complex mathematical descriptions which are hard for people to wrap their heads around.
It's fascinating how a similar constraint arises in industry software engineer; more than fascinating
Similar issue for end-to-end auditable homomorphically encrypted voting systems. Yes, anyone can check the math in theory ... but not the typical voter.
STAR is just score with a single automatic runoff. It gets everything you are talking about in terms of intuition, explanation… everything you like about IRV is present in STAR and basically everything wrong with IRV is fixed by STAR.
Intuiting what "giving one star more or less to a candidate" means is really difficult to understand as a voter. "If more voters had given Kodos four stars instead of three, he could have won" is a headache inducing explanation.
Approval voting is the only alternative to IRV or plurality voting that seems to match the level of intuitiveness of both the voting process and the tabulation process.
If IRV complexity and explanations were not a problem, we wouldn't see today's reality where IRV proponents themselves constantly make incorrect claims about it.
Not always (and not in the linked article here), but often people get the intuition that their 2nd choice will get counted when their 1st choice is eliminated, and then try to get them to understand why their 2nd choice was not counted (because their 2nd choice had already been eliminated) while someone else's 2nd choice was counted…
What happened in Burlington before they repealled IRV shows not only people getting intuitions about IRV wrong but people often don't even get what happened in Burlington because it seems so counter-intuitive. https://www.equal.vote/Burlington
And yet, that scenario is common enough. Burlington is just the case where all the ballot stats were released so we can study it.
With FPTP voting, C would have won of the three candidates, and A would have placed last. If you removed A from the race, B would have won - and did!
Alternate voting systems are supposed to produce different results from plurality voting, and that's often unsettling the first time it happens.
That page makes the claim that IRV produced a bad result and that's why it was replaced. But at least the candidate with the 2nd-most 1st place votes won. If instead the Condorcet winner, A, had won, do they really think it would have been better? A got the _least_ 1st place votes of the three, who's to say there wouldn't have been an even larger backlash?
FPTP is even worse than IRV, except that people know how it is bad so they adapt accordingly.
Of course, it's speculation about the specific backlash, but the core issue in IRV is this (and it happens in the Burlington case):
ALL the voters whose 1st choice loses in the final round never get any of their other preferences counted and they lose their 1st choice. They get NOTHING, no say, totally screwed. They could be as much as 49% of voters. Now, WITHIN IRV, they can later learn (as people have learned about strategy in FPTP) that if they betray their favorite and vote for their lesser-evil choice as 1st, then they WILL swing the election to their lesser-evil instead of the greater evil.
By ignoring the preferences of some voters and counting others, the weighting is unequal and people will feel disenfranchised.
Maybe this older more thorough discussion of the Burlington case will help you understand: https://www.rangevoting.org/Burlington.html
The core point is that voters in IRV can get a preferable outcome via favorite betrayal (a dishonest strategy). Either they do use that strategy and we're back to the lesser-evil problems we have now, or they don't use that strategy and we're back to vote-splitting like we have now, where a candidate choosing to run can both lose and cause a worse outcome for their supporters.
Another way of seeing this could be that such voters had their 1st choice considered and given value all the way until the last round, whereas many other voters had their lesser choices considered in their previous rounds. The 1rst-choicers-all-the-way-till-the-end could be considered more favored than the latter voters I mentioned, who lost their favorite candidates earlier on in the process.
I'm not saying that this is a better interpretation of the situation you posit. I'm just using it to illustrate that it's hard, maybe impossible, to get away from subjective criteria when we consider the virtues of various voting systems.
by the way, Fargo North Dakota just adopted approval voting for their City elections tonight.
The problem, though, is one of correctness, not complexity -- I would maintain that almost anyone could look at that election summary and understand why the conclusion that was reached was reached. And if they had had a traditional non-instant runoff election, the result would likely have been the same. It's hard to even explain why the outcome was "wrong" because the tabulation of the results is so intuitive.
> I seriously doubt that anyone would get a headache over "if people had given that losing candidate higher scores, they would have won". I don't even see how you can honestly claim that to be anything but completely intuitive to everyone.
The question for the intuition is "how many stars to I give this candidate". What does it mean to give them one more star? One person's four-star vote carries exactly as much weight as four people's one-star vote, which seems incredibly odd. An Amazon product with a hundred one star reviews is intuitively worse than one with 10 five star reviews.
Certainly not! In Burlington, people know the Republican can't win. So, like everyone in the current system, people would (and have both before and since IRV) vote strategically. So, the less-hardcore Republicans would vote Democrat in order to stop the Progressive.
In fact, if IRV had not been repealed, a good portion of the Republicans would betray their favorite and vote Dem as 1st choice (dishonestly) in the future in order to stop the Progressive from ever winning again.
Furthermore, when vote splitting happens in a current system, everyone readily gets why it was "wrong" and they adapt their strategies accordingly.
> What does it mean to give them one more star?
It means they are one more point ahead of the others.
> One person's four-star vote carries exactly as much weight as four people's one-star vote, which seems incredibly odd
The weight is relative, that's all that matters. As long as people understand the system, they can realize that they are throwing away part of their vote if they only put a 1-star and nothing else. Four people who put 1-star for candidate A might have put 5 stars for candidate B. They are influencing the race just as much as anyone else.
Here's what it means to be equal: Any voter can score the opposite of another voter and they will cancel out. Our votes can have equal weight if that's possible. That's not always possible in our current system or with IRV.
> An Amazon product with a hundred one star reviews is intuitively worse than one with 10 five star reviews.
If there were 110 voters, then every item is relative to that vote. There's 100 1-star votes for candidate A and 10 5-star votes for candidate B? That means candidate B got zeros (blanks are no points) from 100 candidates. A candidate with 100 zero-star votes and only 10 5-star votes is a worse option.
Within a strict ranked-ballot approach, the overall best tabulation is probably Ranked Pairs.
STAR has some similarities with Bucklin but does not have its problems. STAR's advantages are several and aren't directly just a forgone conclusion merely by showing what's wrong with IRV. STAR is much simpler to tabulate than Ranked Pairs and doesn't need to be tabulated at the highest level, it can be counted at precincts like FPTP.
If there were an objective way to measure actual utilities, score-based methods would be great (and economics and policy assessment would be much simpler, and...)
In STAR voting, you have up to 5 points to give to each candidate. You effectively get to push each candidate ahead in the race relative to the others by as many as 5 steps forward. There is NOTHING subjective about the meaning of points. They are just points. More points wins. They have no cultural signficance, no opinion, nothing subjective.
Yes, there's a mapping to a (typically 0-5) numerical rating like those popular in online review systems, which is a motivation for the forced acronym, and exactly the similarity that is viewed as making it particularly intuitive and accessible.
Cultural differences in how such rating systems are used for similar preferences have been studied considerably.
It's true that you can also view STAR as a limited bucket (and so forced-tie for any but the smallest candidate pool) ranked-ballot method, in which you force voters to arbitrarily select which intercandidate ranking preferences to suppress, and then do a completely wacky (from a ranked preference perspective) method of tallying the ballots.
It is indeed a form of ranking that allows ties and has a limited resolution. But the limited resolution does help with simplicity.
From a UI perspective, presenting a ranked ballot that allows ties is unfortunately complicated. That's what STAR actually could/should be though.
And the tallying method is fine, not wacky. In a sense, it's like Borda Count to get to two finalists and then IRV for the finalists. That avoids all the worst aspects of IRV (which are all symptoms of the way its multi-round elimination ignores the preferences of many voters while counting the preferences of others).
I disagree. Generally, unforced rankings (allowing full expression of preferences with optional ties) are simpler than forced rankings (with no ties) which in turn are simpler than limited bucket arrangements that force ties; “Between X and Y, do you prefer X, Y, or neither?” is the simplest question about voting preferences, and unforced preferences can be answered by answering that question alone; forced rankings may, as the name suggests, force the invention of an artificial preference in some cases, but limited buckets methods force deciding which preferences are most important and which to suppress. And limited buckets methods which apply something more than ordinal meanings to buckets,as STAR does, are most complicated.
> From a UI perspective, presenting a ranked ballot that allows ties is unfortunately complicated
Tallying unforced preference ballots is complicated, “number your preferences starting with ‘1’ for most preferred, ’2’ for next most, and so on, with equal preferences getting the same number” with a ballot with appropriate entry blanks isn't hard UI either in paper or machines.
Even if you want paper optical scan ballots, the main problem is the size of the ballot (which is a logistical problem when you've got multiple simultaneous races) more than the UI.
> And the tallying method is fine, not wacky.
Viewed as a preference ballot, giving non-ordinal meaning to rankings is wacky, since it is inventing information. The wacky description was in that specific “viewed as” context.
> In a sense, it's like Borda Count
I don't disagree with this characterization, though I view it as more of a condemnation than a defense.
> That avoids all the worst aspects of IRV (which are all symptoms of the way its multi-round elimination ignores the preferences of many voters while counting the preferences of others).
If you want to eliminate all the worst aspects of IRV, which you view as all due to ignoring preferences via loser elimination, the simple solution is just to drop loser elimination (giving Bucklin or a form of Majority Judgement, depending on where you use forced preferences or allow ties; classic Majority Judgement even uses limited buckets, though you can use a full unforced preference ballot, so if you really think the preference compression is justified by UI benefits, you can use exactly the same ballot as STAR, with a much more straightforward resolution procedure.)
This is certainly far simpler than STAR, whether or not you use the same ballot.
You are right in noticing that it's not exclusively an unforced ranking (which I agree is vastly superior to forced rankings!). So, in STAR, there's a different between 3 candidates scored as 5,1,0 versus 5,4,0. They count identically in the runoff stage (which is effectively the rank part of the system). But they count different in the score.
I'm not convinced that difference is necessary, valuable, or intuitive to people, but I'm not convinced it isn't. I think these things need more real-world case studies. I definitely think the distinction isn't fatal or anything. I see how it could have a positive impact on outcomes.
I don't agree that multi-round eliminations are simpler than STAR per se.
I'm certainly inclined to see 3-2-1 voting as a competitor with STAR for best overall system.
What it's missing compared to IRV is that you can't go, it's just like what people already do (runoffs), just in a single round.
In STAR, 5 points is simply "most points" i.e. most support. It doesn't mean something semantically. You can give up to 5 points, like if there's a race, you can push each candidate forward as much as 5 steps. The only thing it means is that you pushed them forward more than another candidate.
That's not that hard to get intuitively.
IRV is not what people already do but in a single round, it's much more complex than that. And whoever's 1st choice in IRV loses in the final round, they (and that could be as much as 49% of the voters!) never get any of their other preferences counted at all, unlike either STAR or our current two-round system.
STAR Voting allows voters to rate all the candidates similar to how we rate books on Amazon
Ah yes, Amazon, that site with famously reliable and unbiased user reviews.
This is a terrible idea. It’s a bad voting system made worse by appeal to similarity with popular apps and websites, which themselves use a really bad voting system.
STAR voting is NOT like rating books on Amazon, it's just superficially similar.
At Amazon, if you don't like any of a bunch of books, none of them get 5 stars. With STAR voting, you award points not to mean anything, but only to decide how much ahead in the race you want to push each candidate versus the others. Whoever you want to win most, you push them ahead with all 5 available points. That's it.
Your reaction and misunderstanding does further my annoyance at the people explaining STAR using the Amazon analogy, and I think that bad comparison is harming support for what is truly an excellent voting system.
My issue with all of these point- and range-based voting systems is that when you see the results, you might want to tweak your scores.
Let’s say I’m range voting out of 10 and I give four candidates 1, 3, 8 and 10 points respectively. But the candidate I rated 3 wins, with the candidate I rated 8 a close second. Damn it! If I’d known that was going to happen, I would have voted 1, 1, 10, 10.
So with extra information, range voting boils down to approval voting, and I think it all ultimately becomes ranked voting. It’s hard to imagine any scenario where I would want to change my rankings, even if I have information about the results. If I like both candidates A and B, but A slightly more, I’ll always put them at the top of my list and in that order.
Now, it’s true that in IRV there are scenarios where I can get a better result for myself by voting for candidate ranks in a different order; but those are rare (I think) and definitely unintuitive. In the example above, if B were a real long shot candidate, it might be worth ranking them above A in case B gets eliminated early. But it’s unlikely to make a big difference because, you know, B is a long shot. And that’s just IRV; other ranked voting systems are much more robust.
This is the EXACT reason STAR voting was invented. Unlike plain score, STAR has a runoff where it compares your preference of the top two and puts your full vote to your preference.
So, this is like an exact case study of why STAR is worthwhile. STAR proposes 0-5, but we can stick with 1-10 for this case. You vote 1, 3, 8, 10 and the top two candidates are the ones you voted 3 and 8. With STAR, it doesn't matter that your 3 candidate got a total score higher than your 8 candidate, your vote in the runoff goes to your 8 because that's rated higher. If more voters rated that candidate higher, they win even if their plain score total was lower.
Thus, you don't have to exaggerate all your scores. In fact, you have an incentive not to, because if you just give ties, you risk abstaining in the runoff instead of having a say there.
I mean literally you just spelled out the most common critique of plain score voting which is itself THE argument for why we should use STAR instead.
I’m reading https://www.equal.vote/starvoting and I still don’t entirely follow. It’s lacking some detail I’d like to understand. For example, it looks like it is not a Condorcet method. That seems bad to me -- if you’re not electing the Condorcet winner, you need a very good explanation why; and I don’t trust an appeal to numerical ratings that each voter will interpret and use in different ways.
Aha, yes, Wikipedia has a clearer explanation and confirms that it is not Condorcet: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system and is worth pushing as a good approach for real elections.
One short point: the primary problem with not electing Condorcet is that coordinated strategic majority could, in hindsight and for future elections, force the Condorcet by refusing to support later preferences. In STAR, that strategy is risky and unpredictable. If the Condorcet is a strong case, it will win STAR anyway. If it's an edge case, nobody knows in advance if it will be the true majority or just a bit less, so strategically zeroing all by the favorite is so risky in that edge case, most people won't do it (it could backfire for them to refuse to support their 2nd favorites if their hail-mary hope that they just might have a Condorcet turns out to be wrong). No strategies with STAR are reliable. The best outcomes come from just being honest.
Note: STAR doesn't use rank as a tie-breaker only. It can flat-out overrule a score difference with the 2nd-highest scoring candidate winning. It's not just for ties.
> I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system
Well, since IRV gets pushed for real elections and STAR is better on a large number of factors, and both are better than FPTP…
You otherwise want to promote 3-2-1 https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting or approval or maybe some good PR approach like PLACE voting https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-...
If you want to discuss this stuff more with other folks, https://forum.electionscience.org is the place to go, btw
You’re combining ranked voting with range voting.
Ranked voting is objective and clear (the Condorcet criterion is very compelling) but unfortunately incomplete (Arrow’s theorem, which in this case boils down to unresolvable three-way cycles.)
Range voting is more tractable (counting is easy, no awkward cycles) but subjective (no-one knows what the scores actually mean) and prey to tactical voting.
STAR starts with range voting (so you lose Condorcet) and adds cut-down ranked voting as a final step (only after some rank information has been discarded; and ranking isn’t a sound way to resolve ties).
It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks. That would make better use of the unique advantages of each voting style.
I still don't buy your assertion that no one knows what scores mean. That's no stronger of an argument than the opposing critique of ranking: nobody knows in a rank ballot whether it's a slight preference between two supported candidates or a huge difference between a liked and a hated (but maybe some other candidate is even worse) situation.
In both ranking and scoring, the ballot does not give a transparent view of the voters' beliefs. They only mean what they mean on the ballot, that there are relative scores or a ranked order. We can't and shouldn't assert that we can know more deeply what's behind those marks.
Condorcet is not a bad principle per se, but it's not the absolutely most desirable. If it were the only factor, nobody would accept IRV. And Condorcet means that a candidate who is 2nd choice of 100% of the voters, maybe even a strong 2nd choice (rankings don't carry that info) will always lose even in a case where all the other candidates are grossly polarizing and will lead to civil war. There are at least cases where a consensus is superior to Condorcet.
> It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks.
How does this proposed idea work? What actual system are you suggesting that would do this? EDIT: I see this referenced in your other post.
That's not correct, if there are 4 or more candidates.
If there were exactly 3 candidates the split would have to be something like 51-49, and then the candidate with 100% second place would come second. But it's arguable whether that's a bad result, and it seems like a very unlikely scenario anyway. Even 10% of people voting that candidate in first place would be enough for them to win it.
What I meant to express was that the 100% 2nd choice candidate will lose to Condorcet winner if there's 51% support for the Condorcet winner. I.e. majority support. That's true also for non-Condorcet systems. My point was that Condorcet systems are always also strict majoritarian, and there are reasonable arguments that majoritarianism can be undesireable (such as cases of polarizing slim-majority winner.
If, in a two-candidate election, one candidate gets more votes, should that election be the winner, even if the losing candidate has more passionate supporters?
In democratic elections that respect one-person/one-vote, the answer to that question is simply yes, because that is the definition of one-person/one-vote democracy. Even if there are 100 voters, and it's 51-49, and the 51 voters are lukewarm while the 49 voters are passionate, the candidate with 51 votes wins. No matter what.
The reason that matters is because it is actually fairly slippery to measure passion. If one person submits a 10 rating, and another submits a 7 rating, what does that mean? It could mean that one person is passionate and the other person is lukewarm. But it could also mean that one person is emphatic while the other person is meek. Or that one person is authoritarian and the other person is abused. The entire reason we have one-person/one-vote is to make sure that voters are treated equally, even if society is otherwise telling certain people that they are "less than".
And for those sorts of elections, Condorcet voting is basically perfect. All the flaws people attribute to "Condorcet methods" are only attributable to when there are multi-member Smith Sets.
Now there are other kinds of elections; elections where we don't follow the one-person/one-vote principle. Smaller electorates, non-governmental, self-governing organizations. In those cases, "consensus" is more possible without risking systemic abuse. And in those cases, it might be entirely appropriate to award the winner to the 49% candidate with more passionate support. In which case you would perhaps choose something other than Condorcet.
You should come to terms with the fact that whatever you mean is completely unintuitive to many/most of us, and that almost everyone will just this like they use Amazon. Whether or not the page says "it's like Amazon" or "it's not like Amazon".
The ballots are proposed as labeled "no support" to "most support".
It isn't entirely unlike Amazon, it's like Amazon if your standard for what's a 5, like "the best book" is "the best of THESE candidates". All people need to do to get the system is care about their impact on the outcome of the election in order to realize that 5 doesn't mean "love" or some other semantic thing, it just means the top of the options.
And if people just use it like Amazon and some give no candidate a 5, the system doesn't fall apart, it works pretty well anyway.
http://star.vote is not a controlled scientific survey or anything, but people overall seem to have no trouble using the full range.
In fact, in my anecdotal experience, even over years in the past when I told people about plain score voting and tried to get them not to use the full range (because I misunderstood that issue myself), many people insisted that they would use the full range anyway. A lot of people find it intuitive to give their favorite all the points they can.
But the real answer is that, yes, we need more studies and trials of all these things.
Yes, so you import the well-known cultural variation in numeric rating systems without concrete semantics for rating levels into your voting system. That's a great idea.
More data on ballots is good only as long as it has a consistent meaning and is used in a way that is consistent with that meaning.
STAR (and other score voting systems) gather noise and pretend it is signal.
http://electology.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ https://rangevoting.org/vsi.html
When it comes up in conversation (or I can work it into conversation), I push people to this - it has some great interactive visualizations
Perhaps the most important important property of a voting system is that it is easy to grok, so that people trust it. In particular, aggregates at the local level should combine simply with other districts to tally overall winners.You can tally IRV incrementally, it's just that ranking permutations are the units of aggregation. That's non-trivial. For this reason, I prefer approval voting.
Approval voting is simple enough, but is vulnerable to bullet voting: approving an additional candidate can make your first choice lose. This makes it unsuitable if your goal is to make third-party voting more viable, which seems to be the premise of the article.
And, particularly, there is very notable cultural variation, which means (ab initio at least; over time, one expects behavior modification efforts would be deployed around this), support from different cultural groups in a diverse polity will have different electoral value even when turnout is the same.
> Approval voting is simple enough,
But also has the same problem: concretely what “approval” means is unclear and will be subject to voter-to-voter variation even when the actual preferences are identical.
Only if you assume that compromising is fundamentally good. Do you believe the propensity is to compromise to get the best of the both worlds or the worst of the both worlds? I would point out, for example, that during the bush (II) administration, the only truly bipartisan, compromise initiatives were war in Iraq, No Child Left Behind, and Corporate Bailouts.
My updated intuition now says that IRV means that as long as your top candidate is in first place, your other preferences are disregarded by the system. "My #2 was eliminated too early -- if I had known that my #1 would be eliminated in the end I would have ranked #2 higher".
But, isn't that the whole point? ... that a compromise, perhaps centrist, candidate can emerge victorious?
You rank 1) Indian 2) Chinese and 3) Italian
Your partner ranks 1) Gastropub 2) Chinese and 3) Steakhouse
you're going to get Chinese food, not because it exists on a line between each of your first choices, but because it is acceptable to each of you, if not preferred. It is a compromise by definition.
Chinese food isn't a compromise, a blend between Italian, Indian, Gatropub and Steakhouse food.
In Chinese food there isn't a little bit from every other choices. A candidate being chosen on virtue of a compromise by the numbers doesn't mean s/he aggregates some ideas from other candidates.
Hence my remark about that candidate being on a different spectrum from the others.
I am not saying he shouldn't be chosen or that people wouldn't be happy about it, I am saying that his ideas aren't a compromise from the other candidates' ideas.
How many axes can you chart a poltician's positions on?
Authoritarian<>Libertarian
Traditional Values <> Social Relational Values
Survival Values<>Self Expression Values
Interventionalist <> isolationist
That's just a few from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_spectrum
Say in the US 2016 election Sanders had run as a 3rd party. He was a liberal populist. He might well have been the second choice of both the Trump and Clinton voters, despite not being positioned between the two. He'd still have been the compromise candidate.
So let's talk 2016 presidential election
I'd imagine that a Trump Voter's ballot would look like the following if Sanders had run as an independent.
1) Trump 2) Sanders 3) Gary Johnson (Maybe with a flip on 2/3)
Clinton voters would be
1) Clinton 2) Sanders
Neither primary choice would be acceptable to the other. There would be some voters who preferred Sanders first.
Edit: As much as everyone's trashing IRV as "horrible" I don't see a simple, worrisome case where it violates monotonicity; those seem limited to really pathological electorates where nothing will make them happy anyway.
The reason there are not more examples like this one is that most governments don't release enough information about ballots in IRV elections.
But ... is there maybe a truncated explanation of the general dynamic there?
100 - A > C > B
100 - B > C > A
40 - C > A > B
10 - C > B > A
The problem is that the B > C > A don't get their second choice considered. Why does this matter? Look at it when you put the votes into pairs.
A vs B: 140 people think A > B. 110 think B > A.
A vs C: 100 people think A > C. 150 think C > A.
B vs C: 110 people think B > C. 140 think C > B.
It's terrible because the loser-elimination step that makes non-monotonicity an issue also makes it less straightforward to tabulate, not because non-monotonicity is an issue outside of edge cases.
Difficulty in tabulation affects speed of, certainty of, and confidence in results, as well as cost of implementation.
> Maybe I react differently from the typical voting system enthusiast?
Nope, especially on neglecting pragmatics like tabulation; that's practically a hallmark of voting system enthusiasts.
Which doesn't rise to the level of "that is so bad it must be stopped".
>> Maybe I react differently from the typical voting system enthusiast?
>Nope,
Kind of strange, since the entire reason for my confusion and joining this thread is because of enthusiasts' doom-and-gloom about the quality of the results themselves, and how they worry about the edge cases and I don't.
Are you invigorated by the cost fears? Because they seem like a sliver compared to the cost of Gore vs Bush.
If I can hurt my preferred candidates chances of winning by ranking them higher on my ballot then the voting system is broken.
Non-monotonicity solely on a few pathological edge cases where voter preferences are a nigh-intransitive clusterf—- is not a problem.
The theoretical candidate was everyone's second preference. That sounds like quite a good compromise.
With IRV, though, I could see a situation where they are much more likely to win simply because, nowadays, Republicans' and Democrats' general level of mutual disdain is such that I wouldn't be surprised if it ends up being common for people who identify with one major party to rank the candidate from the other major party below every other candidate more-or-less out of spite.
This is a symptom of our current system. Anybody who has any ambition in politics will modify some of their positions to fit one of the major two parties. If running for another party wasn't a death sentence, you would see more competent candidates in those parties.
Which is worth doing because, regardless of what the ideal situation is, if it's associated with a spectacularly bad outcome in one of the earlier elections that uses it, that's going to be a big impediment to wider adoption.
So the minor parties (and independents) are eliminated first, and their preferences are distributed. Which usually means than one of the major party candidates scrapes over 50%, reflecting the minor party voters' basic preference for one of the major parties over the other.
In this (common) situation, I think IRV actually works really well.
The major parties still end up in government, but they see the first-preference percentages for the minor parties, and understand what policy positions are important to the electorate.
Just a friendly note: this visualization means nothing without context, and is far from "obvious". Unfortunately, I'd place this in the category of "things that are obvious to people who already believe it". Is there a better way to go about explaining your idea?
To paraphrase, this is a simulation which places candidates and voters on a two-parameter preference space. This is useful because two dimensions are easy to visualize, but the same intuitions apply to higher-dimensional spaces.
Each point is colored to answer "which candidate wins when the popular opinion is normally distributed about this point?". That means the fractured visualization shows IRV's non-monotonicity, and how even when popular opinion is close to a centrist candidate (here in red) it might be that the voting system results in the election of an extreme candidate (green).
Since then the second-tier candidates have done what you say about promoting each other: "vote for me and for X". If one loses, the other could win in the next round. IRV has a moderating influence on how candidates campaign. By making a bid for those later rounds viable, now everyone has an incentive to build strong coalitions before they even get into office.
Would another system work better? Maybe, but I still count it as an improvement over FPTP.
Now, arguably this is IRV functioning as designed, where the city's progressive wing could vote as a block without worrying about 2 candidates splitting the vote. It was very much non-intuitive, though, and a lot of London Breed supporters were quite pissed off. IRV allows you to "vote for a position" rather than "vote for a person", but many voters are still stuck in the "but....they got fewer votes!" mindset.
You meant after completing all the rounds of IRV, Mark Leno had more votes despite London Breed having more first place votes.
Which, yeah, is the whole point of IRV (and, with slight variations, most ranked ballots methods): a plurality winner that doesn't have broader support but ends up at the bottom of ballots not ranking them first shouldn't generally win over someone who has broader appeal just because the broad appeal splits first place support with another candidate.
> IRV allows you to "vote for a position" rather than "vote for a person", but many voters are still stuck in the "but....they got fewer votes!" mindset.
No, it lets you vote for a person, and also specify, “if not Alice, then my vote goes to Bob”. The winner in IRV is always the candidate with the most votes at the end of the process; reporting only first place votes as votes for the candidate is just wrong reporting of IRV counts.
Absolutely, it's more complex than a simple majority. But I think "bizarre" is unfair.
In practice, I think it helps to provide a diversity of representatives that more closely reflect the diversity of views in the electorate.
(AKA Schwartz Sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), the beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting, and path winner)
The part that is most appealing to me is how this method eliminates the least performing options first, then proceeds to better pairs.
The only modifications necessary to "fix" it are to add in a "None of the Above" / "No Confidence" slot AND to require fully filled out rank lists.
If NotA wins then the entire election is re-run with all prior candidates eliminated as possibilities.
I implemented the Schulze method in a hobby project once, and the math is a rather simple digraph algorithm, which also gave me a lot of confidence that it's a well thought out voting method.
This is a much more interesting question to me, first because the candidates' positions are more mutable than the voters' opinions and second because as someone whose political opinions are often non-aligned with major parties, I really wish that there was an incentive for viable 3rd-party candidates to give a voice to my views. The ncase.me simulator linked elsewhere on this thread seems more useful:
You'll never be able to sell it to the general public, of course, but if you could do it for just one election I think you'd have everyone on board just from the results of it.
Saying "we only ever eat meat, let's try eating an orange and see if we like it before we eat any of this lettuce" doesn't follow any actual logic. You might hate lettuce, you might hate oranges, but there's no specific factor that binds them together.
Also what sort of things would you factor into what you prefer? How important is each of them?
Because that kind of lesser-of-two-evils incrementalist attitude is inherent to the first-past-the-post system we have now.
If my choice is between 1% of what I want, 2% of what I want or 99% of what I want, saying "why don't you just be happy with 2% since it's twice as good as the 1% you could have gotten" isn't the most logical point to make.
I care much more about getting a good voting system than I do improving our voting system, if that makes sense.
There's an impossibility theorem (Gibbard's) that states that for any non-dictatorial process for choosing among > 2 outcomes, there is no way to avoid tactical voting potentially swaying the results. The next-best alternative might be to make tactical voting so complex and error-prone that nobody bothers.
I often wonder if we should just use Condorcet and if there isn’t a clear winner, declare the result a tie. (That would likely be vulnerable to a kind of DoS attack, though.)
So one option is to hold a runoff between the candidates in the Smith Set.
Another is crazier, but I haven't found a flaw yet. Basically introduce range/score voting on the ballot, but only use the scores if there is a multi-member Smith Set. That way you guarantee Condorcet compliance. And since the voters don't know if the ranges/scores will be used (and they probably won't), they don't have incentive to strategically score a less-desired candidate ahead of a more-desired candidate.
I just thought of a way to possibly make it more intuitive. Use ranked voting, with the addition of a “nobody below this line” item that you can add to your ranking anywhere you like. Then at the runoff stage, you use approval voting, with “nobody below here” determining which candidates you approve.
That gives you a nice easy-to-understand runoff, and is maybe even more understandable than normal ranked voting because you get to explicitly separate out the candidates you really can’t stomach. I suspect some people don’t like ranked voting because you’re expected to stack-rank lots of candidates you dislike.
But we're talking a lot of complexity to have both ranks and scores as separate marks. Super long ballot, will turn away most voters and seem really hard to process.
It sounds like you might appreciate 3-2-1 voting. https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting
(The point of the above was to respect the Condorcet Criterion, and 3-2-1 voting does not meet that criterion.)
The Smith set is as easy to explain as the Condorcet winner, and random selection is trivial, so random selection from the Smith set seems to be a simple Condorcet tiebreaker.
Hmm, there might be something in that...
The Smith set tie would occur more often, and in complex scenarios where it really isn’t clear that it actually is a dead heat.
But of course, random ballot has just one pesky undesirable property: the fact that it’s random.
Basically, I suggest pushing approval voting over other methods for realistic cases.
Could anyone take a stab at explaining how this could happen? I looked at the linked site but it's over my head. The visualizations aren't doing anything for me.
It is a consequence of the loser-elimination step. You can avoid it by eliminating loser elimination, which gives the (unlimited ranks variant of) Bucklin (with ties and truncated ballots allowed, essentially Majority Judgement) voting system, which has its own pros and cons. I kind of lean towards unlimited ranks, ties-allowed Bucklin—count first-place votes, if you have a candidate with a majority of ballots cast, they win, if not add all candidates second place votes and see if you have a majority (of ballots, not counted votes which will now exceed ballots), etc., with a tie-breaking procedure if you get two majorities in the same round (bigger majority, either in current or subsequent rounds, random selection of the tie persists when ballot preferences are exhausted)—is my preferred simple ranked-choice system. Condorcet methods arguably choose a better winner in the case where they disagree, but are less simple.
It's entirely possible (even within the confines of the US Constitution!) to virtually never do this. Elect the House of Representatives by statewide party list. Senate is hard because each state has two senators elected non-simultaneously; otherwise statewide STV would work. Since the President is already elected by the Electoral Congress, skip the popular Presidential election and select the Electoral Congress by sortition among all eligible registered voters in a state (similar to jury selection except without being able to arbitrarily send people home) and have them personally interview the candidates before voting their personal consciences.
It doesn’t matter. It ain’t gonna happen. Not because IRV or condorcet is or isn’t better, but simply because of the installed base. Getting literally everyone to a) understand the subtle differences and then b) agree to switch and c) agree to switch to the same system is impossible because literally every step of the process is itself impossible.
This is not me being pessimistic, this is me being realistic.
Humorously, a top down dictatorial approach would be the only way to “improve” (by some estimations) the current democratic implementation. You’d have to not care about democracy to upgrade democracy.
/s
Proof by contradiction, mate. It's not impossible, just hard. There's plenty of things that once we're said to be impossible, and the data agreed... until they happened. Everything had to have had a first time.
I was unfamiliar with the ranked pairs system, and will study it more to understand it better. It looks promising as far as technical excellence, though I'm afraid it'd still be too hard to understand for the general populace in most (or all) countries.
One thing I suspect about range voting is that it seems to require strategic voting. A voter would still need to give a very favorable score to a majority party that's kind of aligned with their views, as opposed to giving them a lower score than a minority/third party he or she would prefer. One of the strongest appeals to me from IRV is the opportunity it provides for a minority party to unseat majority parties, which is appealing given the political stagnation experienced by many countries. I had also thought that it allowed voters to avoid strategic voting and express their true, individual voting preferences.
After reading IRV's description in http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ , I realized that I had misunderstood one important detail. I had thought that the least popular candidates were eliminated first until only the top two candidates remained, and the one with most votes among them remained. I dislike that the "real" IRV (not the one that was in my head) first checks for a 50%-plus-one majority before eliminating the bottom candidates. That feels too much like the first-past-the-post system for my liking. I wonder if having successive rounds where the least-favorite first place candidate is eliminated would make most people's favorite candidates "bubble up" to the top, producing a final match between two highly-favored candidates. I wonder if such a system is closer to a Condorcet method than the real IRV...
Suppose that a candidate has a majority at the beginning. Then this continues to be the case as other candidates are eliminated. Thus, this majority candidate will be elected at the end. So this extra "if-clause" only speeds up computation, it does not change the voting rule.
IRV has its flaws but they are minor in comparison to the voting system we have.
Could you elaborate on why you think plurality is better than IRV?
However, a system similar enough to your example has been used for years by the Quakers, where each voter gives a score of +1, 0, or -1 to each option/candidate. The difference here is that you can give +1 to multiple candidates, and -1 to multiple candidates. Giving your opinion on one candidate in no way limits your ability to give opinion on other candidates.
Range/Score (and STAR, which is a variation) use numeric score rankings on a preset range, and some methods use a limited set of ranks rather than (allowing voters to use up to) as many as candidates (Approval can be viewed as two-rank system.)
For example, if 40% believe in A and 60% believe in B, and there one candidate, X, standing on platform A, and two candidates, Y and Z, standing on minor variants of platform B, the votes split 30% for Y, 30% for Z, and X gets elected with 40%.
It is easy to see how the 2016 presidential election would have worked out if this assumption was realistic. Hillary 52%, Donald(Republican) 24%, Never-Trump(Republican) 24%. Hillary wins by a landslide, despite playing a sub-optimal electoral college game.
The assumption is very far from realistic. I next turn to whether the lack of realism matters.
Imagine a three way race, with two old established parties, A and B, and a new third party, C. Under first past the post voters who prefer C > B > A, vote B, to avoid letting A in. Meanwhile voters who prefer C > A > B vote A to avoid letting B in. Under first past the post (FPTP) it is very hard to start a new party.
We might frame the issue this way: who decides the fate of the third party candidate? Under FPTP the third party candidate loses and this decision was taken long ago, by men now dead, when they opted for FPTP. Under IRV the fate of the third party depends on today's voters. If they are voting C > B > A and C > A > B then the third party candidate stages an upset victory. If they are voting B > A > C and A > B > C then the third party candidate is humiliated and doesn't bother running again.
The argument for IRV over FPTP is that we prefer that the fate of the third party candidate be in the hands of the voters, rather than seeing the third party candidate lose automatically, by the game theory of FPTP.
The zesty link simplifies away the problem that IRV is intended to solve. But it doesn't argue that the problem is small; it cannot do that because every-one can see that the spoiler effect under FPTP is a big issue. Instead it refuses to mention the problem, simplifies it away, and hopes that nobody notices. That is derailing, not contributing.
One property of IRV that makes it so questionable is its non-monotonicity. This means that you can help a candidate by ranking them lower, and hurt a candidate by ranking them higher. It is extremely easy to visualize how ill-behaved IRV is in the charts on this website:
http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
Meanwhile, ranked pairs (a "condorcet" method) has the property that, if candidate A is more popular than all other candidates pairwise, then candidate A will always win. This is _not_ true in IRV.
If you're interested in falling down the rabbit hole of electoral systems, I recommend looking at this chart that compares their properties:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_system...