SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)

Re:SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) by wahern on Friday September 28, 2018 @07:09PM (#18097750)

Wake me when we have DNS over HTTPS for anything except web browsers. Plus, someone running an MTA is very likely running a recursive DNS server on the same network, if not the same machine, that uses UDP or TCP for upstream queries. Anyone positioned to MITM SMTP is likely positioned to MITM DNS.

EDIT: Ah, perhaps you meant that with DNS over HTTPS, MTAs will need an HTTP client anyhow. IMO the path of least resistance will be adding HTTPS, DNSSEC, or w'ever to machine-local resolver services. But point taken (whether earnest or sarcastic =)

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Re:SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) by tedunangst on Friday September 28, 2018 @07:51PM (#18097907)

Some sort of secure channel DNS seems likely to trickle down. Especially since an MTA is already well past getaddrinfo. And STS already requires https (which I do find kind of weird). So all the heavy lifting code of some form of secure DNS is here.

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Re:SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) by damm on Friday September 28, 2018 @09:29PM (#18098227)

All it takes is someone updating the glibc resolver function to handle DoH.

Then update /etc/resolv.conf with your DoH option or old legacy..

... Not a fan of DoH but it doesn't matter if I like it.

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