Re:SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)
by wahern on Friday September 28, 2018 @06:57PM
(#18097719)
> I think that, from a utilitarian perspective, the only mail servers that matter are the ones that Google and its peers run, and that's the threat model I care about.
I'd be surprised if Google doesn't already enforce TLS for other big peers like Microsoft. In your universe, what do we need a broken standard for?
> you require the radical centralization of all cryptographic trust on the Internet into a tree-shaped PKI
Web PKI isn't radically centralized? It's worse than radically centralized, because you can break Web PKI by attacking the weakest CA.
> it drives a stake through the heart of the last truly motivating problem that DNSSEC was going to solve.
MTA-STS may give people cover to pretend they don't need DNSSEC. But make no mistake: it doesn't actually solve the problem.
It's interesting that technical opinions of DNSSEC have devolved into such irrational hatred that people will openly proclaim that fake security is better than actual, DNSSEC-provided security. Yes, DNSSEC is complex. Yes, it has issues with network privacy. But those arguments don't redeem MTA-STS, which is fundamentally broken.
Re:SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)
by tptacek on Friday September 28, 2018 @07:02PM
(#18097730)
If we agree on the positive argument I don't think we have to resolve the normative one. I disagree with you on that, strongly, but do not expect to persuade you.
I'd be surprised if Google doesn't already enforce TLS for other big peers like Microsoft. In your universe, what do we need a broken standard for?
> you require the radical centralization of all cryptographic trust on the Internet into a tree-shaped PKI
Web PKI isn't radically centralized? It's worse than radically centralized, because you can break Web PKI by attacking the weakest CA.
> it drives a stake through the heart of the last truly motivating problem that DNSSEC was going to solve.
MTA-STS may give people cover to pretend they don't need DNSSEC. But make no mistake: it doesn't actually solve the problem.
It's interesting that technical opinions of DNSSEC have devolved into such irrational hatred that people will openly proclaim that fake security is better than actual, DNSSEC-provided security. Yes, DNSSEC is complex. Yes, it has issues with network privacy. But those arguments don't redeem MTA-STS, which is fundamentally broken.