Sigh.
However, the generally accepted quote syntax on HN does not use code blocks in the first place.
> *Quote goes here*Some users don't, there is no one unambiguously correct method, and the 2nd- most common variant I see has several obvious detriments.
The fact that the "show us your code" feature seems to be predominantly used for blockquotes, on a generally technological site, strongly suggests a failure to correctly match user expectations and needs.
Though as metacommentary in infotech, SV, and YC, the message couldn't be clearer.
Seems more likely that it's a lack of instruction on the comment page. Discord manages to fit all of its formatting into the whitespace under the chat input....
Format your posts appropriately - that's the sole burden of the writer, no one else's.
Don't blame the user.
pre { whitespace: pre-wrap; }
https://www.w3schools.com/cssref/pr_text_white-space.aspThat's what I've included in my own HN Stylus stylesheet for years. Works on Desktop or Firefox/Android, but other mobile browsers don't support it, for lack of extension support.
Updating the HN markup to offer true blockquote support would be a more complete, though less trivial, solution.
I've suggested the first myself repeatedly.
pg asked how to fix this, and was given the solution, on HN, nine years ago:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=592603
The suggestion's been made numerous times:
https://hn.algolia.com/?query=whitespace%20pre-wrap&sort=byP...
I don't think the major problem is that `/^ {4}/` lines don't wrap in a way that's useful for quotes; it's that there's no way to format quotes so people use the only formatting element HN has.
Technically, HN has a couple other formatting elements.
It is a standing convention to use the following syntax for quotes here:
> *Quote text here*https://www.engadget.com/2018/08/29/whatsapp-google-drive-ba...
WhatsApp messages are encrypted end-to-end between each person using it. The whole point of end-to-end encryption is not having to trust the server-side storage.
Furthermore, WhatsApp uses the Signal Protocol-- the state-of-the-art for secure messaging protocols.
The worst that WhatsApp can see is "who's talking to who?"
Finally, the adoption of the Signal Protocol in WhatsApp came long after the Facebook acquisition.
So, no. It wasn't better off pre-fb.
That can be a problem when you're a whistle blower contacting a journalist.
(Server-side storage is a non-issue, due to the encryption protocols in use. It doesn't matter if you distrust Facebook, they aren't going to be able to read your messages. End of.)
The main problems with WhatsApp are as I can see:
- they scoop up metadata
- they upload the data more or less plaintext to Google for backup. (I personally dislike but trust Google but not everyone trusts them.)
- they paid way to much for it to not try to monetize it in all kinds of crazy ways
How do we know this hasn't happened already?
How do we know it won't happen tomorrow?
As has been pointed out here in the chat already: Scott (and others) have reverse engineered it.
> How do we know it won't happen tomorrow?
Consequences.
Even Facebook seems to realize that is the nuclear option.
That said there is a number of places this can still go wrong, but they are equally true for any mainstream client (edit:) and non mainstream clients have their own issues.
Personally neither like nor trust Facebook at all so I try to minimize contact.
Not really, given keys are centrally managed, it is fairly straightforward for WhatsApp to setup MITM intercept.
In fact they don't even need to push a malicious client etc, they just need to push a different public key than the sender/receiver's actual ones when contacts mutually add each other and this will quite simply allow MITM interception unless the people do key verification in person. If what the whistle blower is trying to do is stay anonymous - would they physically meet the reporter immediately?
They could even push new keys to existing mutual contacts and get away with it since most people don't display or again verify key change messages.
Lastly, most people turn on message backup in Google drive which is not encrypted - so a warrant or an account hack would suffice.
WhatsApp implementation can protect basically from malicious non state actors. That's a great thing in today's world in itself but be aware of the underlying tech.
I use WhatsApp without doing that (on iOS), but it does require other people to contact you first before you can have a conversation.
But I could also just dex2jar + JD-GUI the Android app and study the decompiled Java code to see what they're doing.
Edited to add: https://twitter.com/CiPHPerCoder/status/1042870740880637952
Follow-through on WatsApp's initial verification step using some other channel before you assume the communication is secret.
Personally, I don't trust FB, but for a non-technical person there aren't any clearly superior alternatives.
I have not used Wire beyond a test install but it indeed looked promising. In a sense it's even better than Telegram that allows you to just use usernames but you have to add a phone number anyway (also if the other Telegram user by any chance has your phone number in their contacts then your identity is revealed anyway).
But I'd say that Telegram's apps (mobile and desktop both) are superior too all the major IM apps around. I wish they could be more forthcoming about openness.
In researching WhatsApp a while ago, I came across this in a Quora post "But one more point I want to stress here is that, though whatsapp is allowing end to end communication , it does not necessarily mean they can not analyse the encrypted data. in cryptography we call it Searchable Encryption." (https://www.quora.com/Now-that-WhatsApp-can-no-longer-read-y...)
I don't know whether it is accurate to WhatsApp, but it's certainly food for thought and also made me wonder how many other end-end encrypted systems use it.
I personally don't trust FB. WhatsApp is not open source, so I have to trust what FB says. I don't.
There are many important considerations in secure messaging and the EFF has done a reasonable job of trying to cover the subject in their series on messaging (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/secure-messaging-more-...)
Build it yourself and host/use your own app builds and server instances. But then I'll have trust the company I bought my VPS from to host my Matrix instance, isn't it?
Meanwhile, it's not 1994 anymore, and people who know how to look for bugs can (I know this is hard for some people to wrap their heads around) look inside of binaries and draw conclusions about how programs work. There's a name for it; it's a kind of engineering.
It not being open source is a political argument, not a technical one.
EDIT: I ended up doing just that. It took roughly 5 minutes (most of that was making sure I had my PATH for Java set up correctly on this machine) to get decompiled Java code ready to inspect.
If I can compare the open source to the reverse engineered code to see what I'm really using/getting, that seems like a technical advantage. Also, all of the reverse engineered code I've worked with has been difficult and time consuming to digest (missing var names, comments etc); open source gives me a technical advantage in analyzing and understanding the code. Lastly, looking at a companies open source lets me assess their technical sophistication and practices which also seems like a technical advantage.
I haven't spent much time thinking on this subject, but the political aspect seems to be the line of thinking that says: you will engender trust by making a project open source.
Is your reasoning similar?
Also are there good tools for reverse engineering iOS deployments?
There are many; since apps are native on iOS a standard disassembler would work. But there are many more specialized tools, such as class-dump and Hopper.
I'm not an Apple consumer, I don't know anything about iOS in particular.
My point is open sourced code is much more readable and hence more accessible and you can build it yourself and use it most of the times.
This can be done in a number of ways from subpoenas to hacking to threats/blackmail.
In the case of WhatsApp, we do have public confirmation of the Signal team working with WhatsApp to implement end-to-end encryption. [1]
Also the departure of WhatsApp founders under uncertain terms, doesn't give me much confidence with usage of that app for clandestine operations.
Perhaps folks here who are well versed with the state of the app can chime in.