1) Jeffrey had motive. His mother had been abusing him for years.
2) Jeffrey was the last person to see his mother alive. The crime scene evidence also pointed to an “insider” who would’ve felt comfortable sticking around to clean up the crime scene (blood was found in the sink, there was no blood in exit paths).
3) Jeffrey had blisters on his hands consistent with weilding a bludgeoning weapon.
4) Jeffrey’s alibi was that he had been planting flowers at his teacher’s house. But the teacher testified that he had done that four days before.
The second degree murder charge was proper. If the jury believed he killed his mothef because of the abuse, first degree murder might not stick. Second degree, “heat of the moment/emotional disturbance” murder would be the correct charge.
It seems to me that the only reason we do things any other way, is that juries don't have encyclopedic knowledge of the criminal code, and so you have to teach them about what the requirements are for guilt in the particular case.
Given that the court system doesn't like jury nullification, and wants juries to be deciding solely on whether the facts presented to them match the legal requirements for the definition of a particular crime—why would it matter whether they know which crime they'll be asked to evaluate the facts against, before they know the facts? They can learn the facts first, or the law first. Either way, the last step is just matching one to the other. (In the Supreme Court's opinion, at least.)
The reason is more involved, because:
(1) law, like facts, is subject to question and answering those questions is out of scope of the jury, which is the trier of fact alone. Your model would necessarily transfer the judge's responsibility to the jury.
(2) The law creates permission for prosecution (bit civil and criminal , though only the latter is relevant here), but that permission is not a mandate. Judgement of the cake of prosecution is given to the offended party (in criminal law, the executive on behalf of the government). Your model would necessarily transfer the executives authority largely to the jury (though prosecutors could withhold inculpatory evidence to avoid undesired charges being triggered.)
(3) But, most critically, your model would provide the defendant with a vast surface to defend against, and require the defense to provide evidence against any offense the jury might infer from the evidence. The use of specific charges and specifications putd the defense on notice of the specific charges they must defend against.
(4) Related to (3), without specific charges, any trial is essentially a trial for all potential criminal conduct occurring before that point, which creates double jeopardy problems if concealed evidence of an early crime comes to light, as distinguishing between a trial addressing other charges (which would not foreclose a new trial for double jeopardy reasons) and a trial addressing the offense indicated by the new evidence but which merely failed to convict (which would foreclose a new trial) is impossible. Meaningful protection against double jeopardy while permitting trials for newly discovered offenses requires something like the current specific-charge model.
> Given that the court system doesn't like jury nullification,
The court system may not like it, but it has repeatedly been found to be part of the Constitutional order of government. By the court system, I might add, so obviously they like it enough to keep protecting it.
Like I said, I was presuming an ideal jury. (Picture a land where everyone has the legal experience and character of a Supreme Court justice—a land that makes Plato's Republic look populist.)
A real jury is, of course, Not Good at the law.
> Your model would necessarily transfer the executives authority largely to the jury (though prosecutors could withhold inculpatory evidence to avoid undesired charges being triggered.)
Not necessarily. The jury could return a list of crimes that have been proven (in Scottish justice-system terminology), and then the aggrieved could decide which crimes they want the defendant to be sentenced for.
Basically, extend the judge's ability to issue a "judgement notwithstanding" verdict, to be something done in cooperation with the aggrieved party.
Or, to put that another way... take a jury trial, and split it into two pieces:
• a jury-empanelled inquest—a truth-finding procedure—where the jury is there to be a truth-finding oracle, consuming 1. a criminal code and 2. a ream of testimony, and then outputting 3. a set of "proven" / "not proven" decisions for every crime in the criminal code, as they apply to the testimony.
• then, a bench trial, where the judge also has access to the testimony from the inquest, but where the law directs the judge to make their decision the same way they do in a jury trial: by—unless their reading of the transcript reveals that something has gone terribly wrong in the execution of justice—treating "the decision reached by the jury" as the only valid testimony. The judge then assigns a "guilty" / "not guilty" verdict for particular crimes that were being pursued, based on that testimony, and does sentencing.
I think this approach addresses most of your other points. Please poke holes in it :)
> By the court system, I might add, so obviously they like it enough to keep protecting it.
Jury nullification isn't really upheld by the court system (it's been repeatedly found that jurors have no right to it); its existence just comes down to the fact that criminalizing a juror's voting in one direction or the other would kind of break the justice system.
In a justice system that separated the "we declare that you screwed up" and the "so we will punish you" parts, I believe that jurors found to have "voted their conscience" would likely be found to have done something wrong in the eyes of the justice system—just something that cannot, necessarily, be criminalized.
Your suggestion seems to be to coalesce the grand jury with the petit jury, and have the jury decide first that a criminal court should convene to conduct a trial, and then decide only later if the facts proved in that trial correspond to any particular crime or crimes.
The prosecutors could still press for a specific crime, but the defense would also be able to argue directly to the jury that "even if X and Y were true (which they aren't), that would only be a class N crime, because the prosecution hasn't proved Z, which is necessary for it to be a class M crime."
To prove who committed the murder (after proving that the person's death was a homicide at all), all you need is to exculpate two of the three remaining people (by e.g. having them supply air-tight alibis.)
Then, by process of elimination, the last one must be the murderer. Even though that's entirely "circumstantial evidence", it really is a proof, in the deductive sense.
Jeffrey committing the murder doesn't follow from 1) 2) and 3)
Regarding 4) its still hazy as every one's recovery time could be different. Granted it won't be 100 days or something like that, but four days is still touch and go.
Law et al aside. How do Judges rule in this case? There is huge chance of getting this wrong, and how do you live with this thing on our conscious that you would have sent an innocent man to the gallows?
Having motive to kill someone doesn’t prove you did it. But statistically, those with motive are much more likely to be the killer than a random person. That narrows the probability. Likewise, lying about where you were at the time of the murder (which is what #4 is about) doesn’t prove you committed it, but makes it more likely. Those compund—each additional fact narrows the probability that the accused is not guilty.
If you take a random sampling of 100 situations where there exists facts similar to this case, I think you’d find that 95%+ of the time the accused really did commit the murder. That’s all that’s required.
That's 5 innocent people sentenced per hundred people to death/prison for a crime they didn't commit.
That is a lot.
In many cases for the innocent, the trial itself is a big punishment.
You can choose to prosecute a case with basically any evidence (including "no evidence.") In a jury trial, it's up to the jury to decide whether the suspect is guilty—i.e. jury nullification goes both ways, and a jury can return a "guilty" vote despite a complete absence of a case, just because they feel like it. (A judge does have the ability to overrule any guilty verdict they feel was reached unjustly, but in the sorts of situations you'd expect a community biased enough to return a guilty verdict in absence of evidence, you'd also expect the judge—if they're a member of the same community—to be biased as well.)
Usually, though, because juries are almost never that biased (and are not aware of jury nullification), prosecutors just "decline to prosecute" cases that they don't think have enough evidence to sway a jury.
In my naivety I didn't think conviction based on that kind of "evidence" was allowed in the US justice system. At one point when the prosecution didn't think the charge of 1st degree murder would stick they added a charge of 2nd degree murder. In the end the jury found him guilty of the latter.