Something you don't mention but is another nice bit is they have poll observers from each major party watching at each elction site.
One thing they don't have but I wish for is that, after the machine-count totals are in, each party represented should be able to name a small number of precincts for an audit/hand recount. Parties at this point have pretty good modelling of expected results at a precinct level. That would give a cheap way to get lots of certainty against tampering of the machine vote counting.
Largely because election officials are also not computer security experts (or even serious amateurs). Therefore when "big corp" comes knocking with their newfangled electronic touch screen voting system that promises fast, effortless tallies and "security" (it's, right there, the box is checked on the ad brochure...) the election officials have no background with which to be skeptical of "big corp"'s products re. security. And with the promise of "effortless, instant, tallies" (vs. a long overnight counting paper manually) they see the newfangled thing as an improvement over that which they do understand (the long overnight counting paper).
This is IT. When have the technical experts been empowered to make purchasing decisions?
If you are buying IT and you aren’t sure about some spec, security apparatus or venerability, then you can’t be considered knowledgeable.
No one can be expected to know everything but then they should be surrounding themselves with experts and counseling with them ad nauseam
If there is anything wrong found in that first series of audits, then a full audit should be requiered by law and there should be severe prison punishments for those state officials failing to start and finish those audits in the specified time after the election.
Corrupt state officials should not be able to create any sort of delays or use them as an excuse.
If there are any differences in the count then additional locations are required to also do a manual count, and if more than two locations have differences, all electronic numbers are trashed and the whole election is counted manually.
The key to all of this is involving as much of the public as possible though: democracy is government by the people for the people, the people need to be involved in its operation. The only way you dispel the idea of rigging is by ensuring a large plurality of your population was involved each time and would attest to their neighbors that they saw no misbehavior.
Electronic voting is based on trying to take people out of the process - it misses the point.
The inclusivity of paper voting is amazing. It doesn't matter if you are young or old, black or white, highly educated or illiterate, rich or poor, just about everyone can count ballots.
And if you think someone is trying to fuck you over, you too can go count along or watch that ballot box all day to ensure nobody is tampering with it.
Get a few hundred people in the same room that all don't trust one another and all count along. That's how you run an election.
Don't let something that feels wrong steer you away from much more severe and likely problems.
As I've said, about 1.5M people vote in Minnesota alone. Altering the outcome by 1% would require 15,000 additional votes. And this would need to be completely one-sided, so the "anyone can do it" threat you bring up should cluster around the mean - about the same number of "extra" votes are cast for each side.
Don't get caught up in scope issues. The problem we are trying to solve here is the legitimacy of elections. Does a little noise around the edges actually undermine the legitimacy of the outcome? Can it do so?
Also, remember there ain't no such thing as a free lunch. Any mechanism that detects multiple votes by the same individual will produce a number of false positives - thus denying people who are not cheating of their vote. This is actually the pernicious, immoral logic of Voter ID laws in the US. They're marketed as ways to prevent fraud, but the actual intent is to reduce turnout in certain (mostly poor) communities. This is why support for these laws is so deeply partisan - one party is pushing for them, and one is fighting them, and the party pushing for them isn't actually that interested in fraud. Their political interest is partisan advantage, and their mechanism is misleading citizens about their intent, so people will tolerate what should be intolerable.
A system that ties each registered voter to a unique ID which is basically implemented for you if you require ID at the polls will have a false positive rate of ~0 much lower than our current system. This is actually a side benefit.
But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups.
But how do you know. That's the issue. If P is the probability of getting caught, and C is the number of people caught then N ~= C/P. With our current system it seems like P is close to 0 so even with C = 0 there could be a lot of successful attempts.
Rigging a polling place is not viable because it would require coordination between multiple people and leave a clear mathematical trail after. So I would say that, including detection after the fact, that P > 0.5 and that the fact that it hasn't been caught means that N = 0.
> But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups.
This is pretty much separate from my point but I am also skeptical about this. If someone can get to the polling place, stand in a line, and do paperwork to vote, then why could they not do pretty much the same thing to get an ID?
This argument is sounds great but doesn't match reality
https://i.redditmedia.com/NITi8srtcW0xIfOQXPZda6zJNrpb_jRbwg...
Edit: Link to the paper: http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2012/09/20/1210722109...
Consider the Minnesota example. In MN, all physical ballot handling, whether marked or unmarked, sealed or unsealed, must be done in the presence of members of at least two different political parties. Since the only ways to rig an election at the polling place are to either add, remove, or substitute ballots, this makes such fraud extremely difficult to do, especially at scale.
My polling place is two blocks from my house. I can walk there, vote, and be home in 20 minutes. Last time I had to renew my license, it was a three hour ordeal that cost me money and an afternoon of work, and the nearest station is miles from my house (in a dense city).
The other great thing not mentioned here is that elections are run by the AEC, a non-partisan commission.
They are also in charge of redistricting.
So you don’t have gerrymandering and you don’t have BS going on like what happened in Georgia where they “accidentally” wiped all the data 3 times when subpoenaed by the FBI.
Add to that compulsory voting, elections always run on weekends, and a thousand other small things and it’s like one country wants you to vote and the other does not.
And you'll probably have to ask someone who's not in the room about what went wrong. With human hand-counts, the person you need to ask is already sitting there. No mystery, no confusion.
It's not a perfect idea, but I like the upsides more than the downsides.
That said, there are some really interesting non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for elections that accomplish what you're intending without this flaw. Their main downside is that, compared to tallying, they're complicated.
Some places already do partial recounts. It is expensive. Most jurisdictions don't have the budget.
Also, how are you going to scan all these ballots after voting has closed? That would require opening up the lockbox, which tampers with the security of the system. Plus, you're no longer getting results instantly; you'd have to wait until the polling place is closed down, and then open up the box and scan all the ballots. What possible advantage does this have? It'd just slow everything down.
The votes can be tallied instantaneously through the electronic system, but if there's any irregularities the lockboxes can be opened and manually counted as verification. And you can open a small number of randomly selected lockboxes every election anyway, even absent any suspected wrongdoing, just as a check to verify that the electronic counts are working as expected.
How is this not the standard everywhere? Yes, there's more paper (and thus expense) involved, but surely having a non-hackable paper trail is worth it to protect our democracy?
I was at DEF CON the first time they did the voting machine hacking. Those did not fill me with confidence.