Don't let something that feels wrong steer you away from much more severe and likely problems.
As I've said, about 1.5M people vote in Minnesota alone. Altering the outcome by 1% would require 15,000 additional votes. And this would need to be completely one-sided, so the "anyone can do it" threat you bring up should cluster around the mean - about the same number of "extra" votes are cast for each side.
Don't get caught up in scope issues. The problem we are trying to solve here is the legitimacy of elections. Does a little noise around the edges actually undermine the legitimacy of the outcome? Can it do so?
Also, remember there ain't no such thing as a free lunch. Any mechanism that detects multiple votes by the same individual will produce a number of false positives - thus denying people who are not cheating of their vote. This is actually the pernicious, immoral logic of Voter ID laws in the US. They're marketed as ways to prevent fraud, but the actual intent is to reduce turnout in certain (mostly poor) communities. This is why support for these laws is so deeply partisan - one party is pushing for them, and one is fighting them, and the party pushing for them isn't actually that interested in fraud. Their political interest is partisan advantage, and their mechanism is misleading citizens about their intent, so people will tolerate what should be intolerable.
A system that ties each registered voter to a unique ID which is basically implemented for you if you require ID at the polls will have a false positive rate of ~0 much lower than our current system. This is actually a side benefit.
But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups.
But how do you know. That's the issue. If P is the probability of getting caught, and C is the number of people caught then N ~= C/P. With our current system it seems like P is close to 0 so even with C = 0 there could be a lot of successful attempts.
Rigging a polling place is not viable because it would require coordination between multiple people and leave a clear mathematical trail after. So I would say that, including detection after the fact, that P > 0.5 and that the fact that it hasn't been caught means that N = 0.
> But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups.
This is pretty much separate from my point but I am also skeptical about this. If someone can get to the polling place, stand in a line, and do paperwork to vote, then why could they not do pretty much the same thing to get an ID?
This argument is sounds great but doesn't match reality
https://i.redditmedia.com/NITi8srtcW0xIfOQXPZda6zJNrpb_jRbwg...
Edit: Link to the paper: http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2012/09/20/1210722109...
Consider the Minnesota example. In MN, all physical ballot handling, whether marked or unmarked, sealed or unsealed, must be done in the presence of members of at least two different political parties. Since the only ways to rig an election at the polling place are to either add, remove, or substitute ballots, this makes such fraud extremely difficult to do, especially at scale.
My polling place is two blocks from my house. I can walk there, vote, and be home in 20 minutes. Last time I had to renew my license, it was a three hour ordeal that cost me money and an afternoon of work, and the nearest station is miles from my house (in a dense city).
The inclusivity of paper voting is amazing. It doesn't matter if you are young or old, black or white, highly educated or illiterate, rich or poor, just about everyone can count ballots.
And if you think someone is trying to fuck you over, you too can go count along or watch that ballot box all day to ensure nobody is tampering with it.
Get a few hundred people in the same room that all don't trust one another and all count along. That's how you run an election.