> ... the ability of security services to track you on IPv4 versus IPv6 is pretty much about the same.
Identifying the device and identifying the person using it are two entirely different things. Multiple people use the same device all the time.
Ex: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_assets_owned_by_NBCUni... (Comcast)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T#Corporate_structure (AT&T)
But if every device has a fixed or randomized identifier then surely the identifier contains absolutely no routing information whatsoever (the machine might have an address starting ffff:ffff:... but might be behind routers eeee:eeee:... or dddd:dddd:... in completely different parts of the world).
Why do you think so? NAT can be used for IPv6 is exactly the same way it's used for IPv4.
I really don't think it matters too much for client devices anyways, we've found plenty of workarounds by now where it matters. Maybe the best case is NAT-optional.
It would be trivial in that circumstance to blow away any kind of NAT and the pseudo-anonymity/plausible deniabililty it provides and make client devices performing illegitimate activity directly identifiable.
I wonder if such a ruling might be different in that context. It's a perturbing thought.