I also just don't want ISPs etc. knowing what content I read, in minute detail. No, I don't "have something to hide", but I'm sick of it being so easy for companies to build detailed profiles of my habits and then sell that information to people who want to sell me things. No thanks.
Sure, I could run a VPN all the time. But I think to be a good web citizen, site operators should do all they can to protect their users from malicious actors out there. TLS is just one piece of that.
And honestly, for a modest static blog site, you can set up Let's Encrypt in less than an hour.
HTTP feeds this kind of hostile behavior.
A big part of the problem here is that vendors do a _lousy_ job of making this easy. An out-of-box Apache is a fairly good HTTP server, but it'll take you an hour with a good tutorial to make it a half-way decent HTTPS server. Not because HTTPS is inherently difficult but because no relevant expertise was brought to bear in Apache's implementation.
And this isn't just a Unix flavour problem, the IIS handling of TLS is garbage too. Microsoft has documentation that's incomplete or flat wrong, and then you're expected to muddle along following blog posts and video tutorials.
There's a LOT of cargo culting in this space. Almost every instance of the name "Middlesex" you see in an X.509 certificate is a result of this sort of cargo culting, because the postal county of Middlesex ceased to exist before X.509 was even created, but it looks superficially as though you need to specify a "county" in X.509 and so people based in London dredged up Middlesex. And it didn't _break_ anything so they kept doing it without knowing why.
Hopefully in the future more web servers will implement this, and HTTPS will be enabled as the default configuration.
My landlord sent a handyman in while I was on vacation once, and the handyman didn't close the front door all the way (or try to lock it). My door was open for 3 days, visible from the street, and I don't live in the nice side of town. No one stole the TV, but my electric bill was high that month.
A MITM attack on a static site is definitely possible, maybe even easy, but I'm not going to worry about it unless I have something important to protect.
HTTPS doesn't protect the content of your site from being stolen, it protects your users from hostile third-party content masquerading as yours.
Exactly. What does anyone lose if my anonymous untrusted blog does something untrustworthy for that one reader who has an infected router?
Should I encrypt messages I write on post cards, because I'm afraid a disgruntled postal worker will write "you suck" on the bottom? The worst case scenario here is temporary vandalism.
Hostile third party content is only hostile because the client used to access the content does not take client security seriously.
Food for thought: As an end user consumer visiting random, benign websites, I want my browser to be protecting me against hostiles, rather than relying on website operators to do that for me. Just like I run antivirus on my machines instead of relying on everyone else to run it.
If you do this, site providers are forced to switch to https anyway.
No, if everyone does this, providers are forced to switch. If you do it, it just means you're cut off from some portion of the web.
If automated drones roamed the country looking for open doors to break into, people might be more worried about their home security. Fortunately, the physical world protects us from wide-scale exploitation.
Or, let's go even simpler: no server of your own at all. Anyone who uses GitHub Pages for their static site, gets an automatic LetsEncrypt cert provisioned for their custom domain if they set one. (I'm honestly surprised that other SaaS hosts that set you up with some service on a subdomain, and allow you to map it to a custom domain, haven't followed along and done the same. It's an easy feature to offer!)
Deploying Nginx is a uniquely-bad example to use right now for TLS ease-of-use. There are all sorts of setups where TLS "just happens"—some of which web-development novices will likely encounter before they become experienced enough to consider "deploying their own web server" to be a sensible action.
I totally agree that it's important, and I understand the attack vectors. But what about your outdated WordPress/Joomla installation? What about your default password on your admin site? Those I think are more serious issues, but of course harder to tackle.
To exploit a MiTM you need to be on the same network, this could be achieved through your local-cafe's WiFi or by compromising an internal system of a local network. Not a trivial task I would say. If you manage to pull it off, the impact is contained to that local network.
If you compromise the insecure site directly, you can have an much wider audience and HTTPS won't help you in this scenario.
Or, say, your ISP injecting ads and tracking scripts into unencrypted pages your browser requests.
Obviously, not the end of the world. But do you want any third party to easily alter the response from your server to the client(s)?
Related HN discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15890551
This has happened to me. Re-installed Windows on my gaming computer and re-downloaded all my games. By the time I hit 900GB usage, any HTTP page would display a popup with "You have 100GB of data left".
I thought it was malware on the website trying to phish me the first time I saw it.
Web hosts are making it easy to use Lets Encrypt, which surprised me. I thought they'd be reluctant to give up the revenue from high margin certificate sales.
I still like the paper for one good reason ... it challenges IT people to ask the question: what risk am I mitigating with this rule on the users, and is it worth everyone's effort that will go into it? If yes, see if you can impose the rule. If no ... just be sure you didn't get the numbers wrong.
https://github.com/certbot/certbot/issues/1301
Not to worry though, there are over 100 other ACME clients that I can choose from.
Now certbox in itself is not really simple in my opinion, and one feels it very fast as soon as we fall out of the beaten path. For instance having it run for volatile instances isn't simple, or if the Paas misses the single feature you need (ex: wildcard support on heroku) you'll have to bear all the complexity again on your shoulders.
In particular the base principle is to renew the cert every 30 days, so inherently proper automation and error handling is the first barrier to entry for certbot. That's already a bit further than "a few commands" in my opinion.
Yes, content injection is bad, but the chance of it happening multiplied by the damage it could cause to your users is probably less than the the effort required to shift a static blog site to HTTPS. (Do not underestimate the leap in difficulty from copy-pasting from an Nginx tutorial to understanding how Let's Encrypt works).
[1] https://www.nspw.org/2009/proceedings/2009/nspw2009-herley.p...