1) As has been shown time and time again, the rewards of productivity gains accrue to the owners of capital far more than to the workers who are more productive. The result is widening inequality on many levels, which extrapolated a few decades into the future ends up looking... not great. I hope we can agree that de facto serfdom is a bad thing.
2) You can't just look at the number of new jobs when making employment generalizations - you have to look at the quality and type of jobs that were created to replace the ones lost. It's like if you took away someone's house and then gave them a tiny apartment a year later, then claimed "Look, they got housing back! Everything's great again!". In the case of employment, the vast majority of jobs created in the last decade have been contract positions and low-end temp work [1]. If you look at the sectors where employment has grown when new jobs data comes out, low-end service jobs continuously top the list (ex. [2]). We can debate whether or not people actually want these types of new jobs as opposed to traditional real estate/financial services/salaried construction/etc. jobs that were lost in 2009-2010.
3) We haven't hit the automation crisis yet in any meaningful way. When autonomous trucks and warehouse robots become prevalent, then we will be in an actual crisis.
The automation crisis right now is not that everyone is going to lose their jobs overnight, but that automation is exacerbating big problems in the jobs market that lead to massive inequality, the prevalence of underemployment, and the trend towards bad jobs with few or no benefits and workers needing to work gigs on the side to make ends meet or afford the things that their normal job would have provided in decades past. When large swathes of workers lose their jobs to automation in the future, these problems are going to continue to compound unless we start making big policy changes. Yes, people will likely find new jobs to replace the ones lost, but will they actually be better or worse off than before?
[1] https://krueger.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/akrueger/f...
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/business/economy/services...
Trains also took away long distance horse buggie jobs. They were largely automated too. And finally, if you think driverless cars are nearby, then so are completely humanoid robots who can do all the work a human can do.
You seem to be arguing that the issues I brought up are tied only to globalization and outsourcing when they are, in fact, tied to underlying economics that strongly favors automation in the long run. Over the next 10-20 years as automation becomes cheaper and more practical, it makes sense that the same problems will accelerate, even as globalization and outsourcing decline.
[1] https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/08/news/companies/carrier-jobs...
Automation is global reduction of available jobs, which we might be doing (with agricultural mechanization mostly). But nowhere are we close to a mass change in society worldwide, not due to AI, and specially not to be given the blame of rising inequality, wages, debt, and unemployment.
Actually, I can agree that there had been reduction in global jobs as world gets slowly automated. But there won't be a sudden takeover of all jobs by some super sentient AI leading to mass unemployment. And neither are the current problems of inequality, debt, low wages a result of an increasing productivity, but rather increasing globalization.
No shit. There's fewer typewriters these days too.
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKCAMP1960...
John F Kennedy talking about how automation is going to change America in 1960.
I find smarter people tend to broadly overestimate human potential. We are unreliable, tire, are often untrustworthy, make mistakes, are subject to emotions, prone to illogic and irrationality, etc. We're a very suboptimal entropy-reducing machine relative to the forms of purpose-built AI and robotics that will be possible within the next 20 years. It's a shame people aren't more alarmed about this.
There is actually some evidence that what we currently have is already worse than serfdom [0] in many ways. I don't think this is a crisis which is about to occur, but one which has already started, is currently ongoing, and will probably get much worse.
[0] http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/worktime/hours_w...
As for self driving trucks, I remember people telling me a decade ago that they would have lead to mass unemployment by now. The predictions of an impending automation crisis haven't had a great track record.
As for self driving trucks, who told you that? Per my prior comment, we're not there yet, but it is definitely coming. Automation hasn't reached driving yet and it won't in any significant way for at least another 5 years, but as soon as the tech is ready, adoption is going to be rapid. But saying "it hasn't happened yet, so clearly it's bogus" is like building a cabin on an active volcano and saying, "they said it would erupt within the last 5 years and that didn't happen, so clearly it's not going to erupt ever". Just because a predicted timeline is incorrect does not mean the predicted event won't come to pass.
[1] https://www.recode.net/2017/3/28/15094424/jobs-eliminated-ne...
[2] http://evonomics.com/productivity-is-slowing-inequality-is-g...
Betting on widespread automation of trucking is probably one of the safest AI-related bets you could make right now.
This looks much more like the real problem to me. The solution: Make it much easier and less bureaucratic for such people to invest their money.
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000
Unless you believe more people are wealthy enough to live fine without needing to work (the opposite seems to be true[1]), what matters is not the employment rate, but labor participation rate. That's not even considering whether average wages for those who are employed are are keeping pace with rising living costs. The good news is that, eventually, automation will reduce living costs. The bad news is that fewer people will have jobs enabling them to afford even those reduced living costs.
From the BLS website glossary: '"Productivity": A measure of economic efficiency that shows how effectively economic inputs are converted into goods and services.'
I don't see why productivity as an economic measure would increase in the early stages of a process where narrow AI and robotics start to take over human jobs. Until costs come down, when AI software and robotics becomes more generic, and standardized, and adopted outside of narrow industries, the economic effects won't be as dramatic.
The only escape from narrow AI and robots taking human jobs is the creation of more bullshit jobs (see: Graeber), or genuinely new job sectors, but I have yet to read any compelling predictions of new job sectors that will employ large numbers of people and can't be automated.
Creator jobs? How many people on youtube, or patreon, or self-publishing books, earn even minimum wage from the time they put in? If you dumped 1 million, or 10 million, additional people onto those platforms and told them their new job is to create full time, how many of those additional people could make a living wage, or even minimum wage, for the time they spend?
Service jobs? While the wealthy (let's say, upper middle class and above) might want human waiters, human voice support on the telephone, etc., I think that's vastly overplayed as an opportunity for human labor. I don't think that many wealthy people would prefer to deal with humans over good AI, and I don't think it would create that many service jobs even if wealthy people did mostly prefer to pay a premium for human service.
[1] With increasing numbers of people working beyond retirement age, more debt, and more couples both working (I have nothing against that, I'm just pointing out the labor statistical reality that families' standard of living requires that more, now).
Here's labor force participation for prime age workers[1] (which is similar to the prime age Employment-Population Ratio I posted above). The problem with your graph is that it's including everyone 16 and over - so baby boomer retirement makes an impact, as does the ACA (college students not working a job for benefits because they're covered by their parents, people who are retiring earlier because they don't have to wait for Medicare).
Though it's worth noting that even if, for some reason, you wanted to look at everyone over 16, the participation rate is still well above anywhere it was in the 50's, 60's, and most of the 70's. If you're looking at prime age, we're only a couple of percents below the highs in the 90's (and much higher than other periods).
> but I have yet to read any compelling predictions of new job sectors that will employ large numbers of people and can't be automated.
I'm always confused by this argument. Practically every day on HN there are articles about problems that it would be great if more people were working on. Replication crisis? Aging infrastructure? Global warming? Cancer research? Environmental destruction? Food scarcity? Documentation and bug hunting in software? Taking care of frameworks? Early childhood education? Heck, even beyond all the problems on Earth, there are plenty of people who want to work on things like sending people to Mars.
I just can't fathom how people can look at the world and say, "Yep, we don't really need to do anything more than what we're already doing."
So while there is lots to do, it seems hard to think of huge numbers of jobs being created.
Because women entered the work force. Compare your linked chart to the same chart for women [0] and men [1]. It's an important dimension to the discussion, I think, since non-working women are generally socially respected, while non-working men are not.
[0] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRAC25FEUSM156S [1] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LRAC25MAUSM156S
Almost everything you listed there requires high skill/education levels. What about service workers/low-skill jobs (y'know, the things that would be replaced by automaton)? I'm pretty sure they're the people GP was talking about.
I’m not sure even this is true because of the degree of hyper-financialization and rent-seeking in areas like housing and healthcare. For example, with housing, even assuming we clear the zoning barrier, you still run into the problem of housing being an investment vehicle for global Capital. They’ll let it sit vacant or be consolidated into rental conglomerates in exchange for a relatively secure asset with marginal returns.
It’s possible that systems in Europe with a greater degree of decommodification will benefit from automation (e.g. easier to build public housing and easier to administer socialized medicine), but this seems unlikely to hold true in the American context, barring some massive political change.
You claim, that the "Automation crisis" isn't a real problem either, because apparently employment is almost back to pre-2007 levels. This may well be true, but a significant factor that has to be analyzed is: what jobs are being taken. I have no numbers only anecdotes [from UK/Europe, not US], and there is a pattern where low paying service jobs are replacing jobs in the manufacturing industry. This is a direct consequence of automation in the manufacturing industries, and these jobs are not very secure / automation-safe either. Also, this problem is way older than you or me, the first Luddites were smashing machines in the 1810s. The history of the 1800s show that automation (with lots of other factos in conjunction) can lead to societal upheaval and severe economic problems.
As for productivity growth, I concur that by the numbers in your first link show a stagnation in the past decade. That does not mean that this trend will continue in the future. When AI/ML Technologies become mainstream (this is already the case) and receive widespread adoption in several industries (this is not the case by now) productivity growth will increase once again.
If we don't we will have to reduce consumption considerably and there are several ways to achieve that.
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20060110135409/http://www.theoil...
It's kinda more related to that "Made in China" sticker that appears on most manufactured things you buy these days.
No shortage of manufacturing jobs in China. Or Germany (which has also enacted economic policy to keep manufacturing at home), for that matter.
So The marginal choice is known - perhaps the easy wins to be won from human productivity increases have been achieved?
That's false. Firms have been spending more on expanding capex investment than stock buybacks. There's a capex boom going on with the S&P 500 right now.
Year over year capex growth was up 15.6% in the first quarter, and 18% in the second quarter.
By contrast, capex growth for the S&P 500 was flat to negative for most of the prior five years, and was negative for nine straight quarters prior to 3Q17.
We haven't seen that kind of capex boom since the initial bounce out of the great recession in late 2010-2011. And that was massively juiced by the Fed, whereas we're in a very different Fed environment now.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-26/trump-tax...
Plus more recent news is this: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/capex-is-starting-to-ramp-...
This shows that capex investments are only starting to ramp up, are unevenly distributed.
In general it supports the position that stock buy backs are the preferred route of money use given the current monetary scenario. Especially since stock buy backs are at record highs.
This helped me find another point of interest - that 10% of households hold 86% of stocks. Meaning that the gains to shareholders will only re-concentrate wealth.
That was supposed to be impossible. It was seemingly universally claimed by economists, industry pundits, stray talking heads on TV and armchair experts that manufacturing jobs were in permanent decline.
Instead, the US is in the middle of a manufacturing boom. That looks set to continue with at least three factors in the US favor: cheap, abundant energy; the cost of manufacturing in China continues to climb and has made the US a lot more cost competitive in contrast; a slowdown in the DC regulation monster; corporate tax cuts are a big deal for domestic manufacturing - as profit margins in manufacturing are typically modest - and the US is now tax competitive with the OECD median.
To paraphrase Buffett, you get rich making things, and you get poor buying things. The US used to be a potent example of that; China is the latest stellar example of it. The US desperately needs to reduce consumption and boost production + savings, in regards to the ratio in the economy.
Same goes for most industries - there's a small group of companies who show good productivity growth, while the rest stay in place.
So it's just a matter of time.
Let's look at actual measures of automation - productivity growth. It's been very low over the past decade[1] when compared to decades past. Prime age employment has been returning to pre-crisis highs[2] - despite people claiming that the old jobs were gone and new jobs wouldn't replace them (the machines were supposedly going to take them all).
[1] https://www.bls.gov/lpc/prodybar.htm [2] https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS12300060