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Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tptacek on Sunday August 05, 2018 @10:20AM (#17691434)
No. Were Chapoly to be broken next year, we wouldn't "throw away" WireGuard. We'd simply instantiate it over a new set of primitives. That is part of the point of deriving it from Noise.

The idea behind zero-negotiation cryptography is that if there's a problem with the primitives behind the protocol, you version the whole protocol, rather than hoping that some complicated negotiation scheme can future-proof it. No part of TLS's security problems have stemmed from "fifteen mediocre symmetric block ciphers"; rather, almost all of them have come from the TLS protocol's complicated handshaking.

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tialaramex on Sunday August 05, 2018 @01:02PM (#17692227)
It's not about the inconvenience for WireGuard's author in writing a modified protocol document, "simply" instantiating the protocol with new primitives (or parameters, or any changes at all) means throwing WireGuard away as far as all the end users are concerned. For the sort of hobbyist "Hey, I hacked this together in five minutes, awesome" types running Wireguard today in a trivial pair-wise configuration this is no trouble. For a system with fifty thousand ordinary users this is a complete nightmare, and I expect what they'll do is consider that a lesson learned, no more WireGuard.

But perhaps at least some of them will try to muddle along as others have described below, let's try both versions and see what works. Then we don't need a flag day... Whereupon of course they've got a downgrade problem.

Because TLS has been such an overwhelming success there have been a lot of problems.

Let's start with BEAST. BEAST attacks the way TLS 1.0 does IVs. Is that anything to do with "complicated handshaking" ? Nope, not related at all.

Soon after that there's Lucky 13. This attacks CBC modes with a timing-based padding oracle. Handshaking? Nope.

How about RC4 being broken - Handshake problem? Nope, the RC4 stream cipher is just not as good as intended.

CRIME was a compression oracle, still not handshaking.

Coppersmith's and ROCA, as well as the Debian hilarity show that even minting private keys might be too hard, at least in RSA, for people to do it correctly. Once again, not related to handshaking.

Now Logjam really does come down to the complicated handshake, although it does also need a client which is a total sucker.

Some? Yes. "Almost all" isn't correct. Lots of problems with cryptographic primitives and implementation bugs, maybe WireGuard will be popular enough to have so many implementations and to have such a large number of researchers trying to break it...

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by pvg on Sunday August 05, 2018 @02:37PM (#17692745)
Let's start with BEAST.

That's an interesting one to pick. It could not be fixed by negotiation and configuration at all, in the end. The entire protocol version had to be thrown away.

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tialaramex on Sunday August 05, 2018 @03:35PM (#17693048)
Beast works on TLS 1.0

The die-die-die draft would never have been written if we were looking at a situation where TLS 1.0 was gone in practice on the web, let alone SMTP and other slower-moving environments. Even PCI's day-late, dollar-short June 2018 deadline would have been irrelevant if you're right. You aren't right.

No, BEAST's story is much more interesting than that, there were three mitigations and one remains widely in use.

One "configuration" mitigation was to move to RC4 since that's not a block cipher so the CBC mode attack doesn't work by definition. This is no longer considered acceptable because RC4 is way weaker than we'd thought at the time.

The next mitigation is "empty fragments". An attacker only gets to peak at certain data using BEAST (and then they expand the attack and get everything) but we can arrange for the vulnerable block to have zero length, and then the attacker didn't achieve anything for all their effort. We waste a few bytes on the wire, but this works fine by the specification. Alas, some real world implementations had been written to reject these "empty fragments", which had never been needed previously and so you couldn't actually use this in products like web browsers.

Instead client implementations began doing 1/n-1 split, which moves a single byte instead of nothing. The attacker has 1-in 2^16 chance to guess this using BEAST, but it's a single byte, so they had 1-in- 2^8 chance to guess it without BEAST, and thus BEAST is worthless if you can do this.

Of course it's still _wasteful_ but it's both protocol compliant and an effective mitigation. How about that?

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tptacek on Sunday August 05, 2018 @06:51PM (#17694002)
'pvg is right. You're rattling off lots of random technical details about the attack, but his single sentence captures a core problem with "agility": despite having all the complicated handshaking, a whole protocol version had to be burned to fix the problem.

Your confused argument suggests that because BEAST involved chained IVs and not the TLS handshake, it's an example of how the handshake didn't sabotage TLS. You're right: it's not. It's an example how the handshaking, which sabotaged TLS through other attacks, didn't buy anything material for TLS.

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tialaramex on Sunday August 05, 2018 @09:56PM (#17694659)
The confusion seems to lie with you here if it's with anyone. The stop gap RC4 preference is explicitly enabled by handshaking.

Beyond that though you seem to have your history out of order, BEAST is a TLS 1.0 attack, but TLS 1.2 was finished years before BEAST was published.

It's not a case of a protocol version "had to be burned to fix the problem" but two subsequent protocol versions had already shipped years ago which fixed the underlying cause and, as is the reality for which you seem so ill-prepared, scarcely anybody had upgraded.

All these years later financial services companies are getting waivers from PCI saying their cheap third rate POS terminal "has a mitigating control" and so it's fine that they still do TLS 1.0. So that's nice. Nice for them I mean. Hey, if you're "lucky" one day they'll be relying on a ten year out-of-date WireGuard, as enthusiastically endorsed by Thomas Ptacek. And every time you're asked about it you can spit feathers. How dare they. Like I said, if you're lucky.

As messy and uphill as it has been, the journey from SSLv2 to TLS 1.3 was only possible with the handshake.

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by pvg on Monday August 06, 2018 @04:10AM (#17695901)
but two subsequent protocol versions had already shipped

That doesn't really address the 'agility didn't help here' point at all. The argument against agility as a design approach is straightforward and widely articulated - it's obviously informed by the SSL/TLS experience but doesn't outright depend on it. It's not too difficult to imagine that there could be some sort of coherent counter-argument. If you have one, though, it's impossible to parse it out from this enthusiastic mixture of non-responsive detail and superciliousness.

Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tialaramex on Monday August 06, 2018 @07:53AM (#17696850)
But it did help there, as I already pointed out and you ignored twice.
Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tptacek on Monday August 06, 2018 @10:35AM (#17697907)
It did not help here. In fact, it amplified the problem. We knew RC4 to be broken when BEAST was announced. Nevertheless, people enabled it, as a "stopgap", to deal with BEAST. RC4 is arguably less secure than BEAST-affected TLS (BEAST was in practice quite difficult to trigger), and, either way, all those RC4 deployments ended up also needing to be scoured off the Internet!
Re:I made my own WireGuard VPN server by tptacek on Sunday August 05, 2018 @11:51PM (#17694995)
Thai Duong did BEAST during the brief window he worked with me at Matasano, so I'm pretty sure I have the chronology right.