Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by pvg on Saturday August 04, 2018 @12:31AM
(#17685387)
Or it's just their local password with keychain-integrated ssh-agent so they never type anything. I think the chances of that (which is sort of the premise of this post) are much, much higher.
Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by lvh on Saturday August 04, 2018 @12:33AM
(#17685394)
I'm not saying it is literally impossible for this to be safe. I'm saying in pratcie, most of the time, it is not. A 120 bit password is not normal.
Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by Dylan16807 on Saturday August 04, 2018 @01:10AM
(#17685461)
A password manager is not 'normal' but it's common enough that you shouldn't be classifying it as negligible to conclude that these passwords are worse than nothing.
Also the 120 bits was an example and a good amount more than necessary. A 12 character password isn't exactly standard but it's not ridiculous to expect. Once you exclude the passwords that are so bad even bcrypt can't save them, the number of users where the password algorithm makes a difference starts to look a lot smaller than 100%.
And this should be one of the top priority passwords, so it's not too hard to imagine it being in a password manager or using a similar quality.