Consensus shifts that trust from authority figures to others in your group. Bottom-up trust instead of top-down.
When Governments falsify data, in my opinion bottom-up consensus doesn't help, since governments then also could simply participate in that consensus-forming process (see 51% attack)
Setting aside the specific technical details, in concept a database of cryptographically signed audit logs and a blockchain aren't so different - blockchain adds decentralization and a trust/truth resolution formula, at the cost of a different set of scalability concerns. So when is that decentralization specifically useful?
But more to the point, turns out some cryptocurrency implementations move the transaction database to a segwit system because of the scalability problem.
Huh.
Why would a SQL database be centralized in nature?
Just as your n nodes hold the entire blockchain, you would have n nodes holding the entire SQL database.
Of course, you could have a blockckain only on one node, centralised. That wouldn't make it inherently "centralized", however.
Same with SQL databases.
I am the lead engineer on Corda, which is an open source 'enterprise' (i.e. institutional/industrial) blockchain-inspired platform. But if you don't like the B word you can think of it as a decentralised database that can be queried using SQL. The intro to the technical white paper describes some of the issues with "just run a public SQL database" approach:
https://www.corda.net/content/corda-technical-whitepaper.pdf
Why not just use a shared relational database? This would certainly solve a lot of problems using only existing technology, but it would also raise more questions than answers:
• Who would run this database? Where would we find a sufficient supply of angels to own it?
• In which countries would it be hosted? What would stop that country abusing the mountain of sensitive information it would have?
• What if it were hacked?
• Can you actually scale a relational database to fit the entire financial system?
• What happens if the Financial System™ needs to go down for maintenance?
• What kind of nightmarish IT bureaucracy would guard changes to the database schemas?
• How would you manage access control?
So, it's ultimately a system that tries to address these questions and many others too. If you can solve these issues then you can suddenly actually propose an entire market putting all data into a single database engine, and at that point things can get a lot more robust and efficient. But it just wouldn't be politically possible on any sort of scale to do that with Postgres.
I find it hard to follow the distinction between decentralised and distributed, especially since all of the points above would apply to your implementation, as well:
All the decentralised networks rise and fall with enough political pressure, becasue they all have a weak spot - some form of organizational structure that needs to be kept alive by some entity. In your case (from the whitepaper):
> A network map service that publishes information about nodes on the network.
The legal entity that will maintain this service will be faced with enough pressure to shut it down once the state in which this entity happens to operate in implements laws that happen to render some of the content in the database illegal.
If someone provides a solution to this, that would be groundbreaking. Until today, no such thing exists.
The network map is a component I've spent a lot of time thinking about and working on, to make it more and more decentralised over time. Because yes a lot of users flag the same thing you have.
Corda has some simple features to mitigate this. For instance nodes have an additional-node-info directory where you can drop NodeInfo files. These act as overlays on the data received from the zone's network map. If the zone operator removes a party from the network map for some reason (maybe a court order, maybe a commercial dispute, or whatever) then you can just drop their NodeInfo file in this directory and it'll be as if they're still in the map.
So the idea is that the zone operator acts as a coordinator and provider of advice, but it doesn't have real control - node operators can always override whatever advice it's giving out.
The use of cryptocurrencies within blockchain is to "promote" the adoption/distribution of a system. However, there are other cases where the stimulus for the adoption is non-monetary (e.g. access to the information) and thus a crypto-currency is not needed.
Maybe there are some slight advantages in some edge use cases - but if someone came out with a company that was "modified public SQL database technology" would people be investing their money and declaring it important to the future of technology? The answer would be no.
I agree that we are not there yet to use it as a simple drop in solution for such problems. But we are certanly getting there.
Also there are no limited reads (or writes for that matter) every actor of the blockchain can modify their local version as much as they want.
Just as the NSA runs almost all the Tor exit nodes nowadays, what would stop a government from running the majority of blockchain nodes and gain consensus majority?
A 51% attack can do two things: Enable "double-spend" attacks - where the hash rate majority will ignore a block which was previoulsy mined and had a "confirmed" transaction, and instead mine from an older block which didn't have that transaction - but instead place a transaction paying themselves the money back. Anyone accepting payments over Bitcoin should use their common sense as to how many confirmations they should wait depending on the amount of money being transmitted. A 51% attack might eventually be able to write a chain longer than the current one, but it will take some time - and there is the chance that if it fails, the miner will have wasted his electricity costs.
The other attack a 51% hash power can perform is denial-of-service. They can ignore blocks containing transactions they do not want to include in the chain, and as long as they continue to mine the longer chain, those transactions will not succeed.
51% attacks can not change the rules of Bitcoin (although there are many people who wrongly believe this to be the case). If you try to change the rules, the rest of the network will reject your blocks and ignore you.
> what would stop a government from running the majority of blockchain nodes and gain consensus majority?
The costs, primarily. In the case that one party did accumulate a majority of hashing power, the network participants can agree to change the hashing algorithm to one which runs on commodity hardware. That would be many billions of dollars of specialized hardware equipment going down the drain, and will only make the system stronger by encouraging individual participation. Monero did this successfully, and plans to do it each 6 months to deter attempts to game their proof-of-work.
You get out of the proof-of-work mess by trusting one entity, and it doesn't have to be the government. And to use proof-of-work, you implicitly trust the people who wrote all the code you use anyway.
How do the people decide who to trust? An individual can be coerced and becomes a single point of failure in the system.
Make it require multi-party consensus if you want, to reduce single points of failure. DNSSEC (for all its faults) runs on trusted multi-party consensus [EDIT: apparently not the way I think] and isn't a blockchain. But of course anyone or any set of people can be coerced, including you. That will never not be true.
"How do you decide who to trust?" applies to every endeavor in life, so if you want to go do philosophy instead of blockchain, fine.
You said not to put the government of Venezuela in charge of the ledger. But when the government of Venezuela sends armed forces to the offices of your trusted party to confiscate its servers and equipment, what happens to your ledger?
If the government of Venezuela takes all your computers and puts you in jail, what happens to your Bitcoin?
Using trust to secure your ledger is like driving without insurance; sure its cheaper and more efficient, until it isn't.
In a world that relies on not trusting anyone, you are screwed no matter what.
I may have relied on my family to keep a password secret, but that affects only me. The government cannot coerce the entire system unless it is prepared to put everyone in jail. Bitcoin lives on, and will not be stoppable. This is the power of a trustless system.
All I meant is that:
* there is cryptographic consensus involved
* there is no single point of failure
Therefore it's a counterexample who people who claim that everything but PoW has a single point of failure. Am I wrong?
Would you say that cryptography can create a system where you can trust a set of people, without having to trust one single entity, and without destroying the planet with PoW? And can you give me a better example to use next time?
(For what it's worth, I picked DNSSEC because it had a memorable example of a "key-signing ceremony", perhaps the only instance of such a thing I've heard of that wasn't someone launching a blockchain. I realize that DNSSEC sucks anyway.)
This idea that centralization is always evil, or that public actors are inherently untrustworthy and we need some mathematical algorithm to verify all interactions between them strikes me as one of those Silicon Valley idiosyncrasies that Silicon Valley haters laugh at.