Since all the crypto math happens with what is now essentially random numbers, you gain no knowledge from power analysis.
Downside of this method is that it requires additional operations and your crypto algorithm needs to be suitable for this. There is literature on this method, but don't be confused by "blind signatures" which is something different.
Any crypto wizz around that can tell me if secp256k1 ecdsa can be blinded?
There is a bunch of elliptic curve stuff you can do like "multiplicative blinding", e.g. https://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2010/62250433/62250433.pdf.
Still have to have solid software that doesn't do early returns and the like.
Include some kind of energy storage on the device, such as a battery or an ultra-capacitor. Your external power source (e.g., USB) charges your storage device, and your computation is powered from the storage device. Only charge the storage device between complete operations.
Someone watching power over USB would then see no power draw during key operations, and a smooth power draw between operations.
If your threat model includes attackers that will be able to probe inside the device while it is doing operations, and so who could look at the power on the far side of the battery or capacity, then buffering power won't be sufficient.
Random noise would just mean that you have to take multiple measurements and average them. Depending on the system in question, "multiple" may or may not be impractically many.
What I don't understand is why this device recomputes the public key on each read, instead of storing it persistently after creation.
Prevented by not letting anyone casually hook up an oscilloscope to your TREZOR.
Short of a oscilloscope hiding in the computer you use (totally possible), no process can derive the private key from the Trezor in theory.
Even if you have processes that blatantly copy every USB's contents (or even log all interactions verbosely) and log all key presses/clipboard interactions on the machine, you can still use a Trezor without compromising anything.
You can also verify that your clipboard is not being manipulated as the Trezor can verify the address it will be signing a transaction with on the display.
ADC's may be expensive in low volume discrete form, but integrated in (standardized!) peripheral bus (USB) controllers, this could be very cheap.
As always, it depends on the threat model: do you wish to protect against manufacturers/nation states or not?
Esentially adding a micro controller with an Analog to Digital converter that can watch the power pin inside the USB controller/port itself would be relatively simple and cheap.
If you stick a USB drive into a compromised computer to make a transaction, a virus can steal the private key.
If you stick a Trezor or Ledger into a compromised computer to make a transaction, your private key is still safe.
While this attack shows the trezor is probably a bit amateur-hour, it does provide some amount of value.
Specifically, I was answering the question "Why not just use a USB drive"
If I invested in one of these hardware wallets, I'd be interested in making it cost at least $X where $X is greater than the value in the wallet. I'd also like some time component, Y, that would allow me to transfer the money before the private key was found.
funny you say that, because TPMs aren't actually mandated to be tamper resistant, only tamper evident[1]. what this means is that you won't be able to extract the keys without destroying the device, but if you delid the chip and probe it, you can probably extract the keys. I suspect it's the same with other HSMs you see in everyday life (smart cards, smartphone with trustzone, etc.).
[1] sorry i don't have a better source: https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7343-beyond_anti_evil_maid
While there are some smart cards and smartcard-like HSMs (Fortezza comes to mind, but it uses the battery primarily for integrated RTC and seems to not contain any tamper detection mechanism) with integrated battery, common smartcards does not have battery.
The term "smart card" is frequently misused in popular nomenclature. As a technical term, it refers specifically to contact or contact-less (like NFC) cards with an embedded chip which are, at minimum, physically tamper resistant. For example, a typical credit card is not a smart card. A SIM card is a smart card (or token).
Tamper resistant does not imply tamper proof, which can also be a source of confusion.
When I was on a team that made a similar device over a decade ago, we were up to our eyeballs in academic papers about SPA and DPA hardware and software countermeasures. That doesn't mean we didn't make any mistakes, but at least we were knowledgeable enough to hook an oscilloscope up and see what's going on.
These guys completely ignored an entire class of attacks, known in detail for a couple decades, (in reality since 1943, declassified 1972 ([1]). I wouldn't trust these guys to protect anything of value.
[1] https://www.wired.com/2008/04/nsa-releases-se/