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Re:Extracting the private key from a TREZOR with an oscillos... by tzs on Thursday June 07, 2018 @02:02AM (#17253648)
In this particular attack, it looks like the attacker measured the power drawn over USB. This could probably be defeated by buffering power.

Include some kind of energy storage on the device, such as a battery or an ultra-capacitor. Your external power source (e.g., USB) charges your storage device, and your computation is powered from the storage device. Only charge the storage device between complete operations.

Someone watching power over USB would then see no power draw during key operations, and a smooth power draw between operations.

If your threat model includes attackers that will be able to probe inside the device while it is doing operations, and so who could look at the power on the far side of the battery or capacity, then buffering power won't be sufficient.

Re:Extracting the private key from a TREZOR with an oscillos... by exoesquitur on Thursday June 07, 2018 @02:16AM (#17253700)
Anyone measuring power will have the capability to bypass / defeat any external power filtering. To be of value this must be done at the die level.
Re:Extracting the private key from a TREZOR with an oscillos... by esmi on Thursday June 07, 2018 @10:58AM (#17256289)
I was thinking the same thing. The equivalent of a power factor conversion stage at input makes this type of attack impossible unless they have access inside the product.