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Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by blattimwind on Thursday May 31, 2018 @01:36PM (#17198330)
> 3. Don't allow the embedding site to interact in any way with embedded content. Treat it like an entirely separate, opaque layer above everything else, not subject to layering anything over it

I'm actually surprised to hear that this is not the fix here. Instead, they optimized the rendering code, which might not preclude more sophisticated attacks on that side channel.

Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by mattnewton on Thursday May 31, 2018 @03:16PM (#17199189)
As noted elsewhere, this would cause sites with models or menus to appear broken, when the menus or models are stuck behind the iframe. Yes I know, don’t make sited with iframes and litghtboxes or whatever then, but people do, and the option they chose won’t break those people.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by anglebracket on Thursday May 31, 2018 @03:43PM (#17199472)
That's similar to what Kaminsky proposed with Iron Frame[0], but obviously it'd have to be opt-in. Applying Iron Frame-like rendering to all iframes would break a lot of content.

[0]: https://dankaminsky.com/2015/08/09/defcon-23-lets-end-clickj...