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Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by lambda on Thursday May 31, 2018 @01:30PM (#17198276)
I don't think this can really be blamed on CSS. I mean, yes, a new CSS feature allowed a timing attack that could extract information, but these kinds of issues keep on coming up time and time again, meaning that it's not this particular CSS feature that should be blamed.

The issue is the ability to interact in any way with cross site resources which contain any kind of potentially sensitive information. This leads to things like clickjacking attacks, CSRF, information leaks like this, and so on.

The things that could be done to fix it:

1. Don't allow any kind of cross-site embedding (yeah, this isn't going to happen) 2. Treat any kind of cross-site embedding like private browsing mode; don't ever send any credentials along with it 3. Don't allow the embedding site to interact in any way with embedded content. Treat it like an entirely separate, opaque layer above everything else, not subject to layering anything over it

Of course, I don't think any of these are actually going to happen, because they'd break too much. But otherwise, it's going to be a game of whack-a-mole with information leaks, new kinds of clickjacking and CSRF, and so on.

Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by blattimwind on Thursday May 31, 2018 @01:36PM (#17198330)
> 3. Don't allow the embedding site to interact in any way with embedded content. Treat it like an entirely separate, opaque layer above everything else, not subject to layering anything over it

I'm actually surprised to hear that this is not the fix here. Instead, they optimized the rendering code, which might not preclude more sophisticated attacks on that side channel.

Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by mattnewton on Thursday May 31, 2018 @03:16PM (#17199189)
As noted elsewhere, this would cause sites with models or menus to appear broken, when the menus or models are stuck behind the iframe. Yes I know, don’t make sited with iframes and litghtboxes or whatever then, but people do, and the option they chose won’t break those people.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by anglebracket on Thursday May 31, 2018 @03:43PM (#17199472)
That's similar to what Kaminsky proposed with Iron Frame[0], but obviously it'd have to be opt-in. Applying Iron Frame-like rendering to all iframes would break a lot of content.

[0]: https://dankaminsky.com/2015/08/09/defcon-23-lets-end-clickj...

Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by the8472 on Thursday May 31, 2018 @02:03PM (#17198541)
You can get 2. more or less in firefox with privacy.firstparty.isolate = true or various container extensions

Or one could write an extension that sets sandbox attributes on iframes. I'm not sure if one exists yet.