I think that arises from practical difficulties in finding all the relevant information, not from a certainty that it is, in principle, undiscoverable.
I notice how you slip easily from a personal opinion in your penultimate paragraph to the pronouncement of a universal truth in the final one. This seems to be characteristic in philosophy, as displayed, for example, in Searle's 'Chinese Room' paper.
Nevertheless, I agree with the general position that there are unobservable things (that's just my opinion, of course.) I also believe that there are limits to reason alone as a means for discerning truth, and consequently I believe there are limits to what philosophy can achieve (though I see no limits on how much discussion it can generate.)
In principle if we have to violate rights to obtain all of the relevant information, then some information must be undiscoverable.
In a more scientific bent, you have the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the existence of intractable computers science problems to support the idea that there opinion-free realms where science cannot provide solutions.
And I find labeling claims as opinion to dismiss them a bit facile. The underlying point is that there we conceded that there are practical considerations that make us act on incomplete information. Therefore we concede on a practical level that all things cannot be knowable. Conjecture and guesswork pervade everyday life.
Similarly, your use of quantum uncertainty is valid, but its discovery did not put a stop to physics - on the contrary, the discovery of QM has led to vast new areas of knowledge, and has even had metaphysical and epistemological implications (such as the constraints on realism that follow from Bell's inequality) that were never imagined in millennia of navel-gazing. Therefore, if anything, quantum uncertainty tends to stand as a counter-example to the apparent premise behind your claim that incomplete knowledge sets limits on science (I weasel-worded that sentence because I do believe that it could ultimately become a problem, if humanity survives long enough.)
I am not labeling a claim as opinion to dismiss it - in fact, if I cannot offer a definitive counter-argument, then my own position on the matter is an opinion - it is the transition from opinion to certainty that I find interesting. Searle's Chinese Room paper, for example, is an elaborate argument ultimately hung on the unexamined premise that syntax cannot give rise to semantics, and the non-sequitur that a model of a thing is not the thing itself, yet he declares that he has proven that a digital computer can never have a mind. This passing off of opinion as certainty may just be an issue of style within philosophy, but if so, it is an unfortunate one, as it makes it difficult to keep track of what has definitively been established and what remains as conjecture or premise. Certainly, there are many people who think Searle proved something in that paper, yet there is disagreement within that group as to what exactly that is.
Conjecture and guesswork pervade everyday life, science, and even philosophy.
Joshua Greene's lab at Harvard (http://www.joshua-greene.net/) measured subjects making major moral decisions and found, for example, that people who'd received training in medical ethics made more utilitarian decisions about life and death. You could apply the same methods to morals of stories in a randomized trial by having some subjects read them and some not.
Besides studying whether people behave morally is begging the question if the question is "do morals exist?".
Now, that's a contrived example. More realistically, I doubt we'll ever be able to get enough detailed measurements to really understand how genetics, nutrition, exercise, and environment all play together to affect human health. Clearly each is complex enough on its own and to combine them together quickly magnifies the observation problem to be entirely intractable. We can imperfectly generalize and work with populations to come up with various guidelines that seem to work well with populations. We can break down the problems, measuring particular cells or organs. But to recompose all the experimentation and observation into a full system view is much more complex than solving chess or go. It's much more complex than predicting the earnings forecast of a single company. The complexity of the problem space is just ridiculous.
So we try to push the boundaries of the complexity we can deal with, but there are diminishing returns over time. And clearly there are outer bounds we will never be able to approach.
There are plenty of things that cannot be observed. There are plenty of things that should not be observed. There are plenty of things that can be observed but cannot be understood well enough to achieve the goals we want.
I don't find it controversial to claim there are limits to empiricism. The fact that we expect juries and judges to rule on incomplete information is a concession to that reality.
And because there are limits on empiricism, there are limits on science.