It's fascinating that this category of equipment, which searches for viruses by running untrusted code, is still regularly installed in all corners of valuable networks.
To be fair to virus scanner vendors, the only way to mitigate this kind of bug is NIH: don't use 3rd party libs, implement everything yourself. But then, of course, without bugs yourself, as well :)
That is not the only way to mitigate such vulnerabilities. AV vendors have had plenty of time to work on sandboxing parts of their scan engines that have repeatedly been found to have vulnerabilities like this one. Somehow we've arrived at a point where no one would recommend using a browser that doesn't utilize sandboxing to some degree, but when it comes to security products, you can count yourself lucky if they don't just run that code as SYSTEM. That should really tell you all you need to know about the state of the AV industry.
Plenty of people recommend Firefox despite it sharing processes between tabs. More than 10 years after MS sandboxed IE.
Or, you know, conduct audits of open source libraries they use and contribute fixes back.
The few places I've seen 7z used is in installers where the input is known (installer archive in 7z format) and I'm assuming signed in many cases so you can't feed it random inputs. I find it hard to believe Sophos and Symantec and Trend are copying and pasting 7zip.dll into their apps.
[1]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=81...
[2]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=12...
[3]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=15...
[4]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=57...
I never managed to find out why
edit: just found this: https://sourceforge.net/p/sevenzip/feature-requests/1270/ -- seems rather questionable considering MS give away the latest compilers for free
ASLR was primarily disabled because Igor wanted to strip the relocation from the binaries in order to save about 0.5-1% in file size. I have discussed this with him, and convinced him to enabled full ASLR for 7-Zip 18.05.
So now we have 7-Zip 18.05 with full ASLR and DEP. Stack canaries (/GS) are still disabled though.
If you can convince him to get rid of his custom garbage Stdlib replacements and use ISO C++ then you're a hero to maintainability (and would probably improve the performance because the stdlib has move support).
But honestly, I don't think we will ever see a 7-Zip with /GS or CFG. Not only would this cost about 1% in binary size, it would cost an additional 1% in runtime performance loss. Additionally, it would require compiling 7-Zip with a modern compiler like VS2017. You're just asking for too much.
I know it's not you saying this, but it's very strange given almost all files 7-zip will ever see are untrusted files downloaded from the internet
I'd rather have it be 1% slower than be compromised!
I still wonder if there's an ethical dilemma that lies underneath this - is it fair to prioritize needs of users who use your tool in a different way (for backup jobs) over users that use your tool only occasionally, perhaps not even out of their own initiative (they were sent 7z file from a ostensibly trusted source).
Ahhh, but does say VS2017 produce a smaller executable file, or a faster executable?
I am pleased Igor cares about individual 1% improvements - they stack up to significant savings. However I agree for our work usage security is more important.
If I recall correctly, Igor once said that he tested the new VS compiler and it produced neither smaller nor faster executables. I believe there was almost no difference.
Dunno, just as with FB/CA, users have agreed to what befell them. Relevant extract from LGPL 2.1: "THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE LIBRARY IS WITH YOU."
EDIT: /s, ...
I agree with others here on the security vs. performance and security vs. binary size trade-offs. As a thought experiment I wondered at what point it would become a hard decision if I were in his shoes. I think a 10% performance hit would make it a harder decision for me, but at that point I would probably still err on the side of caution and prioritize security.
Of course it's possible this is exactly one of the reasons Igor owns something like 7-Zip, and I don't :-)
If people are so up in arms about the security problems of 7-Zip, they're free to fork it.
But the contents of a file is what really determines the actual file type, though.
So if you decide to block RAR files, you should do that by looking at the magic number. Then you are good to go. And it's not like you have to write a lot of code or anything to do this. The standard 'file' utility in Unix is able to determine the type of a file -- often by looking exactly at the magic number.
Just like you would inspect the actual contents of a file if you were running an image hosting site -- and not trust whatever arbitrary filename the uploader told you that the file had.
If you really cannot avoid implementing something like this, you should inspect the 7-Zip code in order to be 100% sure that the magic number detection in your filter is identical (or matches a superset) to the one from 7-Zip.
CPP/7zip/Archive/Rar/RarHandler.cpp:
#define SIGNATURE { 0x52 , 0x61, 0x72, 0x21, 0x1a, 0x07, 0x00 }
CPP/7zip/UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp: const Byte kRarHeader[] = { 0x52 , 0x61, 0x72, 0x21, 0x1a, 0x07, 0x00 };
CPP/7zip/Archive/Rar/Rar5Handler.cpp: #define SIGNATURE { 0x52 , 0x61, 0x72, 0x21, 0x1a, 0x07, 0x01, 0 }
Those are the two magic numbers for RAR archive version 1.50 onwards and RAR archive version 5.0 onwards respectively, and those are the places they are referenced in the 7-zip source code. I looked at the source archive of the 18.05 version, downloaded from https://www.7-zip.org/a/7z1805-src.7z. I guess if you wanted to be really rigorous you'd look at previous versions as well. If the 7-zip project makes use of a version control system and that vcs supports the equivalent of git blame then that should not be too difficult of a task for whoever wanted to go to that extent of investigation.And here is where one copy of the 'file' command identifies the same magic numbers as RAR archives:
https://github.com/file/file/blob/f0a725a13fe0c1b046d8e07057...
0 string Rar!\x1a\7\0 RAR archive data
https://github.com/file/file/blob/f0a725a13fe0c1b046d8e07057... 0 string Rar!\x1a\7\1\0 RAR archive data, v5
:) Byte marker[NHeader::kMarkerSize];
RINOK(ReadStream_FALSE(stream, marker, NHeader::kMarkerSize));
if (memcmp(marker, kMarker, NHeader::kMarkerSize) == 0)
m_Position += NHeader::kMarkerSize;
else
{
if (searchHeaderSizeLimit && *searchHeaderSizeLimit == 0)
return S_FALSE;
RINOK(stream->Seek(m_StreamStartPosition, STREAM_SEEK_SET, NULL));
RINOK(FindSignatureInStream(stream, kMarker, NHeader::kMarkerSize,
searchHeaderSizeLimit, arcStartPos));
m_Position = arcStartPos + NHeader::kMarkerSize;
RINOK(stream->Seek(m_Position, STREAM_SEEK_SET, NULL));
}
7-Zip finds the magic number if it appears within some searchHeaderSizeLimit, i.e., the file does not need to start (at offset 0) with the magic number. For example, 7-Zip will extract a RAR file which begins with [00 52 61 72 21 1A 07 00] (instead of [52 61 72 21 1A 07 00]) just fine.The enterprise deployment of Trend Micro Officescan I have has the 7z.dll (7za.dll) version 4.57
To me that looks like quite an old version... Probably open to this exploit.
1. Some people mentioned that this would "only affect RAR files" and it would be safe to extract 7z files with 7-Zip prior to version 18.05. This is wrong, because 7-Zip detects the file type from the magic numbers at the beginning of the file. So the exploit can be renamed to 'exploit.7z' and it works just as well.
On /r/sysadmin, someone even mentioned that a temporary solution might be to block RAR files. By the same argument, this is unlikely to be effective.
2. Almost all versions prior to 18.05 are affected. I manually checked version 15.05 and 17.01, and they are definitely affected.
3. Not only 7-Zip itself is affected, but essentially all software that uses 7z.dll as library to extract files. This includes various anti-virus software. However, exploitation may be more difficult (though not impossible) if ASLR&DEP is properly enabled (on all modules).