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Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @02:54AM (#16762474)
Can Linux just ignore the entire cancer that secure boot represents? There is literally no upside for the user.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by Arbalest on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:10AM (#16762554)
Secure Boot is cool when you control the keys. That's quite a lot of work though. Given how easy it is to bypass for consumer systems, yes the defaults suck. However, it makes a lot more sense in enterprise, where someone might actually be employed to manage the chain of trust.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by benbristow on Thursday April 05, 2018 @02:59AM (#16762502)
Other than ensuring that you're booting what you think you're actually booting
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:07AM (#16762539)
I don't know if this is a general problem, but I have never had this issue. My system always boots whatever I installed.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by Jasper_ on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:14AM (#16762585)
How are you sure you don't have a so-called "boot kit" on your machine?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:17AM (#16762603)
Because there are only 2 ways of that happening:

1. I run a malware as root which modifies my image. I don't run anything as root except apt. So this is impossible.

2. Someone steals my computer and modifies the disk. Again, if they have physical access, I have already failed in my security. So this scenario is irrelevant.

Am I missing anything?

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by Jasper_ on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:28AM (#16762672)
1. local-root exploits exist and are quite common. It is possible for an unknown kernel bug to get root access. Remote code execution exploits are also common in browsers and also just all across the Linux desktop in general.

2. apt packages can run arbitrary bash scripts as root as part of their install and update process. Hopefully your third-party apt repo hygiene is good.

3. Just because you only explicitly run apt as root, does not mean no program runs as root. setuid executables exist and are unfortunately quite common in Debian.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:15AM (#16763442)
> local-root exploits exist and are quite common. It is possible for an unknown kernel bug to get root access. Remote code execution exploits are also common in browsers and also just all across the Linux desktop in general.

I highly doubt it. Privilege escalation exploits are rare and fixed with utmost priority.

> apt packages can run arbitrary bash scripts as root as part of their install and update process. Hopefully your third-party apt repo hygiene is good.

Yeah, a root user should be responsible.

> Just because you only explicitly run apt as root, does not mean no program runs as root. setuid executables exist and are unfortunately quite common in Debian.

And I assume that when the root user installed those apps, he was careful and selective and did not include malware.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by tedunangst on Thursday April 05, 2018 @11:46AM (#16765951)
> Privilege escalation exploits are rare and fixed with utmost priority.

A statement which would be much improved with numbers. How rare? Fixed how quickly?

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by mjg59 on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:26AM (#16762663)
You run malware as a user that's able to subvert some other component of your distribution (such as beep on Debian) to gain root and it does that?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:13AM (#16763424)
Gaining root without credentials is a bug of the highest order and must be fixed immediately. Existence of rare exploits that do allow privilege escalation does not mean we take capabilities away from root.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by mjg59 on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:36AM (#16763534)
It actually does - why do you think /dev/mem is more restricted than it was in 1993?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by viraptor on Thursday April 05, 2018 @08:26AM (#16764146)
Seccomp, selinux, grsec, namespaces, blocking module loading and many others absolutely exist to take capabilities away (or can be used that way) from full user access (root or other) to limit what an unknown-at-the-moment exploit can do.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by cjbprime on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:29AM (#16762682)
You're missing the entire field of remote exploits. Meltdown, for example, could be exploited by JavaScript code running as non-root.

It's not about what you explicitly choose to run as root at the command line. That's a tiny fraction of the code that executes as root on your machine. It's about what software can do to somehow gain access to root's privilege level via exploits.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:11AM (#16763414)
> You're missing the entire field of remote exploits. Meltdown, for example, could be exploited by JavaScript code running as non-root.

Yeah and that was a really big deal. Fixes were pushed in record time.

> It's about what software can do to somehow gain access to root's privilege level via exploits.

The correct way to deal with that is to plug exploits or write code that is less likely to be exploited. Taking away privileges from root is the exact opposite of what we should be doing.

Root access should be protected, and any bugs that break this barrier without the user's credentials should be fixed/prevented.

The root user should have absolute power to do anything. This is the basic ethos of Linux.

Taking away power from the user results in ios. I don't want Linux distros/systems to start behaving like ios.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by ksk on Thursday April 05, 2018 @04:45PM (#16768658)
>Root access should be protected, and any bugs that break this barrier without the user's credentials should be fixed/prevented.

>The root user should have absolute power to do anything. This is the basic ethos of Linux.

They're just splitting 'root' into two parts. No power has been taken away.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by emilyst on Thursday April 05, 2018 @03:37AM (#16762715)
> 1. I run a malware as root which modifies my image. I don't run anything as root except apt. So this is impossible.

1. What if apt is compromised?

2. What if apt installs something which is compromised?

3. What if you run something which is compromised and escalates privilege?

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by dingo_bat on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:08AM (#16763398)
> 1. What if apt is compromised?

Then fix it.

> 2. What if apt installs something which is compromised?

This implies apt is compromised. Goto above.

> 3. What if you run something which is compromised and escalates privilege?

If something is able to escalate privilege that's a kernel bug of the highest order and must be fixed asap.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by iknowstuff on Thursday April 05, 2018 @09:03AM (#16764478)
I'm guessing defense in depth is a foreign concept to you?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by tremon on Thursday April 05, 2018 @06:47AM (#16763583)
There are other ways to do that, e.g. by encrypting the disk and booting from usb key or sftp/https network sources.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by josteink on Thursday April 05, 2018 @09:06AM (#16764498)
But you don’t know if the OS you’re trying to boot and enter passwords into to decrypt has been tampered or not.

Not without Secure Boot.

Really... why would I as user not want it?

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by gmueckl on Thursday April 05, 2018 @09:29AM (#16764693)
Because almost no vendor wants to give you the keys to your system voluntarily. If secure boot puts the users in charge, I'm all for it. But there are forces at work to subvert the system to achieve a better vendor lock-in. And providing them with better means to that end is unethical.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by freeone3000 on Thursday April 05, 2018 @11:42AM (#16765893)
I've never been on a system where I couldn't swap the keys in UEFI. Does mokutil not work on your system?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by gmueckl on Thursday April 05, 2018 @02:22PM (#16767533)
You know that this feature only works because Microsoft added it to the requirements of the Windows Logo program for x86 based computers almost at the last minute. Mainboard manufacturers would otherwise cut corners and add the MS signing key as the only unchangeable key to the system.

At the same time, MS specified for ARM computers that want to run Windows that the key must be fixed and irreplaceable.

Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by tedunangst on Thursday April 05, 2018 @11:44AM (#16765930)
Go into the BIOS and set your own keys.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by gmueckl on Thursday April 05, 2018 @02:24PM (#16767551)
I can do that now. But who guarantees that my next mainboard still has that feature?
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by mjg59 on Thursday April 05, 2018 @02:35PM (#16767677)
Shim allows you to branch to an arbitrary additional root of trust
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by itakedrugs on Thursday April 05, 2018 @07:45AM (#16763853)
I wish that we would at least have the option to buy a new computer without it.
Re:Linux Kernel Lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot by paulmd on Thursday April 05, 2018 @12:15PM (#16766232)
You can't just go out and buy one, but there are millions of AMD Ryzen chips with a known flaw in their BIOS and PSP signature-validation routines just ripe for a PSP-Cleaner type application. Go forth and be fruitful.

https://community.amd.com/community/amd-corporate/blog/2018/...

https://blog.trailofbits.com/2018/03/15/amd-flaws-technical-...