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Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by eric_b on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:06PM (#16578258)
> Those devs are gonna be really surprised when they find out that unencrypted connections are routinely tampered with.

Except most big orgs now employ MitM tools like BlueCoat to sniff SSL connections too.

> You have not been paying attention to the hundreds of tools available to make HTTPS painless.

I have, and they don't. They make it easier, but you know what's truly painless? Hosting an html file over HTTP. What happens when Let's Encrypt is down for an extended period? What happens when someone compromises them?

> And real-world attacks that are reported over and over again.

Care to link to a few?

> The problem is that it's not YOUR security, it's other people's.

Oh, so you know better than me what kind of content is on my site? So a static site with my resume needs SSL then to protect the other users?

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by sydli on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @03:00PM (#16578791)
> Care to link a few?

From Friday, in which Turkey takes advantage of HTTP downloads to install spyware on YPG computers: https://citizenlab.ca/2018/03/bad-traffic-sandvines-packetlo...

From a couple months ago, where Comcast injects JavaScript into HTTP connections: http://forums.xfinity.com/t5/Customer-Service/Are-you-aware/...

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by mjmasn on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:45PM (#16578654)
> Oh, so you know better than me what kind of content is on my site? So a static site with my resume needs SSL then to protect the other users?

Without TLS how do YOU know that the user is receiving your static resume. Any MitM can tamper with the connection and replace your content with something malicious. With properly configured TLS that's simply not possible (with the exception you describe in corporate settings where BlueCoat's cert has to be added to the machine's trust store in order for that sniffing to be possible). Hopefully in the future even that wont be possible.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by mholt on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @03:05PM (#16578823)
And web servers can even detect TLS MITM: https://caddyserver.com/docs/mitm-detection
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by CaptSpify on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:44PM (#16578647)
> Oh, so you know better than me what kind of content is on my site?

The content of your site is irrelevant. We do know that your lack of concern for your user's safety is a problem though.

I also wish that managing certs was better, but until then, passing negative externalities to your users is pretty sleazy.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by Karunamon on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:56PM (#16578763)
Oh, so you know better than me what kind of content is on my site? So a static site with my resume needs SSL then to protect the other users?

Absolutely yes. Without that layer of security, anyone looking at your resume could either be served something that's not your resume (to your professional detriment) or more likely, the malware-of-the-week. (Also to your professional detriment).

Do you care for the general safety of web users? Secure your shit. If not for them, for your own career.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by mynameisvlad on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @07:09PM (#16580718)
So I've heard this argument countless times, and it completely makes sense from a theoretical perspective. Yes, it's very possible for MitM to happen, and that would cause one of the two scenarios you described.

But how likely is it to actually happen? For the former, someone would need to target both you and specifically the person who you think will view your resume, and that's, let's be honest, completely unlikely for most people. The second case I can see happening more in theory as it's less discriminating, but does it actually happen often enough in real life to the point where it's a real concern?

FWIW, I have HTTPS on all my websites (because, as everyone mentioned already, it's dead simple to add) including personal and internal, but I still question the probability of an attack on any of them actually happening.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by EtDybNuvCu on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @07:21PM (#16580781)
I have been MitM'd by my ISP, Comcast, multiple times. Their injection only works on HTTP without TLS.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by mynameisvlad on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @07:30PM (#16580847)
Sure, I've heard of the Xfinity MitMs which IIRC tracked users in some way. But would that realistically cause any "professional detriment" as expressed by the parent comment? Most users wouldn't even notice it's happening.

Basically, I see it this way:

- You can be MitMed broadly, like the Xfinity case, but the company in question can't really do anything crazy like inject viruses or do something that would cause the user to actually notice because then their ass is going to be on the line when it's exposed that Comcast installed viruses on millions of computers or stole everyone's data.

- Or you can be MitMed specifically, which will cause professional detriment, but would require someone to specifically target you and your users. And I don't see this as that likely for the average Joe.

Really, what I would like to know is: How realistic is it that I, as a site owner, will be adversely affected by the MitM that could theoretically happen to my users on HTTP?

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by Karunamon on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @09:45AM (#16584667)
As less and less content is served over HTTP, it becomes more and more realistic for an attacker to simply inject their garbage into every unencrypted connection that has a browser user agent in it.

Consider the websites you view every day.. most of them are probably HTTPS by now.

It's the wild west, basically. Regardless of how likely it is that someone is waiting for you to hit a HTTP site right now so they can screw with it, why even take that risk when the alternative is so easy?

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by mynameisvlad on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @04:07PM (#16587835)
> As less and less content is served over HTTP, it becomes more and more realistic for an attacker to simply inject their garbage into every unencrypted connection that has a browser user agent in it.

I've already covered the general case above. Anyone in a position to intercept HTTP communications like that (into every unencrypted connection) is in a position where if they intercept and do enough to materially harm me or my users through their act, then they will likely be discovered and the world will turn against them. They have far more to lose than to gain by doing something actively malicious that can be perceived by the user. So I don't realistically see it happening.

> Regardless of how likely it is that someone is waiting for you to hit a HTTP site right now so they can screw with it, why even take that risk when the alternative is so easy?

I already said I use HTTPS, so your advice isn't really warranted. I also specifically asked how likely it is, so you can't just "regardless" it away. I get that there's a theoretical risk, and I've already addressed it. But as a thought experiment, it is helpful to know how realistic the threat actually is. So far, I haven't really been convinced it actually is anything other than a theoretical attack vector.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by asdbffg on Thursday March 15, 2018 @04:54AM (#16591259)
You are making it sound like "injecting random garbage into HTTP" is some new hotness. It have been done since forever. By the way, — email still works that way. But Google and a couple of other corporations would not like you to trample their email-harvesting business, so there is disproportionately less FUD and fear-mongering being spread around email connections.

Internet providers have been injecting ads into websites for years. Hackers and government have been doing same to executables and other forms of unprotected payload.

Hashes, cryptographic signatures, executables signing, Content-Security-Policy, sub-resource integrity — numerous specifications have been created to address integrity of web. There is no indication, that those specifications failed (and in fact, they remain useful even after widespread adoption of HTTPS).

For the most part, integrity of modern web communication is already controlled even in absence of SSL. The only missing piece is somehow verifying integrity of initial HTML page.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by 0x0 on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:31PM (#16578538)
A lot of ISPs, some huge like the "XfinityWifi" SSID, routinely inject their own javascript in HTTP pages. Some even take no care to namespace their javascript and wreck a party on your window globals, too.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by peterwwillis on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @11:12PM (#16581991)
This could be solved without HTTPS. People choose not to for ideological reasons.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by Liquid_Fire on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @06:59AM (#16583775)
How would you solve it without HTTPS?
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by peterwwillis on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @10:23AM (#16584929)
By signing it.

"Injection" is the process of inserting content into the payload of a transport stream somewhere along its network path other than the origin. To prevent injection, you simply need to verify the contents of the payload are the same as they were at the origin. There are many ways to do this.

One method is a checksum. Simply provide a checksum of the payload in the header of the message. The browser would verify the checksum before rendering the page. However, if you can modify the payload, you could also modify this header.

The next method is to use a cryptographic signature. By signing the checksum, you can use a public key to verify the checksum was created by the origin. However, if the first transfer of the public key is not secure, an attacker can replace it with their own public key, making it impossible to tell if this is the origin's content.

One way to solve this is with PKI. If a client maintains a list of trusted certificate authorities, it can verify signed messages in a way that an attacker cannot circumvent by injection. Now we can verify not only that the payload has not changed, but also who signed it (which key, or certificate).

Note that this does not require a secure transport tunnel. Your payload is in the clear, and thus can be easily cached and proxied by any intermediary, but they can not change your data. So why don't we do this?

Simple: the people who have the most influence over these technologies do not want plaintext data on the network, even if its authenticity and integrity are assured. They value privacy over all else, to the point of detriment to users and organizations who would otherwise benefit from such capability.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by Liquid_Fire on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @11:54AM (#16585655)
And what happens when the content changes? Cacheability is not always a good thing. Your solution is vulnerable to replay attacks. You could be seeing an outdated version of a resource without knowing it. This is only acceptable for truly static content, which is becoming increasingly rare on the web.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by peterwwillis on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @12:21PM (#16585862)
This content should not change, or change very rarely. A bulk of the data on the web is media files and static resources. Until browsers started locking down 3rd party requests, handling these over HTTP was standard. Obviously it was a security problem, but it wouldn't have been with this alternate method.

However, it's not that hard to avoid replay after cache expires. HTTP sends the Date of the response along with Cache-Control instructions. If the headers are also signed they can also be verified by a client. If the client sees that the response has clearly expired, it can discard the document. As a more dirty hack it can also retry it with a new unique query string, or provide it as an HTTP header and token which must be returned in the response.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by 0x0 on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @09:09PM (#16589760)
Sounds like you just reinvented HTTPS with a null encryption cipher. I don't see how this makes anything easier or better.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by asdbffg on Thursday March 15, 2018 @01:47AM (#16590669)
I would love if null encryption ciphers actually worked in real life, but they don't (for the same reason why plaintext HTTP/2 does not — everyone disabled them under political pressure).

By the way, — signing is not equal to "null encryption". Signing can be done in advance, once. Signed data can be served via sendfile(). It does not incur CPU overhead on each request. Signing does not require communicating with untrusted parties using vulnerable SSL libraries (which can compromise your entire server).

As we speak, your SSL connection may be tampered with. Someone may be using a heardbleed-like vulnerability in the server or your browser (or both). You won't know about this, because you aren't personally auditing the binary data, that goes in and out of wire… Humorously enough, one needs to actively MITM and record connections to audit them. Plaintext data is easier to audit and reason about.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by tracker1 on Thursday March 15, 2018 @07:30PM (#16597413)
And how do you sign these requests? How do you get browsers to trust the signature? Oh, well, we already have a similar solution that also protects the entire connection from spying... it's called HTTPS.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by orf on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @02:48PM (#16578683)
It's like one apt package and one cronjob away. I think some acme clients even do the Cron handling for you. So, like one command. There is a really great acme client written in bash which is incredibly painless to set up.

Literally in the time you've spent thinking about and composing your reply you could have implemented free, secure TLS for your users.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by vbezhenar on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @06:52PM (#16580596)
It's not that easy if you don't want to run public http server. I had to write acme client myself because I didn't find a single one simple enough. I spent weeks doing that, comparing to 5 minutes issuing 3-year certificate from wosign when it was a thing. I hate that Google destroyed every free ssl certificate issuer and pushed their child to further dominate the world.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by niij on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @07:03PM (#16580678)
>wosign

Are you name dropping wosign just to be obtuse? They were untrusted because they were untrustworthy, not because Google just doesn't like them. https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an...

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by vbezhenar on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @09:42AM (#16584648)
I don't trust any US company, so it's not any more untrustworthy for me than DigiCert, for example. I'm dropping its name because they were offering free 3-year certificates and it was the best TLS experience I've ever had.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by niij on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @01:18PM (#16586432)
There's a lot of countries I don't trust to keep sensitive data in. But my point is that Wosign was provably untrustworthy, rather than speculation on government interference in other CAs. I saw from your Github that you live in Kazakhstan, I would remind you the government is less than trustworthy as well[0] in regards to digital privacy.

[0]: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/12/14/kazakhsta...

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by asdbffg on Thursday March 15, 2018 @02:00AM (#16590715)
I doubt, that any government is inherently more trustworthy than any other.

It just coincidentally happens, that US controls 100% of root CAs and Kazakhstan (most likely) controls 0. So the later needs more audacious measures, while former can just issue a gag order to Symantec (or whoever is currently active in market).

CA system is inherently vulnerable to government intervention. There is no point in considering defense against state agents in HTTPS vulnerability model. It is busted by default.

Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by stargrazer on Saturday March 17, 2018 @10:11AM (#16607001)
Maybe not 100%. Bermuda has a root CA: QuoVadis Global.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live by orf on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @07:21PM (#16580786)
https://github.com/Neilpang/acme.sh does exactly what you want.