Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
by vbezhenar on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @09:42AM
(#16584648)
I don't trust any US company, so it's not any more untrustworthy for me than DigiCert, for example. I'm dropping its name because they were offering free 3-year certificates and it was the best TLS experience I've ever had.
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Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
by niij on Wednesday March 14, 2018 @01:18PM
(#16586432)
There's a lot of countries I don't trust to keep sensitive data in. But my point is that Wosign was provably untrustworthy, rather than speculation on government interference in other CAs. I saw from your Github that you live in Kazakhstan, I would remind you the government is less than trustworthy as well[0] in regards to digital privacy.
[0]: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/12/14/kazakhsta...
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
by asdbffg on Thursday March 15, 2018 @02:00AM
(#16590715)
I doubt, that any government is inherently more trustworthy than any other.
It just coincidentally happens, that US controls 100% of root CAs and Kazakhstan (most likely) controls 0. So the later needs more audacious measures, while former can just issue a gag order to Symantec (or whoever is currently active in market).
CA system is inherently vulnerable to government intervention. There is no point in considering defense against state agents in HTTPS vulnerability model. It is busted by default.
Re:ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
by stargrazer on Saturday March 17, 2018 @10:11AM
(#16607001)
Maybe not 100%. Bermuda has a root CA: QuoVadis Global.