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Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by Joeri on Saturday January 13, 2018 @03:15PM (#16141123)
Realistically though, your real world choice is android or iOS. Either a product which is half closed (play services) from a company that makes 90% of its revenue from ads, or a product which is entirely closed from a company that makes all of its revenue from selling products directly to their customers. In theory you can get AOSP and be in control, but in practice that’s not practical for normal people.

My two cents: half closed is pretty much the same thing as fully closed from a trust perspective, and apple’s incentives are much less in conflict with user privacy than google’s.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by innagadadavida on Saturday January 13, 2018 @05:00PM (#16141660)
I wouldn’t touch Android with a 10ft pole - none of that open source stuff means anything when no human in earth has the time/money/competency to audit it.

I highly recommend an ad blocking VPN so rest of the apps hitting G ad network are blocked as well.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by Spooky23 on Saturday January 13, 2018 @05:29PM (#16141761)
Why do you trust the ad blocking vpn more than google?
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by madez on Sunday January 14, 2018 @01:37AM (#16143107)
Googles explicit goal is to collect data about you to make money with advertizing. It works so well, Google even gives you stuff for free so you stay with them.

A privacy oriented VPN providers explicit goal is to give you some privacy, and you pay them for it.

Sure, a VPN can turn on you, but then they bite the hand that feeds them. Also, it would contradict what they explicitly say, completely unlike the situation with Google.

A Debian developer might also try to bring a backdoored package to your machine. Is therefore trusting Debian and trusting Apple the same? They are not, as Debians structure is transparent, the developers carry individual responsibility not just towards the Debian project, but towards every body that can see it, i.e. the whole world.

The theoretical possibility of multiple things being equally bad is irrelevant as long as other significant aspects are ignored.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by innagadadavida on Sunday January 14, 2018 @11:35AM (#16144902)
Yeah it’s hard problem. Honestly, The small ad blocking company can sell you out to G too (as one of them did in the past).

I use Adblock VPN on iOS - it also has a dns proxy.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by SEJeff on Saturday January 13, 2018 @06:12PM (#16141901)
Like pi hole? https://pi-hole.net + a vpn
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by walterbell on Saturday January 13, 2018 @05:12PM (#16141715)
What's a good ad-blocking VPN?
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by ce4 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @03:14AM (#16143300)
On Android it's DNS66 [2] or NetGuard [1] (only the github version has hosts based blocking) for me. Both are open source and act as a fake vpn to intercept traffic locally on your device. No Cloud service needed.

[1] https://www.netguard.me/

[2] https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.jak_linux.dns66/

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by eropple on Sunday January 14, 2018 @02:25AM (#16143220)
I find Block This! to be pretty good on my Android devices. It's not actually a VPN--it's a fake VPN that just runs a host filter and dumps ad traffic.

They have a build on the web; I compiled my own off of their source, though, so can't vouch for that.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by nyolfen on Saturday January 13, 2018 @10:20PM (#16142661)
on ios, the ($3) app 'adblock' is a local vpn with domain-based adblocking rules -- in practice it's essentially an adblock hosts file, and doesn't take nearly as much battery
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by yumraj on Saturday January 13, 2018 @05:34PM (#16141784)
pi-hole, with openvpn. self-hosted. DigitalOcean has great guides, which work with any linux vps.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by haydenmk2 on Saturday January 13, 2018 @07:51PM (#16142274)
this kills the battery though
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by yumraj on Saturday January 13, 2018 @08:49PM (#16142401)
Does it? I've been using it on and off, on Android. I have set it to disconnect when screen is off. The impact on battery does not seem to be drastic, though it is difficult to do real side by side comparison. Another option is to only use it on demand, while browsing.

Is there any other option?

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by walterbell on Saturday January 13, 2018 @07:59PM (#16142295)
I wonder why. Storage disk encryption does not, neither does SSL. Why are VPNs using much more power on mobile?
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by joecool1029 on Saturday January 13, 2018 @09:57PM (#16142587)
>Why are VPNs using much more power on mobile?

It can leave connection open which prevents many cellular radio technologies from falling into lower power state.

Really depends on how optimized the cell modem is and how often keepalive packets are being sent by the VPN. Honestly, I haven't seen too much of a battery hit on ipsec VPN on the iphone SE. However, my older android phones used to get shredded on OpenVPN.

EDIT: If anyone's asking, I use the algo.sh script to deploy ipsec vpn on digitalocean (has option to enable adblocking too) https://github.com/trailofbits/algo.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by ce4 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @03:31AM (#16143337)
Wireguard should alleviate exactly that.

It's designed to not use persistent connections, keepalives may have to be enabled in case of nat traversals though (to enable incoming packets).

https://www.wireguard.com/quickstart/

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by bitmapbrother on Monday January 15, 2018 @02:17AM (#16149096)
What makes you think Android isn't audited besides insufficient knowledge on the subject? Wouldn't you think that the most popular OS in the world that has the top security researchers and companies combing through its source code trying to find vulnerabilities for over a decade would classify as being somewhat audited? I find it odd that you would not "touch Android with a 10ft pole" yet have no problem touching an OS that you, or a security researcher, can't audit the source code of. Security through obscurity doesn't work and your pole can't really help you when it bites you and it will.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by scarface74 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @12:03AM (#16142874)
or a product which is entirely closed from a company that makes all of its revenue from selling products directly to their customers.

How is Apple entirely closed?

https://opensource.apple.com

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by SXX on Sunday January 14, 2018 @04:23AM (#16143458)
You can't seriously tell iOS is not entirely closed just because they release source for two components under GPL. If they were able to stop using this GPL-ed close they certainly would.

Apple even stripped most of iOS related code for their MacOS open source drops. E.g they only recently started to release XNU source with code for iOS.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by scarface74 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @07:52AM (#16144057)
Two components? Darwin is a relatively big component.

But as far as Android.... https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/10/googles-iron-grip-on...

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by Joeri on Sunday January 14, 2018 @07:13AM (#16143941)
If you can’t install your own OS on a device, that’s a closed device.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by scarface74 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @09:12AM (#16144302)
So that includes Android? How useful is Android to the average user without the closed source bits Googke provides and the closed source drivers?
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Saturday January 13, 2018 @04:07PM (#16141408)
You don't have to use Play Services, and this is very easy to do. You can also use Play Services piecemeal. The choice really is between open or closed.

You can use Firefox as your default browser on Android but are limited to a bastardized version on iOS. You can run an OpenStreetMap app as your default map on Android, but you have no choice on iOS. You can build your own apps and run them indefinitely on Android, but you have to pay a $99 yearly fee (on top of the Mac tax) or rebuild every 7 days on iOS.

I don't recommend iOS to anybody. People who think it is more secure don't understand defense in depth, and people who think it is more private don't understand that Pixel and Android One builds actually collect less information by default (before opting in on any of the dialogs).

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by seba_dos1 on Saturday January 13, 2018 @04:13PM (#16141436)
Remember that there's microG - free Play Services reimplementation: https://microg.org/
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by Fnoord on Sunday January 14, 2018 @06:04AM (#16143743)
Yep, and LineageOS + microG [1]: "Access all the Google services without proprietary closed software"

[1] https://lineage.microg.org/

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by mcny on Sunday January 14, 2018 @06:03AM (#16143740)
I tried the lineage version: I can't even register for signal (a messaging app) with microg enabled. The only workaround is to disable microg, register signal, then enable microg.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by seba_dos1 on Monday January 15, 2018 @03:00PM (#16152958)
Check if you have enabled GCM. With microG, anything that requires calling home is opt-in.

If that's not it, report it. Every app I use works with microG, and any minor issues I had earlier were being resolved pretty quickly.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by mcny on Monday January 15, 2018 @04:16PM (#16153522)
I switched back to Lineage with open gapps but later I saw this https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/6895...
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by saagarjha on Saturday January 13, 2018 @10:51PM (#16142737)
> People who think it is more secure don't understand defense in depth, and people who think it is more private don't understand that Pixel and Android One builds actually collect less information by default (before opting in on any of the dialogs).

Source, please?

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Saturday January 13, 2018 @11:31PM (#16142812)
For one, orders of magnitude more iOS users have been infected by malware than users of Google or Amazon flavors of Android even though there are orders of magnitude more users of the latter. See Xcodeghost, which Apple had to rely on Twitter users to find instances of in their own App Store. Compare to Google and Amazon, which run static and dynamic analysis of apps uploaded to their stores and allow third party security research on their stores, enabling both earlier detection of malware and faster takedown of all apps that share the same malware.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by millstone on Sunday January 14, 2018 @02:56AM (#16143272)
This is dangerously misleading nonsense. Yes, XCodeGhost was bad for iOS in China, but Android malware in China is of a different class entirely: it often comes pre-installed in the firmware [1]. Furthermore Play Store isn't available in China, and the Android app stores available in China are overflowing with malware.

500 million is the number of devices which potentially had access to an app store containing apps that had malware. It's not the number actually infected. I mean, come on.

[1] https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-china-huawei-zte-...

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Sunday January 14, 2018 @04:48AM (#16143521)
> 500 million is the number of devices which potentially had access to an app store containing apps that had malware. It's not the number actually infected. I mean, come on.

From the article: "XcodeGhost potentially affects more than 500 million iOS users, primarily because messaging app WeChat is very popular in China and the Asia-Pacific region." After that article was published, Angry Birds 2 was also discovered to be infected.

Did you notice how I compared to Google and Amazon app stores? Those are the devices that HN readers would buy (those Chinese app store phones are not available for sale in the US), and they have vastly more users than the iTunes App Store yet in total infected devices can't come anywhere close to the toxic hellstew that is the App Store.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by saagarjha on Sunday January 14, 2018 @12:09AM (#16142895)
Again, source? Xcodeghost was one instance of limited impact.

> Compare to Google and Amazon, which run static and dynamic analysis of apps uploaded to their stores and allow third party security research on their stores, enabling both earlier detection of malware and faster takedown of all apps that share the same malware.

You're assuming that Apple doesn't do this?

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Sunday January 14, 2018 @12:51AM (#16142994)
> Again, source? Xcodeghost was one instance of limited impact.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.macrumors.com/2015/09/20/xc... shows 500 million infected from 50 apps.

> You're assuming that Apple doesn't do this?

No need to assume. https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/more-det... not only shows that there were thousands more apps affected by Xcodeghost than originally reported (and thus, more infected users than the approximately 500 million estimate from the earlier link based on the original 50 apps), but also that Apple was still taking down affected apps days later, waiting for third parties to report them. This despite that Xcodeghost represents a single malware that can be detected with a binary grep. That Apple didn't have the infrastructure to deal with even that demonstrates how woefully inadequate their app management infrastructure is for dealing with malware.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by saagarjha on Sunday January 14, 2018 @01:08AM (#16143040)
> waiting for third parties to report them

Where does the link say this? As far as I know Apple has all the information needed to make this decision themselves. As you said, a binary grep, coupled with many of Apple's static/dynamic analysis tools should be enough to find this issue.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Sunday January 14, 2018 @02:14AM (#16143194)
> Where does the link say this?

"Starting September 18, Apple began to remove some iOS apps infected by XcodeGhost from its App Store.... As of this writing, on Monday, September 21, we notice that there are still some previously known infected iOS apps available in App Store."

> As you said, a binary grep, coupled with many of Apple's static/dynamic analysis tools should be enough to find this issue.

As I said, it should be so simple if Apple had set up the basic infrastructure for this. Since it had not, Xcodeghost remained on the App Store long after it was initially discovered, allowing researchers to find thousands more affected apps. Compare to Google's Play Store which not only performs static analysis but also crash analysis, battery usage analysis, and dynamic analysis through running the apps in cloud VMs (something Amazon did at launch).

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by scarface74 on Sunday January 14, 2018 @12:05AM (#16142878)
Source?
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by millstone on Sunday January 14, 2018 @02:24AM (#16143218)
Is it actually easy to avoid using Play Services on Android? The ways I've seen this done before requires rooting your Android phone, which is sketchy at best, and often cannot be done at all.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Sunday January 14, 2018 @02:45AM (#16143249)
Don't log into a Google account on the phone. Done.
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by tpush on Saturday January 13, 2018 @08:03PM (#16142297)
I don't understand why you are downvoted. The relative openness of Android is the reason something like GNU's Replicant, LineageOS or CopperheadOS (all without Google software) is possible in the first place.

To see proprietary and incredibly locked-down devices such as iPhones advocated for so strongly seems so weird. As if openness and security are at odds or something.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by lern_too_spel on Saturday January 13, 2018 @09:15PM (#16142468)
Apple's draconian policies for controlling coverage of its products clearly work if even otherwise tech-savvy people like the HN crowd are fooled.

https://www.google.com/amp/amp.timeinc.net/fortune/2015/07/2...

https://www.google.com/amp/s/9to5mac.com/2014/08/29/seeing-t...

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by smichel17 on Saturday January 13, 2018 @11:04PM (#16142765)
Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by alsetmusic on Saturday January 13, 2018 @07:03PM (#16142105)
Though an iOS user myself, I was on board with the logic of your comment until this point:

> … or rebuild every 7 days on iOS.

By tossing in a flippant remark, you undermine the legitimacy of the other arguments. I don’t think a reasonable person would conclude that you actually believe the above statement to be true. This type of rhetoric, in which reality is knowingly distorted to make a point, may be less effective than you consider it to be.

Re:iOS 11 Security [pdf] by comex on Saturday January 13, 2018 @07:25PM (#16142195)
No, you literally have to rebuild/reinstall your apps every 7 days, if you're on a free developer account, because the provisioning profile expires.